On 30 March 2026, Home Minister Amit Shah announced in Parliament that “India is now Naxal-free.” Days later, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) formally communicated to nine states that no district in the country falls under the Left Wing Extremism-affected (LWE) category anymore. It was the first such declaration in over five decades. Once spread across states in central and eastern India, also called the ‘Red Corridor’, the Naxalite movement has witnessed a sharp decline in both operational capacity and territorial presence. The numbers are striking. According to data released by the Home Affairs ministry, Naxal-affected districts fell from 126 in 2014 to zero by early 2026. Violent incidents by LWE in the country dropped to 374 in 2024 from 1936 in 2010, a reduction of 81 per cent. In 2025 alone, nearly 2,000 Naxalites surrendered.

The decline of LWE in India can largely be credited to the state’s combined strategy of aggressive security operations, investment in rehabilitation programmes, and infrastructure development. However, the declaration raises a larger question: does the suppression of the insurgency necessarily imply its resolution? While the state claims to have succeeded in dismantling the Naxalite movement and its military capabilities, the challenge now lies in ensuring that the conditions that enabled the insurgency in the first place do not persist. Preventing a resurgence is the key challenge.

Governance beyond Security

Historically, Maoist ideology expanded in areas with weak state presence, limited public services, and systemic neglect of tribal land and forest rights. While security operations have restored control and weakened insurgent networks, the long-term challenge is in ensuring effective and sustainable governance in these regions. Official data from Chhattisgarh reveals that nearly a third of the state's population remains illiterate, with former Maoist-affected districts continuing to perform poorly on literacy targets. Several government initiatives are underway to address these gaps. Since 2019, 255 Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) have been sanctioned in LWE-affected areas, though only 178 are currently functional. Financial inclusion has also expanded, with over 1,007 bank branches and 937 ATMs made operational across the 30 most LWE-affected districts.

Such steps are welcome, but sustained access to healthcare, education, and welfare schemes, alongside functional mechanisms to address regional grievances, will be necessary to build lasting trust between local communities and government institutions. This is particularly important as in many former ‘red-zone’ districts, Maoists derived support by exploiting governance failures and local dissatisfaction with the state. If development initiatives lose momentum after the declaration of victory, the state risks recreating the conditions the insurgent groups have utilised in the past. Therefore, the focus must shift from expanding state presence to improving the quality of governance.

Tribal Rights and Inclusive Development

A second challenge to be addressed concerns the development of tribal communities while ensuring the protection of their rights. Many regions previously affected by LWE are home to large tribal populations. Their communities have faced decades of neglect and hurdles in accessing their ancestral land and forest rights.

The Forest Rights Act (FRA) and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) were intended to provide tribal communities greater control over local resources and decision-making. However, implementation has remained poor and uneven. Delays in recognising forest rights and limited participation of Gram Sabhas in matters of land acquisition and development projects continue to pose challenges in the region. The Forest Conservation Amendment Act (2023) has compounded these failures rather than addressed them. It narrows the legal definition of ‘forest’, removing protections from vast areas of unclassified forest land that tribal communities have historically depended on for their livelihoods. By effectively bypassing the Gram Sabha, it allows the state to approve projects before local consent is obtained. The amendment is currently under challenge in the Supreme Court.

To sustain long-term peace and stability, local communities must have meaningful participation in development projects rather than merely being recipients of them. Inclusive development with tribal rights in mind is more likely to strengthen state legitimacy and reduce the appeal of future mobilisation.

Reintegration and Prevention of Resurgence

The government has significantly invested in rehabilitation programs for surrendered Naxalites. Recent initiatives such as Puna Margham and Lon Varratu in the Bastar and Dantewada districts of Chhattisgarh have sought to facilitate the reintegration of former insurgents through employment opportunities, skill training, and community engagement. Operation Nai Disha by the Jharkhand government consists of a surrender framework that offers lucrative cash incentives to top-ranking Maoists alongside other rehabilitation perks. These programmes represent an important acknowledgement that long-term peace requires not only military success, but also social reintegration.

The recruitment of surrendered Maoists into forces such as the District Reserve Guard (DRG) demonstrates the state's willingness to use local knowledge and expertise in maintaining security in the region. However, concerns remain about the conditions under which rehabilitation is being carried out. The Chhattisgarh 2025 rehabilitation policy offers rewards for Maoists “dead or alive.” It is an incentive structure that risks encouraging killings and the misidentification of civilians as wanted insurgents. There is no prior public list of ‘wanted Maoists’ against which such claims can be verified. The Campaign for Peace and Justice in Chhattisgarh (CPJC) has documented a sharp rise in the average number of people killed per encounter—from 0.29 in 2023 to 1.79 in 2024–raising concerns that ‘eliminations’ were preferred over arrests or surrenders.

Previously, one of the state’s counter-insurgency strategies, the Salwa Judum, also raised serious human rights concerns. It was a state-sponsored civil militia and vigilante movement active between 2005 and 2011. It was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 2011, following documented cases of killings, abuse, displacement, and violence against tribal communities. The state must remain mindful of this history as it consolidates its gains and ensure the protection of human rights going forward.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the declaration of a ‘Naxal-free’ India should be viewed not only as the culmination of a state’s efforts but also as the beginning of a new phase. Independent databases such as the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) continue to record encounters, arrests, and surrenders even after the government’s March declaration. Claims of complete ‘eradication’ are therefore better understood as reflecting the decline of the insurgency rather than its total elimination. Whether this achievement can be sustained depends on the state’s ability to address governance gaps, improve the protection and implementation of tribal rights, and ensure that development reaches the communities that have historically remained at the margins.

Rishika Choudhary is a Research Intern with IPCS’ Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS).