The New Bush Administration and India

11 Aug, 2001    ·   536

Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra opines that the Bush Administration “seems interested in establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ with India


The Bush Administration seems to be interested in establishing a "strategic partnership" with India . President George W Bush, US Trade Representative Robert B Zoellick and Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca and others have indicated this desire in their statements. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's remarks on the possibility of providing base facilities to the US during his Australia trip may be considered as an indication that the NDA Government, if not willing now, may not be averse to such an idea in future. The Vajpayee Government may go forward and enhance the relationship to the strategic plane from the one characterized as "natural ally." No wonder, the Communist Party of India has warned against establishing military cooperation with the US .

 

 

Indo-US official engagements have never been as frequent and intense during the initial months of a new US Administration as has been the case during the current administration. In sharp contrast to the first few months of the Clinton Administration, positive trends in US-Indian relations have been the hallmark of the new Bush Administration. High level exchanges, such as visits by Indian Foreign and Defence Minister Jaswant Singh, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, and Foreign Secretary Chokila Iyer to Washington; and visits by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Chiarman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton and Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca to Delhi have enhanced the political ties between the two countries.

 

 

Significantly, the Bush Administration has not allowed the contentious issue of nuclear proliferation to bedevil the relationship with India . Unlike in the past, Washington did not reprimand India for conducting the Agni test. Notwithstanding some critical statements, the Kashmir flash point mantra has not been chanted in Washington . India , on the other hand, has not reacted negatively to the Bush Administration's proposal on national missile defence, its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on environment, and its reservations on the UN proposal for dealing with the problem of small arms proliferation.

 

 

On the contrary, India 's quick approval of President Bush's May 1st speech outlining his concept of the NMD was in striking contrast to that of many countries around the world, including America 's NATO allies. India 's positive reaction to Bush's concept of a new strategic order appeared euphoric as compared to Britain 's cautious, Germany 's weary and Sweden 's critical remarks on the Bush's speech. The negative Russian and Chinese reaction to the NMD proposal was known. Why did India enthusiastically support Bush's concept of a new strategic order? Although India did not unconditionally endorse the NMD, the Indian official response to the Bush's speech acclaimed the intended unilateral nuclear arms reduction and de-alerting of nuclear weapons by the US . This response reflected the government's desire to engage the new Bush team in a dialogue process on security issues, started during the previous Clinton Administration. Outright rejection and unnecessary criticism are not the right steps if the goal is to engage in dialogue.

 

 

By definition, the NMD system involves missile defence. India , on the other hand, would need a missile arsenal to maintain its Minimum Nuclear Deterrence capability. Reconciling this divergence to protect each other's national interests would require a sustained dialogue and give and take between India and the US . Moreover, India neither has a missile capability nor is likely to develop one in the foreseeable future, which can threaten US interests. Washington does not consider India an enemy or "country of concern." The US NMD system thus does not target India . As Washington argues, it favours the development and deployment of such a system to meet the challenge from small hostile proliferators. Thus it would not have been prudent to oppose the NMD proposal, and  shun dialogue on the issue.

 

 

It is getting clearer that the Bush administration intends to sustain the dialogue process with India . Currently, the policymaking community in Washington is deliberating on the need to lift the sanctions imposed on India after the nuclear tests of May 1998. The goal is to lift sanctions in a way that would not create the impression that Washington is rewarding proliferation activities.

 

 

Secondly, the Bush Administration is making efforts to prevent non-proliferation issues from derailing the Clinton Administration's engagement strategy vis-à-vis India . It has already given assurances to strengthen the bilateral working group on terrorism. It has also hinted at restoring the dialogue on defence issues by Defence Policy Groups, led by the Pentagon and the Indian Ministry of Defence.

 

 

Notwithstanding these trends, the fact remains that every thing currently is at the dialogue level. There is a long distance to travel before concrete partnership materializes.

 

 

 

POPULAR COMMENTARIES