Talking with the NSCN-IM: From Paris to Bangkok to Amsterdam – Part 1

21 Aug, 2001    ·   551

Shivaji Mukherjee lists the various measures that both the NSCN-IM and the Union Government could adopt to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to the Naga problem
Shivaji Mukherjee
In tackling the threat from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the Union government seems trapped in a contradictory strategy of its own making. 

 

 

One horn of this strategy is the government’s decision to “talk” with the NSCN-IM, a strategy like the one it has been trying to adopt in Jammu and Kashmir . Unlike the USA , which has a policy of “no negotiation” with the terrorists, the Indian strategists have demonstrated a proclivity to negotiate with the NSCN-IM to reach a political solution to the Naga secessionist problem. 

 

 

The other horn of this conflicting counter-insurgency strategy is the government’s inability to extricate itself from the “security/military” paradigm while negotiating the political future of Nagaland. The “security/military” approach derives from the assumption that insurgency is a “law and order” problem and can be suppressed by a military response. The danger of negotiating with the NSCN-IM, without abandoning this mindset, is that the negotiating strategy chosen by the government would be determined by it. For example, the criterion used by the Union government for choosing the NSCN-IM as the legitimate representative of the Naga peoples, is that it is the most powerful terrorist group in Nagaland and speaks the “language of violence” most effectively. Deriving from this, the government feels that a negotiated political settlement with the NSCN-IM in the long term, and a ceasefire with it in the short term, will provide them a chance to neutralize it. Once this is achieved, the other Naga terrorist groups can easily be made to “fall in line”. 

 

 

However, by limiting its negotiation strategy within this “security paradigm”, the government has lost its flexibility and been unable to revamp its strategy and recognize the other terrorist groups in the State, like the NSCN-Khaplang and Naga National Council-Adino (NNC-A). These groups are not as militarily powerful as the NSCN-IM, but they need to be included in any final negotiated settlement. The Nagaland Chief Minister, S. C. Jamir, has constantly reiterated the need to include the Khaplang faction in the talks. The Union government seems to have accepted this reality by declaring a one year ceasefire with the NSCN-K faction for the first time on April 28, 2001. However, a recalcitrant attitude by the NSCN-IM, which is involved in a violent ethnic conflict with the NSCN-K has prevented the Naga peace talks from including the NSCN-K and the NNC-A. Unless the two sides in the negotiation—the NSCN-IM and the Union government—find some way of including other terrorist groups in the dialogue, it is doubtful whether a long term solution to the Naga problem can be found. 

 

 

At this crucial phase in the Naga peace talks, it is essential that the government negotiators try to review the negotiating principles. The Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CMG) at the grassroots level has been invigorated by the decision after the July 23-24, 2001 negotiations between Padmanabhaiah and Muivah at Amsterdam to include representatives from civil society. A new set of ground-rules was finalized with the NSCN-IM on January 13, 2001— for negotiations to succeed, it is important that the negotiators from both sides are able to evaluate each others’ negotiating positions.

 

 

From the Indian side, this involves being able to assess the reward structure of the NSCN-IM. An interesting fact is that, despite recent threats by the NSCN-IM to back out of the ceasefire and return to the path of violence after the Union government’s decision to restrict the ceasefire to Nagaland, this has not happened; there was tremendous pressure on the NSCN-IM leadership, incidentally from its cadres, to force the Union government to extend the ceasefire to Naga-majority territories in the North East. This could be because Muivah realizes that, if the NSCN-IM resumes violence, it will lose the support of Naga civil society, which is accepting it mainly because the terrorist group continues to believe in the peace process. The cost of losing popular legitimacy would be too high a price to pay for the unsure gains of a Greater Nagaland. 

 

 

It seems the NSCN-IM leadership is willing to continue with the peace process, as long as it receives the economic benefits of an underground terrorist economy, and popular support from the Naga civil society organizations. 

 

 

 

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