Talking with the NSCN-IM : From Paris to Bangkok to Amsterdam – Part 2
21 Aug, 2001 · 552
Shivaji Mukherjee points out that unless the NSCN-IM and the Union Government find some way of including other terrorist groups in the dialogue, a long-term solution to the Naga problem is not possible
The four-year ceasefire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Union government has failed because it has not yielded any negotiated political settlement. While it has satisfied the short-term goal of bringing down the level of violence and managing the conflict, it has failed to satisfy the long term goal of conflict resolution. Both parties to the NSCN-IM ceasefire should make active efforts to go beyond mere conflict management and adopt strategies that will lead to conflict resolution of the Naga problem.
India
. In a meeting with the NSCN-IM leaders on September 30, 1998 in
Paris
, Prime Minister Vajpayee had stated that secession was not an option and talks must be held within the framework of the Indian Constitution. This was completely different from the NSCN-IM demand for a sovereign Nagalim, which represented a zero-sum game wherein gain for one party would mean loss for the other.
India
.
India
.
The optimal manner to resolve the conflict would be to reach an integrated agreement through negotiations, which would promote the interests of the NSCN-IM and the Union government and yield benefits for both. This would be qualitatively superior to a negotiated compromise, involving both parties in seeking to find some middle ground. To reach an integrated agreement, it is important that the conflicting demands of the two parties — NSCN-IM and Union government — be transformed from their zero-sum nature into non-zero-sum alternatives which could completely or partially reconcile their interests.
The Union government has indicated to the NSCN-IM in the past that it cannot compromise on the territorial integrity of
The challenge before the Indian negotiators is to transform this situation into one that will allow both parties to receive some benefits, without compromising their aspirations. This is what the Nagaland Chief Minister, S. C. Jamir, meant, when he warned in a recent interview that the current ceasefire "may become redundant" if the Centre and the NSCN-IM do not begin discussions on the core issue of the Naga problem to evolve an acceptable solution. For doing this, the Indian negotiators should analyse the reward structures of the NSCN-IM, i.e. the cost-benefit structure of various options that the NSCN-IM could present while negotiating with the Indian side.
The clue to a successful conflict resolution strategy involves constructing a reward structure that is different for the common cadres and leaders of the NSCN-IM. The cadres are motivated by the economic benefits they can extract through extortion, and the respect they receive as being “freedom fighters”. The level of security they demand, and hoped to receive by joining the insurgency movement, is lower than what leaders like Muivah or Isak Swu would desire. The cadres wanted a territorial extension of the ceasefire as they felt threatened by the security force operations against them in the states other than Nagaland. The NSCN-IM operates in the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, and the Senapati, Chandel, Ukhrul and Tamenglong districts of Manipur. For the NSCN-IM leadership, the reward structure would be different; it would involve demands for sovereignty and Greater Nagaland both for the political rewards this would fetch, and their ideological convictions that Nagaland was never a part of
However, it is probably clear to Muivah that the Union government would never allow a sovereign Nagaland; also that the other North East states and terrorist groups therein would never accept a Greater Nagaland which would reduce their territories and areas of influence. It would also be clear to him that his cadres, as well as Naga society generally, would not like violence to return to Nagaland. So, if he insists on an independent Nagalim, then the government negotiators could provide him with non-specific compensation. This could take the form of a discreet promise not to carry out operations against the NSCN-IM outside Nagaland, while not extending the ceasefire officially.
To provide specific compensation to Muivah and Isak Swu would be more difficult, as it would involve satisfying them with rewards in lieu of a sovereign Nagalim. This could be done by government officially sympathizing with their demands, but explaining their impracticability to the NSCN-IM leadership, given the current system in
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