A Border Guards Organization for Anti-Terrorist Operations

28 Aug, 2001    ·   555

Brig SS Chandel speculates on measures that can be adopted to make the Border Guards effective


Indian intelligence has chosen to remain myopic, both in terms of space (neighours, relevant nations and superpowers) and time (present and future); all our wars in 1947, 1962, 1965 1971 and 1999 bear testimony of this statement. We did not have foreknowledge of the Pakistani nuclear capability. Our infirmities regarding antiterrorist operations have caused consternation and led to increase in the central paramilitary forces – Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBF) and the various provincial armed constabularies. These forces are ineffective and incompetent to tackle the motivated, skilled and hardy Afghan, Pakistani, Naga and other terrorists. 

 

 

The BSF cannot effectively guard our border for the following three reasons: Firstly, the BSF is not knowledgeable about the terrain, people, language, and local sensitivities. Secondly, its personnel keep getting rotated, thus losing the expertise gained and contacts cultivated. Thirdly, they stand apart as outsiders, inhibiting trust from likely sources and agents. The CRPF and provincial armed constabularies are basically a lathi (stick) wielding and physically unfit force who are killed and have their weapons taken away with sickening regularity in Nagaland, Manipur and Jammu and Kashmir

 

 

Border guards should be recruited from the region nearest to the area of operations; the Ladakh scouts have been recruited for operations in Ladakh and they have performed very well in all the Indo-Pak wars. There is a need for raising Kargil scouts, Doda and Kishtwar scouts, Punjab Rangers and Rajasthan Rangers. Similarly, Western and Eastern Sea Guards and Andaman Sea Guards should be raised from coastal and island fishermen. The usual physical and educational standards should be modified to suit the local standards as in the case of Gorkhas and Assam Regiments. The terms of engagement should be upto the age of 45 years for all ranks, and they should remain located in the same region for the duration of their service. Many advantages will accrue out of these arrangements. For instance, a ready reserve of personnel will be available in times of need. They could disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication if he penetrates the border in depth. The population will also get employment resulting in economic prosperity; buying them for providing intelligence to the enemy will then become very difficult. 

 

 

The men should be equipped only with small and held signal sets like cellular phones. Their training should be organized by a regular unit posted in the neighbourhood. It should be conduction all through the year as per convenience of the population. This will obviate the requirement of raising expensive training centres. The duration of training should not exceed three months. Emphasis should be laid on weapons training, field craft, mines and explosives. Drill and ceremonials should be pruned. Commanding officer, second in command, adjutant and quartermaster should be from the regular army on deputation. Company commanders and other officers should be promoted from the ranks on the basis of their field performance. 

 

 

These border guards should be tasked to patrol the land borders and coastal waters on foot, local ponies or yaks or local boats / trawlers to identify and report any intrusion or hostile act to which the appropriate service – Army, Navy or Air Force – can react. 

 

 

 

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