The 11th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) took place in rather challenging circumstances from 27 April-22 May 2026. Much before the delegates convened in New York, it was feared that the Conference wouldn’t be able to generate a final consensus outcome document. The Conference Chair, Ambassador Do Hung Viet, tried hard to prove the sceptics wrong by preparing a first draft early in the Conference. He patiently circulated four iterations in trying to build bridges and accommodate disparate positions, though he found each round of changes leading to more dilution of language and acceptance of omissions of several critical issues to buy concurrence. And yet, there were still issues of divergence as time ran out on 22 May 2026. Finally, he decided not to table the document. In his closing press conference, he stated “I understood that there was no consensus, and I decided not to put the draft outcome document for a decision to be made."  

NPT watchers and the media, especially in the US and Europe, were quick to place the blame for the absence of the consensus outcome document on Iran. After all, it was the one paragraph of the document that became the point of contention between the US delegation and Iran. The former insisted on mentioning Iran by name, which was obviously not acceptable to Iran. The US wanted the text that underscored the importance of compliance by States Parties with the Treaty’s non-proliferation obligations to also make a reference to Iran’s non-compliance. The paragraph, therefore, called for “a prompt return to compliance through the full, timely and effective implementation of safeguards obligations, and emphasize, in this context, that Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” Iran wasn’t ready to accept its name being mentioned in the context of non-compliance. Rather, it wanted the final document to strictly condemn military attacks on safeguarded, peaceful nuclear facilities, calling them a violation of international law and UN Charter Article 2(4). Consensus couldn’t be achieved.

Given that the RevCon took place as a fragile ceasefire held the war in West Asia, it wasn’t surprising that a frosty atmosphere between the US and Iran cast a shadow on discussions. In fact, the tone of acrimony was visible right at the start, when the US objected to Iran's nomination by the 120 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement as one of the 35 conference vice presidents. The position is only ceremonial with no executive authority. But it brings visibility, prestige, and a seat within the conference leadership structure. The US criticised this move as an affront to the NPT since a violator of the treaty was being accorded this role.

Interestingly, Iran didn’t shy away from asserting its position on relevant issues at the RevCon. A high-level delegation led by the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, Reza Najafi, brought technical, legal, and nuclear-relevant knowledge to the table. Recognising the high-stakes involved for its reputation and positions, the Iranian delegation came well-prepared to navigate the scrutiny it expected over its uranium stockpiles.  

Iran also presented several working papers on issues it has consistently raised at the NPT in the past, and actively took part in the discussions. Seeking to showcase itself as a victim of “illegal military attacks on IAEA safeguarded nuclear facilities,” it used these attacks to highlight "double standards," arguing that nuclear-armed states were violating the IAEA’s safety principles. Iran was referring to the IAEA Director General's Seven Indispensable Pillars for nuclear safety during armed conflict, and the Five Concrete Principles for Zaporizhzhia. Reference to the paragraph on these principles, however, was eventually deleted from the text of the draft document over its four iterations.

Amongst the working papers that Iran presented were those seeking provisions for negative security assurances, disarmament, conclusion of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The last issue has long been central for Iran. Its Working Paper titled, “The inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and realization of Article IV” argued Article IV, which grants non-nuclear-weapon states the right to peaceful nuclear technology, doesn’t preclude uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of plutonium for non-military reasons. Tehran used this framework to defend its stockpiles of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium (HEU), claiming enrichment to be an inherent sovereign right, and not a "privilege" granted by Western powers. The Iranian interpretation, therefore, has been that it has the right to enrich as a member of the NPT. On this it has the broad support of the NAM and Global South countries. The US and its European allies counter that the NPT doesn’t endorse or guarantee a right to HEU if a country is in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards since uranium enriched to 60 per cent has no credible, conceivable civilian justification.

The friction on this point is created by an ambiguity in the text of the NPT since Article IV explicitly extends the right to peaceful nuclear energy, but it neither explicitly endorses nor prohibits uranium enrichment by a country. This creates room for varying interpretations of whether countries have the right to develop the full fuel cycle or not. As more countries move towards nuclear power programmes, driven by energy security and climate change considerations, it may become necessary for the NPT States Parties to accept a position on it, though fractious political relations will make it difficult to do so.

China supported Iran’s position seeking condemnation of US and Israeli attacks on its nuclear facilities in June 2025, and on other targets in the country from 28 February 2026. Beijing supported Iran's arguments regarding the double standards of Western counterproliferation and backed the position that country-specific targeting in the final draft was counterproductive to achieving consensus. On the issue of double standards, Iran had the backing of Arab nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) members. Meanwhile, Moscow, too, publicly defended Tehran and blamed the US’ “hardline stance” and lack of flexibility for the deadlock at the RevCon. It may be recalled that at the last RevCon in 2022, Russia had objected to the statement in the draft final document that expressed "grave concern" over military activities near Zaporizhzhia and stressed the "paramount importance of ensuring control by Ukraine's competent authorities."

The tendency to blame a particular country for the inability of the NPT’s 191 States Parties to muster consensus on issues of importance, including the final document, is not a helpful depiction of RevCon proceedings. Member states may assuage themselves by doing so, but there is a widespread understanding that the issues that create stalemates at the NPT run far deeper. There are serious structural problems that create frustrations between the NWS and NNWS, the primary one being between how to prioritise non-proliferation and disarmament. This will need some serious fixing at the forthcoming preparatory committee meetings prior to the next RevCon in 2031.

Dr. Manpreet Sethi is Distinguished Fellow, CAPSS, and Senior Research Advisor, APLN.