Nuclearisation of Tibetan Plateau and its Implications for India
13 Mar, 2001 · 482
Satish Kumar points out why India and China should sort out the issue of nuclearisation of the Tibetan Plateau through a security dialogue
Li Peng has visited
India
and met the Indian President, Prime Minister, other leaders and the media. But he ducked the
Tibet
issue, since
China
does not consider
Tibet
to be a dispute between
India
and
China
.
India
’s commitment to improving bilateral ties with
China
and discussing the boundary dispute is clear. But this will not dispel the cloud of mutual suspicions and antagonism unless the
Tibet
issue is brought on to the agenda. The nuclearisation of the
Tibet
plateau is an established fact. According to a report submitted by the American author John Avedon to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 17 September 1987 , “one quarter of
China
’s 350 strong nuclear missile forces are in
Tibet
.”
China
’s major nuclear sites are located in
Tibet
.
China
’s nuclear production establishment, known as the
Ninth
Academy
, was ready to produce nuclear weapons by 1971. The first batch of nuclear weapons manufactured was reportedly brought to
Tsaidam
Basin
and stationed at the extreme
north west
of Amdo province because of its high altitude and isolation. These missiles, located at large Tsaidam and small Tsaidam, are reported to have a range of over 4,000 km, placing the whole Indian subcontinent within striking distance.
Tibet
is equally important for
China
and
India
. George Ginsburg and Michael Mathow, who made the first study of Communist China and Tibet, explained the strategic importance of Tibet in these words, “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent and may well have all of South Asia within his reach, and with that all of Asia.” In fact, the Chinese take over of
Tibet
is based on their strategic calculus.
China
was not linked to
Tibet
by road. Immediately after its occupation in 1951, the Chinese began constructing highways which connected
Tibet
and
China
. By the end of the 1970s,
China
had completed more than 90 highways and 97 percent of
Tibet
was connected with
China
by road. This transportation network has speeded up the process of militarisation and nuclearisation of
Tibet
. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the process of nuclearisation continued unabated.
India
in particular. Chinese nuclear policy is based on limited deterrence which, according to Johnston, a specialist on
China
’s strategic doctrines, is aimed at inflicting heavy counter-force and counter-value damage on the enemy.
India
deploys its nuclear weapons on the Sino-Indian border, the situation will become volatile. Ecologically, militarisation of the Tibetan plateau is an important regional and global issue, because it is a major source of river water for
India
,
Bhutan
and other countries. Upsetting the ecological balance of the high Tibetan plateau also affects the jet streams that blow over it, and are linked with the environment of the whole Asian continent and global climatic patterns.
India
to raise the
Tibet
issue. In fact,
Tibet
was the buffer zone between the
British India
and
China
. Chinese nuclear establishments are mostly concentrated in ‘Inner Tibet’, which is closer to the Chinese mainland and different from ‘Outer Tibet’, which refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region that enjoys autonomy and separate entity; therefore establishment of Outer Tibet as a buffer zone poses no threat to its nuclear sites. The concept of buffer zone should be based on the British-Russian Treaty that was signed on 1907. This treaty was the culmination of the rivalry between
Britain
and
Russia
. Both imperialist powers agreed to create
Tibet
and
Afghanistan
as buffer zones between the two. This treaty not only induced peace in the region but also reined in the incessant flow of money on defence preparedness which was a logical corollary of mutual suspicion, danger and threat perceptions.
India
and
China
and induce peace in the entire region. Unless it is done accordingly,
India
’s security will remain endangered; and endangered security is bound to create mutual antagonism and suspicion.
India
deploys its nuclear weapons on the Himalayan border, then
China
might advance its nuclear weapons to Outer Tibet which is very close to the Indian border. Such an initiative will bring two nuclear powers on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. So, it is wise to sort out the difference through security dialogue.
The strategic importance of
Prior to 1950
Chinese nuclear establishment on the Tibetan plateau affects the South Asian security in general and
The Tibetan plateau is hardly two thousand kilometres away from the Indian capital. If
The time has come for
In fact, neutralisation of Outer Tibet will decrease the tension between the
At this juncture, if