Lessons from Doda, Kishtwar and Jammu

17 Aug, 2001    ·   546

Brig Chandel suggests new initiatives in strategy, intelligence and planning to wrest the initiative from the militants in Kashmir
Brig. SS Chandel
Give the devils their due. In carrying out terrorist acts in Doda, Kishtwar, and Jammu Railway Station, the Mujahideen have displayed imagination, initiative and audacity. Strategy and coordination also seem to be astute and professional. When the pressure from the security forces began to build in up the Valley, Kargil and Sia Chen  and confrontation seemed to have reached an impasse, they were directed to move south to Doda and Kishtwar. When the security outside vulnerable points like airports, railway stations and bus stands became too tight they chose to get into the train itself and open fire at the Jammu railway station. Lets concede that they are several moves ahead of the security forces that have only reacted, unable to use their manpower strength, fire power and technology to their advantage against the terrorists. Unless we learn these lessons, we will not be able to wrest the initiative from them. We have to think afresh about future strategy, intelligence, planning and communication, personal and field leadership. The conventional approach will not do. 

 

 

Strategy

 

 

Our strategy should rest on five pillars. Firstly, decentralized command and control. No action above the battalion level can be envisaged to counter terrorism, that too only for cordon and search operations. Otherwise prowling patrols and ambushes should be planned at company level. Secondly, Village Defence Committees should be integrated. Thirdly, we should gain and retain the initiative by anticipating likely actions by the terrorists even by luring them by posing as graziers and farmers during the day. Fourthly, all administrative movements must happen at nights. Fifthly, local people should be enrolled as scouts to be stationed permanently in the area of operations. 

 

 

Intelligence

 

 

Humint (Human intelligence) network should be built across the borders within Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Thailand and other countries where the terrorists have their bases and in training camps in the forward zone. Electronic intelligence, i.e. radio intercepts, play a subsidiary role in these operations. For acquiring human intelligence in the forward zone, adequate funds should be placed at the disposal of local commanders. Deep intelligence will have to be organized by RAW and IB. Intelligence should also identify collaborators within the country who are necessarily involved in collecting information and providing logistical support by way of safe houses and travel arrangements.

 

 

Operational Planning

 

 

Our operations planners should put themselves in the skin of the terrorists to imagine what variation and where the next strike should be planned. If it was graziers and railway station this time, will be Jammu airport the next time? (Let us not forget the LTTE attack on the Katunayake airfield). Or would it be the Jawahar tunnel? Or Mandis? Or the Vaishno Devi Temple ? Or the base camp at Katra? Or Chamba? And so on. Similarly the methodology: if it was gunning of civilians at the Jammu railway station this time, it could be a remote controlled explosive device next. Our planning teams (never more than three persons) circulating in the area in civil clothes and in public transport should scour their respective areas and work out their plans.

 

 

Deep Offensive Action

 

 

It is more important to make the enemy react to our moves than keep reacting ourselves. Towards this end, India should help the oppressed people of Baluchistan , Sindh, Shias and the Ahmedias in whatever manner they seek. This may make Pakistan see that encouraging ‘Liberation struggles’ is a game which both parties can play.

 

 

Weaponry

 

 

In anti-terrorist operations, small is beautiful. Kalashnikovs, Pistols and grenades are the best weapons of offensive utility in small actions against the terrorists. Bigger weapons are a handicap. Weapons should be supplemented by night vision devices and hand-held cell phones. LTTE cadres use ICON sets extensively. These can be bought off the shelf in Singapore , Hong Kong and Japan . In no case should we go through the procedures of working out a GSQR, getting the MoD’s approval and inviting quotations and tenders. 

 

 

Personnel and Leadership

 

 

The personnel for anti-terrorist operations must be locally recruited. They will have the critical advantage of being familiar with the terrain, people, language and sensitivities of the people amongst whom they will be operating, and will also be able to live off the land. They should be transferable only within the region; in that way their expertise and experience will accumulate. Thus, we should raise Kargil Scouts, Doda Scouts, Jammu Scouts, Jaisalmer Rangers, and Naga, Tripura and Manipur Scouts in the East. Only the Headquarters Officers and clerks should be posted from the Army. 

 

 

Anti-terrorist operations are best suited to the temperament and physique of young people. Leadership too should come from them. To give them the requisite incentive, the number of posts of Junior Officers should be increased three fold. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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