A Meeting with Al Badr Group at Lahore

22 May, 2001    ·   497

Col Virendra Sahai Verma recollects his meeting with Al Badr leaders during his visit to Pakistan in March 2001
Al Badr was recognized in September 1999 as one of the nine major militant groups operating in the Valley. A delegation of retired soldiers from the India-Pakistan Soldiers’ Initiative for Peace, which had visited Pakistan recently, met representatives of the group on 1 March 2001 at Lahore . It is significant to note that this meeting was organized at their request. Lashkar-e-Toiba also wanted to meet us. This request came on the last day and our busy schedule did not permit the meeting though we would have liked to meet them as well. It was interesting to listen to their motivations first hand from Mujahideen leaders.

 

 

Maj. Gen. M.H. Ansari, bearded Pak army officer retired in 1976, led the Al Badre group whom we met. He heads the accountability cell of Al Badr. Amongst the other members of the group whom we met were two fathers whose sons are at present fighting in J&K. One of them, who is the principal of a school, had one son already ‘martyred’, and the other son was fighting in the valley. 

 

 

Al Badr surfaced in its present form in September 1998 after splitting from the Hizbul Mujahideen. Former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar gave its name. It is a militant outfit of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Al Badr is a complex in the Gurbaz district in Khost province of Southern Afghanistan , which comprises six training camps. The Khost camps have attracted a large number of young men from Punjab (Pak), NWFP, Sindh, Kashmir (both sides of LOC), Afghanistan and even some Arabs. These camps were handed over to the Harkatul Mujahideen. Its supreme commander is POK based Salahuddin. Al Badr is active in Kashmir and Afghanistan . It is reported that militants involved in Kargil were from Tehrike-e-Jehad, Al Badr and Harkatul Mujahideen.

 

 

Maj. Gen. Ansari (retd.) commenced his talk by saying that when he heard that some retired Indian Army officers have come on a peace mission, he requested for a meeting and he is happy that this was arranged. He said it is a good move and a good initiative. He went on to describe how 60 to 80 thousand Kashmiris have been killed by Indian troops at this time Maj. Gen. B N Dar of India intervened to say that the militants have caused violence and security forces are only protecting the people and sovereignty of the state. There is not a house, which is not affected by the violence whether it is of Hindu or Muslim. Gen. Ansari accepted that in the cross fire some civilians might have been killed by the Mujahideens. He said that the Mujahideens number does not exceed a few hundreds or at the most he said four thousand whereas seven to eight lakhs Indian troops are fighting in the Valley. They will naturally cause more destruction. 

 

 

Gen. Ansari mentioned that the Mujahideens are fighting voluntarily and are under nobody’s control. The Pakistan Government cannot stop them. At this stage one father of a mujahideen stated that after one of his sons was killed in Kashmir , he and his wife attempted to prevent his other son from going, which proved futile. His son was motivated after reading a story in time magazine. Those who go to Kashmir know their return is uncertain. At least there is two-way traffic to Afghanistan . In Kashmir it is only one way. 

 

 

Dr Mubashir Hasan, prominent peace activist and former finance minister of Pakistan , who was acting as facilitator, asked the Al Badr leader to specify his minimum demands to stop or reduce the violence in J&K, which the Indian delegation can convey to the Indian leaders. How can a way out be found? Gen. Ansari replied that the number of Indian troops should be reduced in J&K. He has witnessed Pakistan troops returning back from the LOC. Even a token reduction will give some solace to the Kashmiris and a message for peace across the border. Gen. Ansari pleaded that both India and Pakistan should sit at the negotiating table without preconditions. After the first ceasefire during Ramzan, there was some hope of talks and the Mujahideens had reduced their operations. Since there was no follow up on the peace process by India , the boys got impatient and violence increased. Lt Gen. Moti Dar and Col. A R Khan of India said that talks could commence only if violence is stopped or at least reduced. Gen. Ansari replied that the violence would automatically reduce if talks were resumed. When asked about other militants groups and whether they would also reduce the violence if talks were commenced, he said that he cannot guarantee but feels that all the militants will reduce violence if talks are resumed. He was questioned that he was saying that the militants are independent; at the same time he says they will reduce violence if talks are commenced. Does it mean that the authorities in Pakistan can control Mujahideens. He did not answer this question but said that he is certain that, if talks are resumed, the violence will reduce. 

 

 

Assessment

 

 

Our discussions with the militant group led us to believe that for the bulk of the young Muslim Mujahids, Jihad is a strong motivating factor for fighting in J&K and making supreme sacrifices. We have to accept this fact, and should analyze its causes. There may be some criminals and for some, the money factor may be important. But for the bulk of young men it is a voluntary response to help a fellow Muslim who is reported to be in ‘distress.’ We have to accept this fact. 

 

 

The Mujahideens, though they belong to various groups, can still be controlled by establishment in Pakistan . There is no doubt that they are trained and supported by Pakistan establishment. Pakistani militants foresee a long struggle and no end to it if the stalemate continues. It appears that they do not hope to win over the far superior Indian security forces. Most of the militants would support a forward movement in the peace process. In this process they may find an opportunity for resolution of the dispute. A token reduction of troops from the LOC may help in reducing tensions and could be a useful diplomatic ploy, but have to see that preparedness is not sacrificed.

 

 

 

 

 

POPULAR COMMENTARIES