The Indian government's peace offensive in Kashmir has failed. After stubbornly refusing to talk to Pakistan - the Indian government finally gave in and invited General Musharraf for talks. Although the Indian government’s abrupt turnaround has been welcomed across the board, I wonder how it may achieve its objectives-- if the objective is to end terrorism and de-escalate tension in the subcontinent.

Prime Minister Vajpayee and his team calculated that the cessation of hostilities by the Indian armed forces would prompt at least some of the separatist groups to jump the gun and make way for a possible peace dialogue. That strategy clearly did not work out. After holding out for six months - the so-called "ceasefire"- or "no first strike", as it should have been referred to, is now over. The Indian armed forces are once again free to neutralise the militants, while the government in New Delhi tries direct peace diplomacy with Pakistan. 

The speed of events in the past few weeks has taken observers by surprise on both sides of the border. So much so that, even some of the senior Indian officials are uncertain while fielding questions on the abrupt change of policy. There is no doubt that neither side will be eager to compromise. A peaceful resolution of the problem would first require peace in the Kashmir Valley. This would be much harder for Pakistan to guarantee than for India.

Let us look at the equation. India spends close to 36 million dollars each year in maintaining the anti-insurgency forces in the Kashmir valley. It has at least 300,000-armed personnel stationed permanently in the region. International concern over Kashmir has become particularly acute after India and Pakistan went nuclear in 1998. That increases New Delhi's vulnerability and severely limits its foreign policy options to keep Kashmir outside the sphere of international mediation. 

Prolonged militancy can have severe consequences for India's internal law and order. 

That explains perhaps why the Indian government has been slicing away decades of national consensus on Kashmir and making room for compromise. 

For Pakistan, however, Kashmir is an unresolved question of its very existence. Most Pakistanis believe that they will remain incomplete as a nation without Kashmir. Its fanatical zeal has led Islamabad to pursue a suicidal arms race with India at the cost of more pressing matters like education and development. 

The establishment in Pakistan must be given full marks for the way in which it has single-mindedly followed its mission. Insurgency has proved to be an effective low cost policy option. For one, it keeps Indian forces engaged in heavy counter-insurgency operations. Another it acts a safety valve where irredentist Islamists vent their rage. 

Kashmir has become a playground for the hundreds and thousands of Talibanised Mujahideens (holy warriors). Pakistan's rulers (and this includes the military and the civil bureaucracy) know only too well, that if the Kashmir "dispute" ever gets resolved, fundamentalist Islam will subsume whatever remains of the country's moderate civility.

A lasting peace can only be negotiated under two possibilities. One, where a conflict itself has overrun its course, and two, where the party holding the strongest interest in negotiations, does so, with a position of advantage. In the case of India and Pakistan, none of these conditions apply. The cost of this conflict weighs far too heavily on India and no agreement, under such circumstances, will be possible.

What then of the much anticipated visit of General Pervez Musharraf to New Delhi? Well, not much. It will remain high on atmospherics than substance ... another opportunity for both leaders to bask in the flashlights of the world media perhaps. But peace? Never mind peace. That utopia will remain as elusive as ever.