Attack at Katunayake: Strategic Rights and Political Wrongs

02 Aug, 2001    ·   533

N. Manoharan analyses the reasons for and the implications of the recent attack on the Katunayake airbase and the Bandaranaike International Airport by the LTTE

N Manoharan
N Manoharan

 

 

The daring attack by the LTTE on the Katunayake air base and the Bandaranaike International Airport near Colombo on July 24 entailed an “unprecedented destruction for modern aviation”. A total of 11 aircraft were attacked, including two Israeli Kfir bombers, two Mi-17 transport helicopters, one MiG-27 fighter aircraft, three Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and three Airbus planes. The attack was also directed on the fuel storages. The total estimated loss could be anywhere near $500 million. 

 

 

What made the Tigers launch such a major attack after keeping a low profile of late, fearing international isolation? Was this connected to the recent air raids by the Sri Lankan Air Force on LTTE strongholds? Or was it related to the politico-strategic situation in the island?

 

 

A retaliation by the Tigers against the incessant air raids on the LTTE areas by the Sri Lankan Air Force was expected. In fact, on July 2 the LTTE issued a stern warning. For some strange reason it was ignored. No extra precaution was taken on the anniversary of ‘Black July’. The attack is seen as the Tigers’ desperation for a breakthrough to boost the dwindling morale of its cadre. Of late they have been on the run, after setbacks on the battle and political fronts. They could not launch any major attack nor inflict heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan armed forces. The rate of cadre loss has also increased. Besides the Sri Lanka Air Force, enthused by its newly acquired Israeli bombers, was attacking LTTE strongholds to “disperse their realignment and attack on Jaffna town”. Hence, the only option available to the LTTE was to cripple the Air Force at its base, rather than rely on its inaccurate and risky anti-aircraft guns. It is from the Katunayake airbase that attacks were being launched.

 

 

The operation is also designed to add to strains in the collapsing island’s economy. Less economic growth would also means less money for divertion to the war front. It was also intended to signal that in any process of settling the issue the LTTE cannot be excluded. Through the announcement of referendum it was clear that the government had decided to exclude the LTTE in resolving the ethnic conflict.

 

 

However, though strategically sound, the attack will certainly be politically suicidal for the LTTE. The attack has strengthened the Government’s hand in dealing with political uncertainty. It is easy now for the ruling regime to convince people that it is imperative for them to vote for a new constitution to deal with the LTTE. The government can easily campaign that there is a “nexus” between the Opposition and the LTTE. The United National Party (UNP) alliance with pro-LTTE parties like the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and, to an extent, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) can be pinpointed that has been in the forefront to bring in no-confidence motion against the present regime. It has also strengthened the voices of the Sinhalese hardliners to come down heavily on the militants; they could also argue that any concessions to the minorities would be counter-productive. This would be against the interests of the innocent members of the ethnic community which the LTTE represents.

 

 

The attack has also put a question mark over the Norwegian initiated peace process. With what moral authority can the LTTE now demand lifting of the ban upon it by the Sri Lankan government? The attack has undone the painstaking efforts of Oslo and the Sri Lankan civil society organizations to bring the two parties to the table. By this attack the LTTE has isolated itself further from the international community. It is about time that the organization sheds its blood-tainted paws and came to the negotiating table to clinch a long-lasting deal. Both the government and the Tigers have to ask themselves an important question: Is the issue military or political? If it is military, it goes without saying that violence is the only means to reach a solution. But if it is political then only political means could bring about a long-lasting solution. 

 

 

 

 

 

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