Border Management: A Rebuttal to Brig Chandel’s A Border Guards Organization for Anti-Terrorist Operations
10 Sep, 2001 · 573
Mallika Joseph gives a rebuttal to Brig Chandel’s article "A Border Guards Organization for Anti-Terrorist Operations"
Brig Chandel’s suggestions on better border management in his article, “A Border Guards Organization for Anti-Terrorist Operations” candidly portray the Army’s views on the paramilitary forces. His proposition on engaging/recruiting the local population for border vigilance and protection is a workable option and needs to be commended. However, his plea that these border scouts be raised in lieu of the inept paramilitary forces deployed on the border lacks objective appreciation of ground realities.
China
in 1962, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) was raised. The Border Security Force (BSF) came into being after the war with
Pakistan
in 1965. That these forces were formed due to constraints on the Army in facing external aggression has to be borne in mind before labeling the paramilitary forces incompetent. Further, the intrusions in Kargil in 1999 were in sectors manned by the Army, and not the paramilitary forces. Moreover, in areas covered by the Disturbed Areas Act, like
Kashmir
, the paramilitary forces have been placed under the operational command of the Army.
Kashmir
and the North East are extraordinary ones that require unique responses. Absolving oneself of responsibility and indulging in a blame game will not help. Belittling the role of the paramilitary forces will not make the Army more efficient. What is required is better coordination between the various forces fighting a common enemy.
He accuses the paramilitary forces of being “ineffective and incompetent” to tackle the Afghan and Pakistani terrorists. What needs to be analyzed is whether it is their responsibility to handle these terrorists. The Armed forces, initially, were to secure the country from external aggression and the Crown Representative’s Police (now Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF]) was responsible for internal security. After the border conflict with
One of the reasons that Brig Chandel gives why the BSF cannot guard the border effectively is because the officers are rotated frequently; this prevents them from cultivating their contacts and the expertise gained by them is also lost. The rationale behind the BSF’s policy of rotating the troops every two years is to relieve them of battle fatigue, which can lead to serious consequences, if ignored.
Brig Chandel also accuses the paramilitary forces, particularly the CRPF, of being ill-equipped to meet the challenges of insurgency. It should be remembered that while the Army works with a budget of Rs. 35,000 crores (US$ 7.8 billion), the CRPF has a budget of only Rs. 2072 crores (US$ 460 million), the BSF Rs. 2700 crores (US$ 600 million) and, the ITBP Rs. 173 crores (US$ 38 million); this has a telling effect on the equipment that these forces possess. In Kashmir, the Army is the only entity that has the privilege of having uninterrupted twenty-four hours power supply; all others, including the civilians and state and paramilitary forces, are lucky if they have power supply for even four hours. Fighting the insurgents against such odds has not, however, deterred these paramilitary forces from doing their duty; in 1999 alone, the CRPF apprehended 5039 militants, killed 199, and recovered 746 weapons and 17,931 rounds of ammunition; the BSF, until October 2000, since being deployed in counter-insurgency operations, has killed 3584 militants and apprehended 11,433, and recovered 13,232 weapons, 1078,211 ammunition and 9712 kgs of explosives.
What causes concern is that the views put forward by Brig Chandel reflects the prejudices of the armed forces. In a national daily, Wg Cdr Pant writes that, “the army needs to concentrate on its primary task of defending the country from external aggression which can happen only when there is a single restructured CPO [Central Police Organization] geared to tackle internal insurgencies”. Even if, as Pant envisages, a single restructured CPO effectively handles internal security issues, in the changed post-nuclearized scenario where overt war has been substituted by proxy war, what is the need for an Army which supposedly waits for an external aggression that may never happen?
The situation in
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
