India, China and No-First-Use : Strategic Culture or Realpolitik ?

13 Jul, 2001    ·   522

Shivaji Mukherjee says that the No-First- Use policy of India and China are rooted in their defence culture and reflects their 'defensive defence'
Shivaji Mukherjee
India and China are the only two countries that adhere by the principle of No-First-Use of nuclear weapons. A comparison of their nuclear doctrines reveals conceptual similarities in their nuclear doctrines:

 

 

·                     Both nations have declared a No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear posture making a radical departure from the nuclear theology of the other nuclear weapon states (NWS), who retain the nuclear-first-strike option (except Russia for a short period in the 1980s).

 

 

·                     Both nations have declared they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

 

 

·                     Both nations accept that abolition of nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapon free world is a desirable goal. 

 

 

·                     Both nations have proposed an international treaty on the No-First-Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, especially between  the NWS. India is willing to enter bilateral and multilateral negotiations to emplace NFU. China drafted a Treaty on No-First-Use (NFU) in January 1994 and circulated it to the USA , Russia , UK and France . But only Russia entered a bilateral agreement with China on December 4, 1994.

 

 

·                     Both nations underline the defensive-orientation of their nuclear postures. A white paper issued by the Chinese Government in 1998 reiterated that “ China possesses a small number of nuclear weapons, entirely for meeting the needs of self-defense.” The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine commits India to maintain “credible minimum nuclear deterrence”.

 

 

·                     India and China have evolved strategic cultures based on their historical, military, institutional and geostrategic experience. There is a certain similarity in  their strategic cultures, but subtle differences, too. What follows is a brief comparative analysis of their strategic cultures and the impact on their NFU postures.

 

 

There are two alternative interpretations of Chinese strategic culture. The writings of Sun Tzu and Confucius present ancient China as possessing a weak martial tradition (especially in contrast to Japan ) and a preference for strategic defense and minimal use of force. To quote Sun Tzu : “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. . .”. Likewise, Mao emphasized defeating the enemy through attrition based on time and space. But, Alastair Johnston suggests that China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or parabellum strategic culture into the Maoist period and beyond, hence, China ’s strategic behavior exhibits a preference for offensive use of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities.

 

 

Some scholars argue that China ’s NFU policy emphasizes strategic defense and is compatible with the Confucian paradigm. Others believe that, in recent years, China has been moving away from minimum deterrence towards limited deterrence (more maximalist), exhibiting this  parabellum strategic culture.

 

 

Some Indian strategic thinkers believe that the NFU posture in India ’s nuclear doctrine flows logically from its traditional defense-oriented strategic culture. Some attribute this defensive tradition to India ’s lacking a martial tradition and conquest of foreign territories; others point to the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence. Some Western scholars have interpreted the paucity of writings on strategic issues in ancient India as due to India ’s lacking a strategic culture. 

 

 

What accounts for the active advocacy of NFU and defense-orientation in the nuclear postures of both India and China ? How much of this orientation is a result of realpolitik calculus and how much can be traced to their strategic cultures or deeper reasons embedded in the ways in which these two ancient civilizations have learnt to think about military/strategic issues? 

 

 

The common Western perception is  that the NFU posture is merely unverifiable diplomatese. It is policy jargon which can be unilaterally reversed during crises. This viewpoint emphasizes realpolitik and diplomatic cost-benefit analysis as the raison d’etre underlying  India and China ’s NFU policy.Alternatively, the very fact that a nation accepts NFU at even the doctrinal level implies that there are  strong norms and values operating in the strategic realm. So, the initial choices of NFU by India and China are probably rooted in their traditional defense-oriented  strategic cultures.

 

 

It is interesting that both India and China are committed to developing a nuclear triad. Today, China seems to be moving away from minimalism towards developing tactical nuclear weapons and India could shift towards a war-fighting doctrine in future. Could this be due to  realpolitik calculations based on changing threat perceptions, or push factors provided by technological and economic development? Or could it be that the strategic cultures of these two nations is evolving  because of  the changing  international environment?

 

 

 

POPULAR COMMENTARIES