Future of US Policy in South Asia: Controlling Pakistan
02 Mar, 2001 · 478
Parama Sinha Palit argues that US interests in South Asia in the future would largely depend on its success in curbing Pakistan's aggressive designs, particularly in Kashmir
Prior to his departure for
South Asia
in March 2000, President Clinton summed up his views on the region by calling it ‘the most dangerous place’. South Asian observers could have hardly agreed more. After Pokhran and Chagai in 1998, and Kargil in 1999, the region became exceptionally volatile. This is, of course, not to suggest that
South Asia
was a haven of peace before. While
India
demonstrated its nuclear capabilities way back in 1974,
Pakistan
’s progress in assembling nuclear weapons became evident by the late 80s. Despite clear evidence regarding the nuclear threats of the region, the
US
chose to ignore them in the 70s and 80s. At that time, the concern for neutralising the Soviets was the overriding objective. Accordingly, it supported
Pakistan
’s military ambitions.
Pakistan
utilised the magnanimity for building up its conventional weapons arsenal as well as nuclear strength.
Soviet Union
changed the
US
perspective of
South Asia
. There were two reasons responsible for the transition.
Pakistan
was no longer useful to the
US
for deciding the balance of power in the region. Withdrawal of Soviet presence from
Afghanistan
marginalised
Pakistan
’s significance as a political ally. Moreover,
India
gradually emerged as an attractive destination for US commercial investment due to economic reforms, a growing market and as a provider of information age services. A stable, secure
India
promised prospects of a happy hunting ground for US business interests.
Washington
’s interests in
South Asia
would largely depend on its success in curbing
Pakistan
’s aggressive designs, particularly in
Kashmir
. In this respect, the
US
has its job cut out. It has to ensure that the tensions between
India
and
Pakistan
do not snowball into a nuclear crisis for
South Asia
.
Washington
’s handling of
Kashmir
and the larger issue of Indo-Pak relations would be decisive in determining the stability of the region. Its repeated insistence on a bilateral solution to
Kashmir
is well taken. But this doesn’t mean that it can be an indifferent observer and yet expect
South Asia
to fit snugly into its envisaged agenda of economic and commercial prosperity.
South Asia
would be restraining
Pakistan
from carrying on low-intensity warfare in
Kashmir
.
Pakistan
seems convinced in the capability of nuclear weapons in deterring larger, destructive wars. It believes that
India
wouldn’t escalate the low intensity conflict in
Kashmir
in the fear of precipitating a nuclear confrontation.
Pakistan
has inherent advantages in sporadic, small-scale conflicts, compared to full-fledged conventional tussles, where odds favour
India
.
Washington
has to be amply blunt in discouraging
Pakistan
from its current activities in
Kashmir
by pointing out the futility of the approach.
Pakistan
’s rapid Islamisation and growth of a jihadist culture in the country have been responsible for its various irrational actions. As of now, the ruling establishment in
Pakistan
shows no inclination to revert to civilian governance. The sponsoring of terrorism in
Kashmir
, promotion of insurgency in various parts of
India
and provocative overtures at the LOC are part of an overall strategy to destabilise
India
. So far,
India
has resisted the temptation to cross the LOC and has prevented the conflict from blowing up. But it is important for the
US
to take the lead in impressing upon
Pakistan
the need to develop a constructive
India
policy.
South Asia
was a politically balancing entity for the
US
. Now it is an economically sensitive region. The future
US
policy in
South Asia
will be determined by commercial and business motives. Cultivation of economic interests implies maintaining close ties with
India
. But that would call for greater distance with
Pakistan
. Given the present circumstances, getting closer to either
India
or
Pakistan
, would mean antagonising the other. Recent developments have underlined
India
’s importance to the
US
as a priority zone in
South Asia
. Apart from economic interests,
India
and the
US
have certain common strategic concerns. These include, countering terrorism, managing nuclear proliferation and containing
China
.
US
objective is to marginalise
Pakistan
and distance it from
China
too. A Chinese supported
Pakistan
is a substantial deterrent to the
US
perspective of a stable
South Asia
.
China
is a primary security threat to
India
. Besides, subsequent to Cold War, it is considered to be the principal strategic competitor to the
US
. For promoting long-term interests in
Asia
, the
US
would like to have strategic co-ordination with
Japan
and
India
. In trying to achieve the objective, the
US
has to ensure that the China-Pakistan alliance doesn’t emerge as a thorn in its flesh.
US
foreign policy on
South Asia
. One of these is the proposed NMD system. Development of NMD by the
US
is likely to provoke an identical reaction from
China
. A stronger
China
will imply a better-equipped
Pakistan
forcing
India
to consider new defence capabilities. The eventual outcome would be greater volatility and tension in
South Asia
which would be inimical to US interests in the region.
The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the
In the coming days, realisation of
Undoubtedly, the toughest challenge for US in
During the Cold War,
The long term
A crucial issue in this regard is the possible impact of other autonomous developments in