Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) - II
02 Mar, 2001 · 476
Brig Chandra B Khanduri comments on the changes in military strategy with high technology becoming integral to all military operations
The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated RMA in its initial effective form, although, the primary value of emerging technology had been substantiated during the England- Argentina Falkland war. While the NATO and the developed countries grappled with the problem of continuous technical advances,
Pakistan ,
Japan ,
South Korea and
China too have devoted considerable attention to it. The ASEAN countries made good progress from 1993 but the economic recession of mid-1990s, stopped them in their tracks.
South Korea has a TMD and
Japan ’s defence budget has arisen to about $400 billion, second only to US’s,
Pakistan has continued to improve its acquisitions rather than indigenously develop its RMA but is well off in its technological applications in all fields of military capability including integration of Services, their logistics and ISR.
Australia and
Singapore . Known through its sobriquet of a ‘Phantom Army,’ the corps size Australian Army is recognizing itself and has brought about a large qualitative improvement in mobility, fire power and force multipliers. Its quick and effective response in
East Timor in 1999 saw its emphasis on the RMA. The ‘strong punch’ of a tiny nation like
Singapore is demonstrative of its adopting the RMA fruitfully.
Asia , however, RMA has distinctly made significant strides in
Israel and
China . While
Israel ’s standing is thus far unchallenged,
China ’s modernization of PLA is turning its doctrine of ‘fighting in local condition’ to ‘fighting against an enemy in modern high technological battle field conditions’. It has an obvious reference to the Chinese apprehension of a future conflict over
Taiwan .
Indian Ocean . Its two aircraft carriers added to its maneuverability. But the Indian Navy remained a regional force, at best. The IAF too improved qualitatively. Its Mirage 2000s gave it a matching capability to
Pakistan ’s F-16s. It also improved its strategic lift capability. Nonetheless IAFs strategic capability especially against
China , despite superior aircraft, remained confined to a defensive role.
Pakistan forced the Kargil War on
India in May 1999, the Services maintained nothing more than a mere status quo. Even with the post Kargil War improvements with a one time budget hike of 10 percent for the financial year 2000-2001, RMA was no where in the Indian Armed Forces. The reasons for this slow effort are the reluctance to integrate defence resources, agencies and evolve long term security strategies.
India ’s intelligence, surveillance and strategic target acquisition besides operational logistics remain compartmentalized. Overall integration of all these to acquire and provide ‘dominant battle space knowledge’ as the RMA envisages, needs to be considerably enhanced.
India , the challenge is immediate and needs to be handled on a war footing.
The Japanese and South Koreans with American help and their own sound economies have striven hard to improve their RMA. Consequently while
RMA has found its ways even amongst the lesser military enthusiasts such as
Among all nations of
The Indian Defence forces made a quantum jump from 1970s. On the ground the Indian Army rose to almost a 40 division force with two strike corps, its own aviation, improved communications, ECM and a small amphibian and airborne capabilities besides some addition to operational logistics and air defence. The Navy too acquired a Nuclear Submarine for trials in the
The system continued to suffer as the budgetary control (varying between 2 and 3 percent of GDP) kept modernization at slow pace. Until
· The progress on integrating the MOD and the Services has remained tardy and a victim of bureaucratic manipulations-cum-political skullduggery. Consequently, lack of unanimity of decision on common issues of doctrines including RMA continues to haunt the Indian defence.
·
· Integration and coordination are two sides of a coin, especially in military affairs-the research and development specifically. The DRDO and other defence oriented industry and R&D requires both boost and accountability to achieve RMA.
· While some degree of ‘weaponization’ of nuclear weapons has been achieved, we are still far form formalizing our nuclear doctrine and its command & control. The armed forces are also not sufficiently prepared to fight in a nuclear environment.
Keeping pace with the RMA will require review of existing defence resources, to instill efficiency, economy and modernization through integrated and accountable systems. For
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