Implications of the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty

28 Aug, 2001    ·   559

Dr Subhash Kapila analyses the strategic fallout of the recent Sino-Russian Treaty on the Asia Pacific region


A twenty years Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China on 16 July 2001.

Russia and China have signed a number of protocols and agreements in the post-Cold War era covering strategic issues, but this treaty subsumes them. The contextual circumstances that promoted the treaty can be summarised:

·                     Russia and China’s growing apprehensions about US’ global dominance

·                     Russian and Chinese perceptions of strategic pressure by the US, with the eastward expansion of NATO, active American role in Central Asia and reinforcing the US-Japan Security Cooperation Guidelines

·                     China’s worries about US’ intervention in countries on the Yugoslav model, on grounds of humanitarian considerations

·                     Bush Administration’s National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) plans.

While both Russia and China have claimed that the Treaty has no strategic objectives or military alliance character, it cannot be overlooked that both signatories intend to serve notice on the US’ unipolar status.

The Treaty comprises of twenty-five Articles listing various areas of cooperation. The provisions that have strategic significance are in brief:

·                     Strategic collaboration (Article 1)

·                     Principle of ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons against each other and non-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles against each other (Article 2)

·                     Russia’s unqualified support to China on the Taiwan issue and ruling out Taiwan’s independence (Article 4 and 5)

·                     Both countries would desist from joining any unions or blocs or enter agreements with third countries that damage the security interests of the other (Article 5)

·                     Articles 11 to 14 require that both countries jointly resist any attempts at intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states under any pretext, maintain global strategic balance and strengthen the role of the United Nations.

·                     Article 14 stipulates that both Russia and China strengthen stability in neighbouring regions by creating “multilateral mechanisms of collaboration on questions of security and cooperation that would correspond to their realities”.

The implications of the Treaty for the various countries are:  

Russia: Except for China’s support on the Chechenya issue, Russia does not seem to have gained much. Russia, dependent on Western and US economic aid, is unlikely to adopt a confrontational mode with them. Russia has already indicated its readiness to discuss modifications to the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. This discomfits China.

China: It seems that China has virtually imposed this treaty on Russia. China has drawn strong support on Taiwan, hoping it would preempt US initiatives to support Taiwan. China has also succeeded in pinning down Russia not to enter into any similar understandings with other countries in neighbouring regions. China has secured her Western and Northern frontiers, thereby enabling greater strategic assertion elsewhere.

United States: Official US reaction has been dismissive. It has maintained that the Sino-Russian Treaty does not change the strategic balance of power, and that the US welcomes good relations between Russia and China. However, political circles in US have made calls for greater US vigilance regarding China’s intentions and military build-up. The US could react more strongly after the Shanghai Summit in October 2001.

Japan: Any strategic cooperation between Russia and China, even without a military alliance, must be a matter of grave concern to Japan. In the prevailing security environment, any Japanese Government would find it hard to resist calls for Japan upgrading its military capabilities.

India: India needs to seriously analyse each and every article of the Treaty and seek assurances from Russia that it does not impinge on existing Indo-Russian treaties and agreements. It does bring into focus that, in Russian priorities, China is of prime importance. 

The Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and China has resulted from their shared apprehensions regarding US’ role, attitudes and military intervention on humanitarian grounds. By not imparting the character of a military alliance to the treaty, Russia and China seem to be signaling that, while they find American unipolar dominance distasteful, they would not militarily confront it. 

However, if both Russia and China feel that their Treaty would help create an architecture for a multipolar world, they would be disappointed. Any attempts to create a ‘multipolar’ bloc by Russia, which includes China, would find very few supporters in Asia.

This does not, however, mean that the US could afford to be oblivious to similar responses prompted by perceptions of US arrogance. Neither the United Nations nor the larger international community can be ignored by the US. 

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