Kashmir: The Way Ahead – Part II

24 Aug, 2001    ·   553

Interview with G Parthasarthy, Former High Commissioner of India at Pakistan

 

 

Interview with G Parthasarthy, Former High Commissioner of India at Pakistan

 

 

At the summit in Agra and before, Pakistan has been insisting that Kashmir is the core issue. What are your comments?

 

 

Pakistan ’s claim that Kashmir is the core issue has never been consistent. On 12 April 1999, Gen. Musharraf said that he considered India to be a hegemonic power and low intensity conflict with India would continue even if the Kashmir issue was resolved. Further, at Agra , he made it clear that Pakistani action in Kargil, which was related to its Kashmir policy, flows from its desire to avenge what happened in December 1971. So I think the policy of the Pakistani Army establishment in Kashmir flows from its desire to destabilize the secular plural body politic of India . It is simply using the developments in Kashmir to achieve its larger aim stemming from its compulsive hostility towards India . 

 

 

So, do you think that, for Pakistan , Kashmir is the means to an end?

 

 

Yes, as far as the Pakistani military is concerned, Kashmir is merely a means to bleed India . In fact, I recall when I was in Pakistan , Lt, Gen Durrani, who is a former Director General of the ISI, openly said at a seminar, in which one of my officers was present, that the aim of the ISI was to weaken India from within, and that they can do it.

 

 

If that is the case, what can India , do?

 

 

I would hope that as a result of international pressures and the internal problems they are facing, because of their policy of compulsive hostility towards India , Pakistan will see, in course of time, that following such a policy does not serve its interests and will change itself.     

 

 

Certain recent initiatives, whether successful or not, have been undertaken inside Pakistan , like the drive against arms and the jehadi groups openly collecting funds. Do you think that this points to a possible shift in Pakistan ’s perceptions and policy?

 

 

No, I don’t think the drive for deweaponization within Pakistan has got anything to do with the mutually reinforcing nexus between the ISI on the one hand and the terrorist organizations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen on the other. This nexus also has its own linkages with the Taliban. All these have to be viewed as a single entity. The much talked about deweaponization drive by the Musharraf regime is basically targeted against organisations involved in sectarian violence. There is naturally apprehension among the Shias in Pakistan that this will be directed more against them rather than the Sunni groups. It had therefore not met with success so far. The numbers of weapons surrendered are marginal and meaningless.

 

 

What are your comments on the attempts to reign in the jehadi groups, which are now considered outside the control of the Pakistan administration? They have a larger Pan- Islamic agenda whereas that of Pakistan ’s is narrow.

 

 

As I stated earlier, a mutually reinforcing nexus exists between the ISI and these groups. There is no question whether the ISI can control these groups; they are armed and trained by the ISI. It provides them with staging areas to cross into India and operational details of how they should operate once they cross into India . It provides them with info on assets and safe houses once they are inside. If such assistance is not provided, we can eliminate them as soon as they cross the Line of Control. So there is no question of the Jehadi groups operating independently of the ISI. They are fully hand in glove with the ISI. 

 

 

As far as their Pan-Islamic agenda is concerned, there is a feeling, and I share this view, that while their Pan-Islamic agenda is explicitly stated by these groups, it is implicitly endorsed by the Pakistan establishment, which has strong Islamic leanings. 

 

 

On the developments inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir in light of Pant’s mission…

 

 

The Government made a serious mistake in delaying the announcement of the appointment of Mr. Pant. I think it would have had a far greater impact had it been announced simultaneously with the Prime Minister’s announcement on the “non-initiation of combat operations” on 19 Nov 2000. His mission therefore started a bit late when our policies led to marginalised groups like the Hurriyat being given undue importance. It was also a time when people in the Valley were scared of people with the gun; there was a gap of five months between both announcements which had facilitated entry of non-Kashmiri militants who were in a position to threaten anyone who might have wanted to cooperate with the government. And, therefore, this initiative received a setback. If counterinsurgency operations are able to restore the situation prior to the announcement of the “non-initiation of combat operations”, then it can be hoped that more people would come forward to interact with Mr. Pant. 

 

 

The Central Government’s policy towards the Hurriyat seem confused as on one hand it says they are not important and on the other prevents them from going to Pakistan. Your comments…

 

 

When you compare statements and actions of the Hurriyat with the writings of the ISI supported news agencies, they virtually coincide with each other. This makes it very clear that the Hurriyat basically echoes the views of the Pakistani military establishment. The Hurriyat will therefore never challenge the views of the Pakistan military establishment or that of the ISI supported United Jehad Council. 

 

 

The Hurriyat enjoys a degree of political support, though untested, in the Valley; its claims that it is the sole representative of the people in the valley are exaggerated and fanciful. Therefore, I see no harm in dealing with the Hurriyat as any other group, political party or organization in the Valley. 

 

 

But if evidence presents itself to us that their actions lead to violence in the state or are prejudicial to the security of the state, then the law must take its own course in dealing with them.

 

 

So what is the problem in letting them go to Pakistan ?

 

 

Knowing their background, and their links with Pakistan , what interests of India would be  served by letting them going there? They will come back with more ideas on how to worsen the security situation in the Valley. India gains nothing by sending them there.

 

 

What does India lose?

 

 

By sending a solitary group, this group achieves international recognition that we would not wish them to have 

 

 

Your observations on the issue of governance within Kashmir …

 

 

It is very difficult for any state to govern efficiently and carry out developmental programs in the light of persisting insurgency. This is an inevitable consequence of violence perpetrated from outside. Now that elections to panchayats have been held, we need to identify imaginative means to see that developmental funds reach the people. There needs to be enhanced interaction between the Centre, that provides the funds, the State Government, that implements it, the security forces, and the newly elected panchayat leaders at grassroots level. 

 

 

Various solutions like plebiscite, trifurcation, regional astronomy, and conversion of Line of Control into international border have been proposed.  Which one do you subscribe to?

 

 

At the present moment, it is premature to talk of any solution. There is already a stated position – the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir including PoK, the whole of the Northern Areas, and the areas illegally acceded to China by Pakistan , must all be returned. I don’t think that there is any need nor is it prudent to articulate a solution and digress from the stated position that has already been articulated by the Parliament, and therefore the people of India . 

 

 

As and when we get into a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan that leads to reduction of violence, then cooperation across the Line of Control can be discussed. Currently it is too premature. 

 

 

There seems to be widespread support for conversion of the Line of Control into the international border. What are your comments on that issue?

 

 

It has been publicly articulated but I don’t think that it should be the viewpoint that India subscribes to, either as a public posture or a negotiating position. 

 

 

What are your remarks on Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan , if at all it materializes?

 

 

It is good that a continued diplomatic process has been initiated. There will be occasions at the UN General Assembly and thereafter the various forums of SAARC – Foreign Ministers or summit. I do not see any point in the Prime Minister scheduling a visit to Pakistan if it is to end in a fiasco like in Agra . It is important that a conducive atmosphere exists from which something positive can emerge at the next summit or meeting.

 

 

 

 

 

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