The Place of Atomic Power in Energy Security

18 Aug, 2001    ·   547

Report of IPCS Seminar held on 27 July 2001
The following is a report on the Friday Group Discussions held on 27 July, 2001 in the IPCS. The main speaker was Mr. Stanislav E. Barkovskiy who is the representative in India of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy.

 

 

In his presentation Mr. Barkovskiy made the under-mentioned points:

 

 

·                     There was a general energy deficiency in the world. This could be met by atomic energy, and Russia was planning to build an additional 30 nuclear reactors. They are  environment- friendly, unlike other sources of energy like hydroelectricity, which required a large pondage that led to deforestation and affected the ecology by arresting river flows. World fossil fuel reserves, including gas, were limited and led to emissions causing global warming; this was also the case with thermal energy from coal-based power plants. Non-renewable sources of energy were undoubtedly safe from an environment standpoint, but they were not suited for large-scale industrial applications. The use of plasma through Tokomak-type devices was promising but still at the experimental stage. This left nuclear energy as the best choice, and reactors could be made safe to avoid the danger of possible accidents like Chernobyl . Indeed, nuclear energy was the answer to the problem of Green House Gases and the difficulties in finalizing the Kyoto Protocol.

 

 

·                     So far as nuclear energy went, the preferred technology should fast breeders. This was also India ’s choice to exploit its possession of 70 % of the world’s known thorium reserves. India was planning to produce some 2.5 gigawatts of power from fast breeder reactors, for which the technology was now available to use the fuel in a renewable manner. In fact, using this technology, weapons grade plutonium and spent reactor waste could become a resource for fuelling fast breeder reactors. Such reactors were also ‘ proliferation resistant’. In fact, an international project needed to be established to study this technology and undertake the R & D for its exploitation. India ’s nuclear scientists were among the best in the world and, if they joined this project, they would be able to guide the R & D to suit their special requirements.

 

 

·                     Breeder technology is also being studied by the IAEA. It is financially viable, and as cheap as other sources of energy. Thus power from Tarapur costs around Rs. 0.50 per KWh, from the Enron project about Rs. 7.50, and it would be approximately Rs. 3.50 from the Kudankulam plants when they become critical. No doubt atomic power plants have a longer gestation period for their establishment but they also have a longer service life. No doubt there were problems with transmission of power but they were manageable. Apart from Russia , the countries with advanced atomic energy programmes were Germany and Japan .

 

 

During the discussions several issues were debated at length. The information received and the conclusions reached are briefly described below.

 

 

·                     There are legal problems in the supply of nuclear technology to India by Russia that arise from the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to which Russia subscribes. There is also the strenuous opposition of the United States to any supply of reactor technology unless it is made under fullscope safeguards. Mr. Barkovskiy felt that the United States may not support these transfers but it was also likely that the Bush administration might relax the US rigid policy   in this regard. Anyway, Russia had much experience with a cooperative but competitive relations with the US over the years, but this had not affected the essential stability of their relationship.

 

 

·                     Could Russia supply more VVERs for India ’s atomic power programme? Two reactors had been contracted in 1998 and they met the NSG guidelines. It was informed that the DPR (Detailed Project Report) is ready and the contract is likely to be signed very soon. They would be commissioned in 2007, and it was difficult to look beyond that period to affirm whether more reactors could be supplied or not. It was also difficult to envisage transfer of technology as these reactors used enriched uranium and were different from the VVERs constructed by Russia , especially their nuclear safety features; hence their transfer would not be economical. However, Indians would be trained in its operation by Russia . 

 

 

·                     Enriched uranium fuel was being supplied to Tarapur under the safety clauses approved by the NSG and there was no problem. 

 

 

·                     The question was raised whether it was in India ’s economic interests to import atomic power plants from Russia when the Power Division of the Atomic Energy Commission was starving for orders. In reply, it was stressed that the 500 MW Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) standardized by India was not the best technology available. The cost per KWh was around Rs. 3.50 in India , as compared to Rs. 0.40 in Russia and Rs. 1.20 internationally. Besides there was the question of financing. Russia was making the initial investment needed for the Kudankalam project; its costs of Rs. 70,000 per MW were comparable to Indian costs; so was the generation cost. Besides, all components were of Russian origin and not obtained from any other supplier that might come under the prohibitions of the NSG guidelines. 2 VVERs had been sold to China .

 

 

·                     It was suggested that India could easily avoid the problem of the NSG guidelines by placing the civilian components of its atomic energy programme under fullscope safeguards, leaving aside its military components. This would enable India to obtain nuclear technology and international financing without duress. In fact, India was contemplating amending its Atomic Energy Act to allow private financing of the atomic energy programme. Here it was pointed out that this would establish a dubious precedent, and the Indian atomic energy establishment was opposed to any kind of “islanding” for technical reasons.

 

 

·                     The problem of waste management   could be managed if it was accepted that reactor spent fuel is not waste but a resource for fuelling reactors by using the appropriate technology, This conformed to thinking in India about this issue. The end product, after fully recycling the spent fuel, would be environmentally harmless due to the short half-life of the remaining actinides. This meant there would be no further need for uranium mining and the existing mines could be used to store the deactivated spent fuel products.

 

 

·                     Energy conservation was important, and it was necessary to gain control over transmission and distribution losses. But the need for additional generation could not be ignored if one compared the use of energy by India and select developing countries, quite apart from the developed countries in the world.

 

 

 

 

 

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