Extending the Peace Net: Three Snakes and a Peacock
14 Mar, 2001 · 483
N Manoharan looks into the hurdles that remain in the Centre extending the ceasefire to all the militant groups in Nagaland
After
Kashmir
, it is the turn of the Northeast. The Centre is “actively” considering the Nagaland government’s proposal to extend the three-year-old ceasefire with the NSCN (IM) to two other insurgent groups—NSCN(K) and Naga Federal Group (NFG). The rationale is that no one group has the mandate to resolve the problem. The Nagaland Chief Minister, S. C. Jamir, is of the opinion that “peace is an essential pre-requisite for progress and development”. This is also in line with
New Delhi
’s efforts to “discover ways and means to restore peace, bring development, and generate employment opportunities in the strife torn region”. Then where lies the problem, and why the delay?
New Delhi
has made it clear that it is willing to talk to any militant group if they are willing to abjure violence and come to the negotiating table. However, unless these inter-factional differences are resolved, there will not be a solution to the oldest insurgency problem in the country.
Thailand
. The delay due to conflicting interpretations of the ceasefire agreement is also responsible.
Manipur , Assam
and Arunachal Pradesh. The three chief ministers, who met the Prime Minister, Vajpayee in March, urged him to extend the ceasefire to the entire Northeast by initiating a dialogue with all the militant outfits in the region. They made it clear that limiting the truce to the NSCN factions “in the long run would be detrimental to their states” since they have large Naga populations. It is argued that limiting the extension of the ceasefire only to the Naga inhabited areas will mean tacitly accepting the demand for a “Greater Nagaland”.
Kashmir
case. But there are stark differences between the
Kashmir
situation and the one that prevails in the Northeast. Firstly, unlike
Kashmir
, where foreign outfits are active, the groups in the Northeast are local, although they do enjoy support across the borders. Secondly, the Home Ministry statistics on the killings suggests that the violence during the ceasefire has drastically reduced compared to the pre-ceasefire period. The situation in
Kashmir
is just the opposite. Thirdly, unlike J&K, there has been a positive response from the militant outfits in the Northeast. For instance, the Kaplang faction of the NSCN, which has opposed the ceasefire so far, has now indicated its willingness for the ceasefire. It is true that they are being hunted down by the Burmese authorities, but the real reason is that the faction wants to go along with the peace wind that has started blowing in the state.
The hurdles remain the parties to the conflict. Firstly, the main Naga outfit, NSCN (IM), has opposed Jamir’s proposal. It does not recognize the two other rival groups and demands that they come under its banner before the ceasefire or peace talks. But, this is an unwarranted demand. It is fair that these groups should reach a broad understanding with the other two prior to holding talks with the Centre. The differences between them are not on policy matters but due to their belonging to different sections of the Naga tribe. While the Muivah faction draws its support from the Semas and Tankhul Nagas, the Kaplang faction enjoys support among the Hemi Nagas. The other faction, Federal, had its origins in the Angami tribe.
The second hurdle seems to be the Centre’s failure to evolve a comprehensive peace deal in the northeast. The peace talks with the NSCN (IM) have not made much headway, despite three years of ceasefire. The only positive result has been the periodic extension of ceasefire. Of course, the delay in the talks can be attributed to the imprisonment of the IM leader, Thuiangleng Muivah, and the ongoing court cases against him in
The third hurdle comes from the chief ministers of
But Home Ministry officials claim that the suggestion for holding a dialogue with all the outfits in the Northeast could become a problem, as finding common ground rule might not be an acceptable proposition for all of them. The ‘pro-comprehensive’ approachers might point out to the
The, ‘particularist approach’ will not deliver the goods, which has been realized by the Centre now. At the same time, talking to all the outfits in the region under one umbrella is also impractical. Was not the Mizo Accord, which is considered to be a successful agreement in the Northeast, reached without linking it to any other militants operating in the region? Thus, a feasible approach could be that the ceasefire includes all the three outfits in Nagaland, but not all areas inhabited by the Nagas.
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
