Malé, the capital of the Maldives, witnessed a large ‘Lootuvaifi’ (‘Stop the Looting’) rally on 3 October 2025. This was the biggest public demonstration against President Mohamed Muizzu since his election. The opposition Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) issued five key demands during the rally. Strikingly, none addressed the protection of the country’s hydrographic information and maritime data. This omission comes against the backdrop of China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean. Despite President Muizzu’s commitment to the Maldives mapping its own waters, his government has signed opaque agreements with China for hydrographic mapping, and allowed China’s dual-use research vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 03, to dock in Malé. These developments introduce new uncertainties regarding Beijing’s intentions, and raise serious questions about the Maldives’ maritime sovereignty.

Hydrography and Strategic Cartography

Hydrography has emerged as an important instrument in Indian Ocean geopolitics. Whoever has greater control over oceanic data can wield it to their geopolitical advantage. For smaller states like the Maldives, hydrography thus is both a development and a security issue. For context, hydrography is the science of measuring and describing the physical features of oceans, seas, coastal areas, and the seabed. Though it may seem benign, its use goes beyond mapping. Hydrographic data, as per the International Hydrographic Organisation, is a foundational asset for maritime governance and state rights. It involves collecting and analysing data on water depths, tides, currents, and shorelines, physical features such as seabed compositions, and underwater obstructions, to describe and predict changes over a period of time.

Hydrography supports essential civilian uses, including safe navigation, resource management, infrastructure planning, disaster prediction, and scientific research. It is also a dual-use technology with significant military applications in strategic planning, battlefield operations, maritime domain awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and equipment testing. Hydrography provides the data for strategic cartography, where maps become tools of influence, surveillance, leverage, and territorial control. The UK’s post-1982 hydrographic activities in the Falklands, China’s use of cartography to legitimise claims in the South China Sea, and the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations to contest Chinese claims all illustrate how mapping functions as a tool of maritime power.

Maldives’ Pursuit of Hydrographic Autonomy      

With 1,192 islands, a total land area of 298 sq km, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spanning 900,000 sq km, the Maldives faces a strategic cartography challenge in mapping the entirety of its EEZ. After cancelling its 2024 hydrographic cooperation agreement with India, President Muizzu announced that the Maldives would conduct its own surveys to safeguard marine data. However, debts ranging from US$ 557 million in 2025 and over US$ 1 billion in 2026 complicate the Maldives’ ability to import the necessary hardware and software for this exercise.

The now-terminated India-Maldives agreement had enabled the Maldives to gain capacity-building, technical training, and to conduct hydrographic surveys under the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) leadership. The decision to end the agreement stemmed from Muizzu’s ‘Maldives First’ policy announced in 2023, which sought to assert national autonomy in maritime governance and reduce external dependence. Malé, following the termination of the agreement, sought to indigenise hydrographic activities by engaging domestic firms. However, limited technical expertise and lack of sophisticated equipment necessary for independent operations stymied their efforts.

China’s interest in the Indian Ocean region poses strategic challenges for small island states such as the Maldives in safeguarding hydrographic data. The Chinese survey vessel docking in Malé after conducting hydrographic surveys in the Maldives’ EEZ, followed by a 2025 agreement between the Maldives Environmental Protection Agency and the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, has heightened concerns about opaque data collection. Maldivian media have reported on China retaining exclusive data access of seabed devices and fish-aggregating systems capable of monitoring currents, acoustics, and the movement of ships and submarines. China has a history of using hydrographic data in the South China Sea for sea-denial and A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) strategies. This is a serious development for the Maldives’ data sovereignty, with downstream implications for other regional and extra-regional actors such as India, the US, France, Japan, and Australia.

Way Forward

The Maldives has sought to address capacity gaps and balance against external monopoly by seeking assistance from abroad. If developed fully, such a strategy would have the long-term goal of transforming the country into a hydrography powerhouse, strengthen its maritime agency, and protect its blue economy. The short-term approach would involve prioritising existing resources and building domestic capacity through selective and transparent international partnerships. A hedging strategy remains its most viable path, with partnerships based on transparency, economic benefits, and data autonomy. Malé has already approached partners such as Australia for hydrographic equipment. The maritime security provisions of the 2020 Maldives US Defence Framework Agreement can also be used for future hydrographic capacity-building. India, too, offers a credible model with a record of transparent, win-win hydrographic cooperation. China may also be leveraged cautiously as it recalibrates its image toward capacity-building.

Sayantan Bandyopadhyay is a doctoral research scholar with the Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS) at the School of International Studies (SIS), JNU, New Delhi.