Nuclear South Asia: Reducing Risks

12 Apr, 2001    ·   487

Shaukat Qadir asserts that it requires an understanding of each other’s concerns and political will on both sides to move forward from the present India-Pakistan nuclear conundrum
From one perspective the South Asia nuclear equation is a first-ever situation. The closest the world came to this during the cold war era was the ‘two Germanys ’. However, there was no ongoing conflict and, the control of these weapons lay with powers far removed in both, time and distance, which resulted in an objectivity, which could only result in greater security. 

 

 

It is important here to understand the ‘illogic’ of deterrence. Deterrence is based on the fact that the opponent must believe that the other will use nuclear weapons, to deter, and be deterred. Thus the option of ‘no first use’ mitigates against the very logic it is based on, which is itself illogical. When China joined the nuclear club, the US accepted China as possessing deterrence, even though it had only two dozen warheads as opposed to the many thousands in USSR and US. Had roles been reversed, it is unlikely that China would have accepted the US as possessing a deterrent, since the level of ‘unacceptable damage’ is higher in this part of the world. Such views are heard amongst Chinese scholars that if India wants to take us on, by all means. We will lose a couple of hundred million, but India will be wiped off the face of the earth. Similar views have been expressed by Indian scholars regarding  Pakistan . In this region, therefore, deterrence requires a clearer definition. 

 

 

The following conclusions could safely be made. Firstly, that neither leadership desires a nuclear exchange. Second, that both sides possess a crude second strike capability, which is recognized. India by virtue of its greater depth and longer range of its missiles and, Pakistan , by virtue of the diversity of its terrain close to the borders, will not allow any pre-emptive strike to guarantee that no weapon could have survived. Third, that neither country is likely to have access to the kind of sophisticated C4I capabilities available to the US , within the foreseeable future. In fact, even if they did, it would  make little difference, since the flight time of the missiles range between three to seven minutes. Such a brief interval ensures that, even with the most sophisticated systems, either side would discover it has been ‘nuked’, after being ‘nuked’. Fourth, and lastly, that sooner or later China will have to be built into the equation. There is a view that presently India can not deter China , and inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. Despite India ’s claims, it is not likely to possess this capability very soon. However, any discussion on nuclear security will have to cater for India ’s expressed concerns regarding China .

 

 

Accepting this reality, the real concern becomes that of a nuclear exchange through accidental use, unauthorized use, or through misperceptions. Although this kind of information is seldom shared, there may have been as few as fourteen and, as many as twenty seven occasions when the US President had, figuratively speaking, ‘his thumb on the button’. Even if this never happened, it could have, which is cause for concern. How much more likely is this in South Asia , where the technological support is primitive, and the flight time so short? 

 

 

The term ‘Strategic Warning Time’ denotes the time interval between the emergence of a nuclear threat and the ability to respond. The nuclear powers have sought to bring it as close to zero as possible. It might be better to fix a reasonable interval, say forty minutes, so that a potentially disastrous situation can be diffused through dialogue, for which time is essential. This implies creating a physical distance between the missile and the warhead. Professor Scott Sagan, Stanford University , appears to have independently arrived at the same conclusion.

 

 

There will be several problems, beginning with verification. Not only of warheads and missiles numbers, but also the distance between them. There are technological ways of getting around this difficulty. The problem is that their reliability is in direct proportion to the degree of intrusiveness. Intrusiveness is likely to be resisted by both actors in South Asia , and even more so by China . Andrei Zagorski, Executive Director at the East-West Institute in Prague , is working on a futuristic and revolutionary idea: shared early warning systems, which might well be the way forward though not just yet. However, there are ways round difficulties in any solution, but they require an understanding of the problem, of each other’s concerns, and political will on both sides. Those of us who live on this ‘the razor’s edge’ can but only hope that the governments on both sides come alive to this problem. So far they cannot even talk. 

 

 

 

POPULAR COMMENTARIES