Nepal after the Regicide: Maoist Threat Increases
05 Jul, 2001 · 516
Chandra B Khanduri perceives Maoist insurgency as the biggest emerging threat and pleads for a political solution to overcome it
This article is the continuation of Nepal under Maoist Threat written by Brig.C.B.Khanduri
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The events of the regicide clearly show that the real threat to
The main problem of
The Maoist insurgency has also spread to the Terai and parts of
The various governments that have been in power since 1996 have devised a three-pronged strategy to contain, if not liquidate, the Maoist insurgency. First, an effort to unify the political parties has been made by appointing Sher Bahadur Deuba, a former Prime Minister, for going into the overall cause and consequence of the insurgency. Second, development of the area is being prioritized and efforts are afoot to reach the people. Third, CI Operations by the Police, the Special Police and the employment of the Army is also being considered. Overall, therefore, it is a strategy of Suppression of insurgency along with Reconciliation- a policy of carrot and stick.
The Nepalese Government has taken several measures to improve the efficiency of the Special Police Force comprising about 35,000 personal. It has increased its strength by some 22,000. It is arming it with 7.62mm Galil assault rifles. The army has been instructed to train it in CI operations. The Police, including the Special Police are taking the brunt of the casualties for the past 4 years
In so far the employment of the RNA for CI operations is concerned, it is a ticklish problem and even the PM needs approval of the National Defence Council, the King (being the Supreme Commander), and consensus with the political parties. The Army itself insists that all parties should agree to their involvement. The RNA Chief quotes the 1998 situation when the ruling party employed a part of the RNA for CI, but soon the orders had to be rescinded for failure to get approval from NDC! GP Koirala, although earlier keen on the Army’s employment in CI, had to change his stance. He said; “I am not in favour of mobilization of the army…it is the ultimate weapon. If it fails, do we then call the Chinese or Indian armies?” So the CI remains confined to Police action.
In the final analysis,