India lacks a stand-alone concept for littoral manoeuvre warfare. This absence may have been inconspicuous until recently. Of course, Indian maritime strategy emphasises the importance of “littoral regions” in its illustration of sea-control and -denial operations. At the same time, the joint doctrine for amphibious operations identifies the key warfighting elements for littoral tasks. However, manoeuvre in that domain, i.e. using the land to affect the sea, remains poorly articulated.

Today, this absence is a problem. The modern battlespace is highly transparent, fast-paced, and attritional, as ongoing conflicts attest. In the Black Sea, a small conventional force denies the advance of a much larger one using unmanned and remote platforms. In the Red Sea, a mobile non-state force disrupts global sea lanes of communication using precision land-based strikes. As such, conventional notions of operational victory through amassed units and territorial control no longer hold.

Some countries already have or are developing their own concept of littoral manoeuvre warfare in response. Many are adapting lessons from these conflicts to do the same. In fact, the Chinese are also considering a littoral manoeuvre warfare concept in response to the changing posture of American forces in the Western Pacific, further validating the need for one. India must do the same: develop a concept for littoral manoeuvre warfare.  

India’s joint warfighting doctrine already has the elements needed for littoral tasks. This includes sea-to-shore insertions and coastal defence batteries, to name a few. The armed forces are also actively pursuing next-generation capabilities such as massed area-denial, precision stand-off, unmanned teaming, and forward-operating platforms and units.

However, Indian operations in the littoral today can be characterised as unidirectional or focused only on sea-to-land effects. This means using sea-based land capabilities in a non-expeditionary role. This joint force will embark, fight on, and retake island and coastal territories under the adversary’s control. The battle is thus static; think Operation Beaver in 1971. This frames the joint force as a concentrated mass. One that remains outside the adversary’s range, waits for the right battlefield conditions, relies on defensive fires, and uses fewer points of supply, near mutual support.

What is needed are Indian littoral operations that are multidirectional or also focused on land-to-sea effects. This means using sea-based land capabilities in an expeditionary role. This joint force will move across the island and coastal territories to engage, fight against, and contest the adversary at sea. The battle is dynamic: though not a perfect example, think Operation Pawan in 1987. This frames the joint force as a dispersed surge. It operates inside the adversary’s range, builds the right battlefield conditions, relies on offensive fires, and uses several points of supply, away from mutual support.  

Put simply, all amphibious operations are littoral manoeuvres, but not necessarily the other way around. The key distinction is in the scope and direction of the operation. In the latter, the joint force does move ashore, but in a far more distributed, mobile, and lethal manner, and more importantly turns its insertion and denial capabilities back towards the sea. Amphibious operations can thus be classified as conventional; something that has been done by armies for millennia. Littoral manoeuvre is a relatively newer concept, a product of multi-domain and combined arms warfare.

As such, current Indian littoral warfare capabilities are about deterrence and defence, not manoeuvre. Seaward operations from the littoral remain staggered and siloised. Coastal batteries defend the homeland and not the joint force. Island spaces serve as strategic outposts and not kill boxes. And the at-sea naval formation functions as a brute yet vulnerable implement.

The irony is that Indian military leadership acknowledges these gaps. The amphibious doctrine concedes that the kind of large-scale conventional operations it describes are no longer feasible in the modern battlespace. And the maritime strategy identifies the need for obscured forces to inhibit the adversary’s freedom of action. In another twist, India seems to be exporting the idea to other countries. The Philippines’s interest in the BrahMos system is specifically for the sort of mobile, archipelagic, stand-in capability India needs. Yet, ‘littoral manoeuvre warfare’ as a distinct concept of war remains absent from Indian operational art.

Developing such a concept (and force), along these lines, would greatly sharpen India’s existing naval edge in the Indian Ocean. One, it would channel the need for joint capabilities across the armed services more effectively. Two, it would better protect India’s growing blue-water force in continental seas. And three, it would enhance India’s sea-denial and -control posture across its island chains.

Littoral manoeuvre is the only true multi-domain warfare (sea, air, and land) and demands the greatest coordination among the armed services. Such a concept of warfare would help test the effectiveness of the armed forces’ restructuring and modernisation initiatives through joint commands and stand-in formations. It would offer a useful operational template for examining how the joint force’s command-and-control mechanisms and fast-reacting drone and armoured divisions operate.

At the same time, the armed forces are integrating unmanned and autonomous platforms into these new formations. Employed in a littoral manoeuvre force, such platforms become immensely critical in both specialised offensive and screening defensive roles during high-intensity conventional conflicts. Organised this way, these platforms can be used in peacetime to protect the blue-water force at sea, as well as sea-lanes of communication as needed.

Finally, and most impactfully, India already has the strategic depth to conduct offensive operations along its island chains. As India seeks to maintain its ability to shape key areas of ingress and egress in the Indian Ocean, the flexibility and mobility of a littoral manoeuvre force would offer a considerable advantage. A network of dispersed, expeditionary sensor-shooters along the Andaman and Laccadive Seas would make the region a gauntlet for any adversary—especially those from the east.

The armed forces are acquiring littoral manoeuvre warfare capabilities. But it does not have a solid, stand-alone concept in place to leverage them. This gap is potentially dangerous in Indian doctrine. One caveat is that littoral manoeuvre warfare remains a matter of debate within the forces instituting the concept. That, however, does not preclude the armed forces from engaging in a similar exercise.

The Integrated Defence Staff, already on a run of various joint warfare doctrines, must write one on littoral maneouvre warfare into existence. And the force, like its amphibious subsidiary, must be stood up as soon as the theatre commands are restructured.

Siddharth Anil Nair is Research Associate with the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.