Pakistan Today - III: The Myth of Talibanisation
27 Feb, 2001 · 473
Suba Chandran argues that neither the civil society nor the political elite favours “talibanisation” of Pakistan
Is
Pakistan
getting talibanised? What are the factors that underline such an assumption? Would the mere growth of the madrassas in numbers and the support received by the jihadi organisations from a section of the society be sufficient enough to assume that the process of talibanisation of Pakistani society is in process? What does one mean by “Talibanisation’? What are the factors involved in “talibanisation” process? Can those factors be applied to
Pakistan
? These are certain questions that need an in-depth analysis before concluding that
Pakistan
is getting talibanised.
Pakistan
? An analysis of the electoral performance of the various Islamic parties in the last ten years will prove that the public support for these parties are in fact declining. In the 1993 elections, the religious parties in
Pakistan
were able to corner only 5.6 percentage of the votes. Not only the percentage of the votes polled by these parties have declined, but also the number of seats that these parties had in the National Assembly also had declined. From 18 seats during the 1970s, it has come down to 9 seats in the 1993 elections which further declined to 3 seats in the 1997 elections. According to a survey conducted by The Herald, majority of Pakistanis feels that the religious parties have caused more harm to
Pakistan
in the last fifty years. The fundamentalist parties do have street power, in terms of mobilising a huge crowd for any meetings, hartals and related events, but do not enjoy popular support inside
Pakistan
.
Pakistan
. These madrassas however do not form a monolithic entity. The general perception, rather the misperception is that these madrassas primarily have jihadi literature in their curriculum, teach and preach jihad with the main objective of producing “holy warriors”. It is true, but only to an extent. The main reason for the parents to send their children to these madrassas is not that they aspire their children to become jihadis or islamic scholars, but rather due to their economic inability and due to the failure of the government to provide necessary educational infrastructure, in terms of primary and secondary schools and competent teachers. The
Pakistan
government spends merely around two percent of its GNP on education. Even this meager amount does not reach its destination due to corruption and mis-administration. Most of the government run schools are without teachers. As a result, many of them remain useless, and worse, the buildings are occupied by the local politicians. On the contrary, the madrassas provide accommodation, food and even a small scholarship.
Pakistan
’s control is even more dangerous. Besides there is an underlying tension between these groups due to their sectarian nature and the differences among those who support them. The unity that was witnessed during the Kargil war was temporary. Once the
Kashmir
problem is resolved these jihadi groups will end up fighting each other. These jihadi groups have strong sectarian leanings and their sectarian loyalties undermine all other allegiances.
Kashmir
. If they try to implement any of their version of “Islamic” principles, they will be rejected by the society. However, these groups will have enormous “street and nuisance value” because of their organisational structure and the easy availability of small arms and would be pose a serious threat to the law and order situation inside
Pakistan
.
Pakistan
. The moment the government takes serious steps to improve the public education in terms providing necessary infrastructure, allocation of funds and better administration, the growth of madrassas is bound to decline. The military government has taken certain steps to curb the influence of the jihadi and taliban forces. Efforts such as the deweaponisation drive, ban on public display of arms by the jihadi forces and an attempt to regulate the funding are small but significant steps, which will be effective if implemented earnestly in controlling them. And if these forces try to implement their version of Islam the civil society is bound to resist them. Already in the NWFP, where the taliban groups are supposed to be strong and experimenting their version, the local population has started resisting them. For example, when the taliban supporters tried to stop a foot ball match in the NWFP, they were chased out of the ground by the locals.
Pakistan
.
How much popular support do the fundamentalist elements enjoy inside
The second element that needs to be carefully looked into is the role of madrassas in
The third element need to be focussed is the threat to the society from the “jihadi” organisations. Today the jihadi groups have become financially independent and have enough resources to carryout the jihad without the support of the Pakistani government. These groups acting independently of
The threats from the jihadi groups is bound to increase in the coming days, provided the government remains inactive. But the military government seems to be serious in controlling these jihadi groups and have taken a series of measures to control them. The jihadi groups may receive the support of the people in terms of moral and material, as long as their objective is limited and focussed only on
The financial independence of the madrassas, the refusal of the ulama to integrate with the main line curriculum, the socio, economic and educational conditions of the backward classes and the linkage between the madrassas and some jihadi organisations, and the increasing independence of these jihadi groups is bound to be an effective challenge to the governance.
But in no way, the mere growth of the madrassas and the proliferation of jihadi groups will result in talibanising
These jihadi and taliban groups may strike terror every now and then, like any terrorist groups operating elsewhere, but neither the civil society nor the political elite favours “talibanisation” of
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