Rehabilitating Surrendered Militants in J&K: Lessons from Past Experiences
09 Mar, 2020 · 5657
Shivangi Seth explores the experiences of three previous policies aimed at rehabilitating surrendered ex-militants in J&K to identify insights that might be useful for formulating a new one.
In
2018, New Delhi directed the then Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Governor, Satya
Pal Malik, to formulate a new surrender and rehabilitation policy for
ex-militants to J&K, a draft of which was floated in 2019. Post the state’s
reorganisation in 2019, such policies will fall directly under the centre’s
purview. This commentary traces the experiences of previous such policies
implemented in J&K to identify insights that might be useful for
formulating a new one.
The Three Previous Policies
The 1995 Surrender Policy was the first one, and it entailed monetary incentives to surrendered
militants—including INR 1,50,000/- as fixed deposit (FD); INR 1,800/- as
monthly stipend; cash for surrendering weapons; and vocational training. However,
although 1317 militants surrendered in the first two years (and an estimated 2200
surrendered in total), this policy had a myopic focus on monetary incentives and
many returnees
claimed that neither those, nor vocational training materialised.
The
2004 Rehabilitation Policy intended to offer “facility to those terrorists who undergo a change of
heart and eschew the path of violence” and “accept the integrity of India and
Indian Constitution.” It reflected the 1995 policy’s approach of cash for
surrendered weapons and vocational training initiatives; promised surrendered militants
INR 1,50,000/- in FD payable three years after surrender, contingent upon good
behaviour; and a monthly stipend of INR 2,000/-. As
of 2015 (over a decade since the policy’s introduction), 432 ex-militants
had availed this policy’s monetary incentives. Much like the 1995
policy, the 2004 policy too had limited focus on socio-economic and
psychological reintegration of militants.
The
2010 Policy
on the Return of Ex-Militants to the State had a framework broader than those of its predecessors. It sought
to “facilitate the return of ex-militants who belong to J&K state and had
crossed over the PoK/Pakistan for training in insurgency but have given up
insurgent activities due to a change of heart and are willing to return to the
State.” It demarcated four entry-points for returnees—Wagah-Attari, Salamabad,
Chakan-da-bagh and New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA). Since
some of these returnees had settled in Pakistan, their Pakistani wives,
children, and other dependents were also to be considered for entry as per
existing laws. This policy, too, however, was largely ineffective. As
of 2016, only 489 of the 4,587 militants who had crossed the border to
train had returned. Moreover, they mostly returned through the Indo-Nepal
border instead of the four designated routes, thereby becoming ineligible to
avail the scheme’s benefits. Furthermore, the returnees’ Pakistani wives faced trouble in
acquiring identity cards and basic documentation in India. Notably, the 2010
policy was the first to consider psychological rehabilitation by establishing counselling
centres for returnees and their families, but those centres were never
set up.
Lessons for the Future
In
addition to systematic implementation of the policy, any policy for rehabilitating
ex-militants in J&K must: a) address barriers that the context of
rehabilitation pose, including security threats, social stigma, and recidivism;
b) be designed to reverse the psychological components of radicalisation; and
c) be able to offset
the influence Pakistan might have vis-à-vis ex-militants’ ability to return.
Ex-militants
are vulnerable to various stigmas, security threats and vices when attempting rehabilitation
into the very context in which they had taken up arms. In conflicts like
Kashmir, a small portion of the local population views militants as ‘freedom
fighters’, whereas other locals view them as ‘traitors’, a state-of-affairs
that hampers reintegration prospects. This
is exacerbated in the case of the returnees’ Pakistani family members. Furthermore,
‘surrendered’ militants are also vulnerable to security threats from their
former ‘colleagues’, especially in contexts like J&K where the insurgency is
ongoing. Additionally, whether ex-militants can fully adapt to non-violent and
law-bound frameworks of civilian life in India’s context needs further
examination. For instance, some ex-militants who worked as Special Police Officers
under the 1995 policy and eventually constituted the Ikhwan force were accused
of committing gruesome human rights violations against civilians. Where the
militants should be rehabilitated—for reasons of stigma and security—and what
professions they might be fit to enter, are questions that merit deeper
analysis based on context-specific factors.
Given
how the insurgency is still ongoing, there is also a risk of the rehabilitation
policy ending up as a revolving door for militants. Psychological
rehabilitation is crucial to reduce the odds of recidivism. Previous reintegration
policies in J&K neglected its significance. Surrender presents an opportunity
for psychological rehabilitation, on which future policies must capitalise. In
this regard, relying on a simplistic understanding of ‘radicalisation’ could be
counter-productive. Combining material incentives with structured and sustained
psychological support will help create a holistic rehabilitation policy.
Additionally,
given how returnees’ use of routes such as Wagah and IGIA allows India to prove
Pakistan’s involvement in the J&K insurgency, the possibility of Pakistan threatening the safety of potential returnees cannot be ruled out. This potentially
explains why many returnees chose the India-Nepal route. These realities must
be addressed.
Comprehensively addressing all such relevant
aspects is crucial for any policy aimed at reintegration of ex-militants to
J&K to be effective and sustainable.
Shivangi Seth is a Research
Intern with the Centre for Internal and Regional Security at IPCS.