Three German states went to the polls in September, and in two of them, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged as the largest party. AfD’s surge—from second place in last year’s federal elections to now being first in the two states—raises the question of how long before it joins the German governing mainstream. AfD has also consistently led Germany’s weekly polls, clocking 28-30 per cent, and ahead of the second-place CDU by 7-10 per cent.

These results and numbers demand a conversation about what an AfD-led or AfD-included government would look like. While the party’s domestic policy has been widely tracked, its foreign policy has received comparatively less scrutiny. This piece tries to understand AfD’s foreign policy, and what, if anything, it means for India’s ties with Germany and the EU.

Understanding AfD’s Foreign Policy Thinking

Ulrich Sigmund, AfD’s lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, where the party won, was quoted as saying, “We see American interests, we see Russian interests, but we have our own interest, namely the German interest.” This suggests that the party’s foreign policy model centres on a ‘nation-first’ approach and sits outside the traditional German foreign policy model of consensus. Mainstream German parties have viewed Russia as a major security threat and the US as an important security partner. The AfD is trying to show flexibility without permanently allying with either Russia or the US. Conversely, AfD is known to have a soft corner for the former, to the extent of having been accused of spying on behalf of Russia. It has also held the most consistent positions on dealing with Moscow: not condemning the Russian aggression in Ukraine in its manifesto; opposing German arms transfers to Ukraine; and repeated calls to restore the Nord Stream; amongst others.

With Washington, AfD seems to distinguish between a Washington with Trump and one without. The AfD has been called “an anti-American party.” Its overall view of the US rests on two distinct grounds. The first is domestic. AfD views Germany as lacking sovereignty because it is bound to American directives. This is compounded by the AfD’s rejection of multiculturalism and immigration, which it sees as being championed by the US earlier. The second is geopolitical. AfD sees multipolarity as several equal powers enforcing their ideas of law and order in their respective regions. It casts the US as ‘raumfremd’ (territorially alien to Europe) and views Russia as a natural partner in the European sphere. AfD’s structural anti-Americanism differs from its positive outlook towards Trump’s America, whose movement it has courted directly since 2016. This includes its co-leader Alice Weidel congratulating Trump in 2024 even before his own victory speech. The party views Trump as an ideological and perhaps a civilisational ally, thus pursuing a dual America policy, one of which may have an end date.

AfD balancing towards Moscow while selectively embracing Trump’s Washington resembles a form of multi-alignment, while also suggesting that the party lacks a single coherent doctrine, with several ideas and pathways seemingly under active internal contestation. Consider the contrasting stances of AfD's co-leaders, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, when four AfD legislators were reportedly planning to attend a Europe-BRICS gathering on Russia’s Black Sea coast in Sochi. Weidel urged the legislators to keep a low profile, while Chrupalla defended the trip and said that he did not view Russia as a threat to Germany. This extends to a broader factional pattern within the party. AfD’s eastern faction favours a fundamental reorientation toward Moscow while its western faction favours a more tactical ‘Germany-first’ policy that keeps formal structures like NATO intact.

However, this internal contestation seems absent from the party’s China policy. Weidel has emerged as something of a cult figure on Chinese social media platforms. Chrupalla, meanwhile, visited China earlier this year and advocated for warmer relations, while accusing the German government of waging an “economic war” for proposing a tougher trade policy toward Beijing. Previously, reports have also accused AfD’s European election candidate, Maximilian Krah, of receiving financial backing from Beijing.

German mainstream politics has generally maintained a moderate stance on its relationship with China, based on economic cooperation. The equation has evolved from a strategic partnership to systemic competition, and now to de-risking as the economic relationship becomes increasingly uneven. An AfD that once rejected the EU and which favours a European security architecture independent of NATO will find a ready partner in China.

What It Means For India

AfD’s stated policy on India can be understood from its 2024 parliamentary group application, which advocated that Germany adopt India's foreign policy approach "as a model" and strive for a "comprehensive German-Indian partnership." Beyond this, it is useful to assess an AfD-India approach through the party’s two most settled instincts on China and Russia.

Germany’s stated attempt at de-risking from China has turned its ‘Focus on India’ into a substantial hedge against Beijing. Chancellor Merz's visit to New Delhi before going to Beijing is a small but meaningful optics play on that front. Officials in Berlin have explicitly framed New Delhi as central to reducing Germany’s critical supply chain dependencies, and in recent years, the two countries have signed agreements on critical minerals, semiconductors, and more. AfD’s China policy enjoys intra-party consensus representing a stronger pull towards Beijing. This can potentially weaken the strategic logic of de-risking that has fuelled Germany’s existing focus on India.

Conversely, Moscow can be a strong rallying point between the AfD and India. India’s ties with Russia, especially its oil purchases, have been a recurring point of contention with Germany and the EU. An AfD-led or influenced Germany may not outrightly withdraw support from Ukraine but it will definitely continue to be sceptical of it, and advocate for normalising ties with Moscow. This would then make India’s Russia posture less objectionable than it is currently.

AfD’s foreign policy is an unresolved argument between an Atlanticist viewpoint and a Eurasian one, held together by nationalistic priority. The party remains excluded from government, so none of its stated positions constitute policy just yet. But its growing electoral weight has been visible in certain choices made by mainstream parties in Germany, whether on Ukraine or migration. How AfD’s internal argument settles between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, and to what extent, could shape German foreign policy if the party becomes part of the governing mainstream in the future. For New Delhi, an appropriate approach would be to track AfD’s growth while focusing on this divide, rather than forecasting a single outcome.

Ashutosh Nagda is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS).