As Bangladesh prepares for its political transition under the newly elected Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman, following nearly eighteen months of being led by an unelected interim government, early signs point to a potential recalibration of Dhaka’s foreign policy priorities, including its engagement with India. Domestic political shifts in Bangladesh have historically shaped the trajectory of its relations with India, alternating between close cooperation and periods of mistrust, often in a reflection of the dominant political ideology in Dhaka.

Bangladesh’s transition to a new political dispensation has injected some hope in expectations of the future of India-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi is likely to proceed cautiously, mindful of the BNP’s contentious history with India and the complex legacy of the interim administration led by Dr Muhammad Yunus. What might Dhaka do? What can be read from the BNP’s earlier tenures? And what immediate challenges is the Rahman government likely to face in a relationship reset with India?

BNP’s Past Outlooks on India

The first setback in bilateral relations came under General Ziaur Rahman, founder of BNP and the former president of Bangladesh, who called the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace “unequal,” and distanced Bangladesh from the Awami League’s India-centric foreign policy approach. During the BNP’s subsequent tenure in 1991–1996, diplomatic friction further intensified.

The BNP–Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) coalition government’s tenure (2001–2006) is widely considered as the worst phase in New Delhi-Dhaka relations, mainly due to the security challenges the former faced during that period. India’s strategic interests in Bangladesh are intertwined with the security and stability of its northeastern states and West Bengal. During the BNP-JeI years, New Delhi repeatedly raised concerns about Dhaka providing refuge to northeastern insurgent leaders and allowing Pakistan-linked militant organisations to use Bangladeshi territory as a transit corridor to carry out acts of terrorism and other subversive activities in India.

In addition, India alleged that the then Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia had close links with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, to the extent of apparently receiving money  from them ahead of the 1991 parliamentary elections. Under her leadership, BNP cultivated a Pakistan-friendly posture at home and abroad, and simultaneously diversified strategic ties with China, while labelling Indian initiatives as hegemonic and unequal. BNP’s closeness to Pakistan and China was also a concern for India, as the BNP-JeI-Pakistan-China connection not only amplified Indian security concerns, but also undermined New Delhi’s strategic position in the region.

In the current context, a factor that could work in India’s favour is that the JeI is not part of the government this time. The JeI was believed to have exacerbated security concerns during its coalition years with BNP; it also managed to retain control in Bangladesh during the recent phase of strained bilateral ties. Its absence from government therefore creates more scope for dialogue between India and Bangladesh. This hypothesis will soon be put to test when the Indian border states of Assam and West Bengal go to the polls in March and April 2026. It could be reasonable to anticipate political mobilisation around identity, migration, or minority issues in the nearly forty constituencies along the India-Bangladesh border where JeI has electoral influence. This is in addition to its past record of heightening security concerns in India, which could together have repercussions in and for India.

Immediate Challenges for the BNP Government

Following the BNP era, India found a partner in the Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina. Over the course of her 15-year tenure, both sides made great strides to mend and build relations. Relations however deteriorated sharply in 2024 following Hasina’s ouster from office and subsequent refuge in India, and amid rising anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.

Dr Yunus’ criticism of New Delhi, particularly on India granting refuge to Sheikh Hasina, and his outreach to Islamabad; attacks on minorities in Bangladesh; and the death of student leader Sharif Osman Hadi deepened bilateral tensions, leading to diplomatic protests and reciprocal visa suspensions. Tensions even spilled into the sporting arena, marked by cricketer Mustafizur Rahman’s removal from the Indian Premier League and Bangladesh’s exit from the 2026 T20 World Cup hosted by India.

Several decisions and statements made by Yunus during this period were construed as direct attacks on India’s strategic interests. The release from prison of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) leader and al Qaeda supporter, Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani, is believed to have security implications for India. The Yunus administration’s decision to acquire JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Islamabad, jointly manufactured by China and Pakistan, is perceived as a matter of concern in India due to its indication of closer defence ties between Dhaka and Islamabad. During his visit to China, Yunus urged Beijing to establish an economic foothold in Bangladesh and linked it to the country’s strategic access to India’s northeast. He also welcomed Beijing’s interest in a USD 1 billion Teesta River project, which raises strategic security concerns for India given the project's proximity to the Siliguri Corridor.

Conclusion

From an Indian foreign policy perspective, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman faces the complex task of navigating the BNP’s negative impact on relations with India as well as the damage done during the Yunus administration. To overcome these past challenges, the BNP will likely initiate trust-building through sustained engagement with New Delhi. Efforts in this regard have already begun.

On his first day in office, Foreign Minister Dr. Khalilur Rahman emphasised the government’s desire to maintaining good, mutually beneficial relations with all countries, especially its neighbours. He affirmed that efforts would be made to resolve all issues as well as stagnation in ties. This stated commitment offers India cautious optimism about the possibility of its strategic security issues being addressed.

With the aim of resetting relations with India, the new government in Dhaka has already taken steps to distance itself from the decisions or the outlook of the Yunus administration. Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar’s visit in December 2025 for former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s funeral, the invitation to Prime Minister Modi for the Prime Minister Rahman’s oath-taking ceremony, and statements from BNP officials collectively signal an intent to stabilise and mend ties with New Delhi.

Prerana Priyadarshi is Deputy Director (Projects), and Senior Researcher at IPCS.