Lessons from Agra: The Road Ahead

15 Aug, 2001    ·   539

Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 4 August 2001
Panelists: G. Parthasarathy, Rear Adm. Raja Menon and C. Raja Mohan

 

 

 

 

G. Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan , began the discussion by stating that India had initiated a series of ill-considered initiatives, starting with the announcement of a cease-fire in Kashmir in December 2000. This was not backed by any political initiative. The Government did not think through the implications of the withdrawal of the ceasefire and the invitation to President Musharraf. Both decisions were announced without taking the people into confidence. Besides, the Indian government miss-handled the All Party Hurriyat Conference issue during the summit. Either its leaders should have been arrested or allowed to meet Musharraf without reservations. The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) announced by India were a positive development, especially the lessening of visa restrictions.

 

 

The Government of India also did not undertake adequate preparations to handle Musharraf. Whereas Musharraf came to India with a clear focus on Kashmir , no serious groundwork was done on the Indian side The Indian delegation was led by Jaswant Singh, whereas the Pakistan side was led by Sattar, who has very long experience of Indo-Pak relations. Even after the summit, India did not perform well, with contradictory statements being made by the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister about the outcome of the summit.

 

 

Musharraf came to India to undo the Simla agreement and Lahore Declaration. For him, the Simla agreement emphasizes bilateralism; prohibits both countries from using their territories against each other; provides sanctity to the Line of Control; prevents hostile propaganda; and asks for a step-by-step approach to resolving the issues between India and Pakistan . These propositions are unacceptable to him. 

 

 

India should reorganize its military forces in Kashmir . The Pant mission needs to be revived and the APHC should be engaged. India should not be on the defensive in Kashmir and should adopt a proactive policy. India should invite Altaf Hussain and Benazir Bhutto to India .

 

 

Rear Adm. Raja Menon stated that in the history of negotiations, there has not been an instance in which a dispute involving an area like Kashmir has been resolved peacefully. India prefers a parallel dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues, whereas Pakistan wants to resolve the Kashmir issue first. 

 

 

The Kashmir dispute involves a number of micro and macro factors. Militancy in Kashmir was brought under control to a large extent by 1995. However, the Indian government missed the opportunity to build on it. The ground situation in Kashmir is different now. There is a feeling in the lower ranks of the Indian Army that India is not winning the war against militancy. The Indian side of Kashmir is far more developed than Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. India should take further steps to capitalize on this situation. For example, as of today, the Kashmiris are only able to view PTV. 

 

 

At the macro level, India should continuously engage Pakistan . An analysis of negotiations of the major militancies in the world, for example, Northern Ireland , Palestine etc would highlight the need for a sustained dialogue between the parties involved. No dramatic results can be achieved in a single meeting. Given the existing complications, it would take a minimum of five to six years of continuous engagement between India and Pakistan to arrive at a solution on Kashmir . 

 

 

Raja Mohan started with a comment that both India and Pakistan had judged-judged each other. India believed that Pakistan is weakening both domestically and internationally, and that it is prepared to make concessions. Its attitude towards Pakistan was based on this assumption. Pakistan , at present, is similar to North Korea , but is not isolated as India chooses to believe. Pakistan , in fact, has successfully used the “failing state” theory as its leverage at the international level to further its interests.

 

 

India has no other option but to engage Pakistan . India should aim to contain Pakistan both by fighting the crossborder terrorism in Kashmir and by engaging it in continuous negotiations. India should not hesitate to announce unilateral measures, including on nuclear CBMs. Inside Kashmir, the APHC has the power to veto negotiations, which should be taken into account. The initiative in Kashmir and with Pakistan should proceed, but with a definite plan. India should also increase the cost of war for Pakistan . Altaf Hussain, Benazir Bhutto and the Jamaat-e-Islami should be invited to India . Vajpayee should visit Pakistan , but not immediately. There should be prior negotiations at the official level before Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan  

 

 

Comments, Questions and Responses

 

 

The comments, questions and the responses focused on the following:

 

 

·                     The Ministry of External Affairs in India not consulted on inviting Musharraf to India . MEA was not consulted either in announcing the cease-fire in Kashmir , nor on the Pant mission.

 

 

·                     There is a need to rein in the media without becoming counter productive. Handling the media needs extreme caution.

 

 

·                     India did not have a definite agenda, whereas, Pakistan came with a specific agenda. Musharraf wanted to remove Simla and Lahore from the negotiations process and India gave in to these demands.

 

 

·                     Musharraf came to India to continue his proxy war and not for peace. India should take adequate steps to fight the insurgency in Kashmir . It needs to be pro-active and increase the cost for Pakistan in NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan .

 

 

·                     Inside Kashmir , there is an immediate need for good governance. The lack of governance has resulted in the Kashmiris listening to only the Pakistani version of events. The hostile propaganda promoted through PTV and the madrassas needs to counter with good governance.

 

 

·                     The morale of the Indian troops fighting in Kashmir is high, as the counter insurgency operations have proved by yielding results. The morale of the militants is very low, and they find it extremely difficult to recruit new members. The militants are being given inadequate training before being inducted and are being equipped with poor weapons.

 

 

·                     The Government of India should engage the think tanks in India to get professional advice on difficult issues like Kashmir .

 

 

 

 

 

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