Indo-Pak Relations and Prospects of Re-enaganement

10 Feb, 2001    ·   462

Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 31 January 2001
Speaker: Maj. Gen. Mehmood Ali Durrani (retd.) 

 

 

Former Military Secretary to Gen Zia, Former Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factory.

 

 

General Durrani began with the statement that Indo- Pak relations have been a roller coaster ride with regrettably few highs. However, he believed that the desire for peace exists in both countries. For the majority of  people in India and Pakistan , the basic priorities are education, social justice and improving the quality of life. Secondly both countries realize that wars have not solved  their disputes and  it is time to give peace a chance. Lastly, the fear of a catastrophic nuclear exchange between the two countries emphasizes the need for a peaceful solution to all disputes.

 

 

Besides the persistent high level of mistrust that exists between the two nations, the following events have had a serious negative impact upon the Indo-Pak relations. These are, the Kargil war, and the military takeover in Pakistan .  Though the latter was a purely domestic event, the leadership in India chose to see the military takeover in Pakistan as  marking the ascendancy of the very group responsible for Kargil.  The  present government in Pakistan is struggling with a colossal  domestic agenda,  but the  Indian Government is perched on  a high moral ground refusing to engage  the military government in Pakistan unless it  delivers Kashmir to India .

 

 

General  Durrani opined that  no government in Pakistan , civil or military  is capable of delivering Kashmir to India .  Insurgency in Kashmir is not the creation of Pakistan ,  he but  conceded that Pakistan may have added fuel to the fire.  According to him, it is not believable that half the Indian army is chasing year after year, a couple of thousand insurgents pushed across the LoC by Pakistan . Unfortunately, the problem in Kashmir has changed from a purely Kashmiri struggle to an Islamic jihad.  An essentially political problem has become a complex politico- religious issue.

 

 

Despite the high level of mistrust, the leadership in both countries must engage in dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue. To move into the 21st century, India and Pakistan have to jointly defuse religious, ethnic and social bigotry from  their polity. India and Pakistan have a shared culture and history and with wisdom and patience are capable of resolving the problem if they re-engage. However, in the present atmosphere of mistrust a re engagement along the lines of the Lahore Agreement might not work. A special effort has to be made to initiate a  limited agenda outside the glare of publicity.

 

 

The prevailing environment presents two major problems

 

 

§ The possible escalation of ethnic and religious  violence in India and Pakistan based on narrow- minded religious bigotry and domination by the Jihadi and RSS cultures. 

 

 

§ The spinning out of hand of the Kashmir conflict and the possible use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear escalation could be in the form of a preemptive strike by India or a counter strike by Pakistan in case it’s survival is threatened by a conventional offensive.

 

 

Future talks between India and Pakistan need to focus on the following aspects

 

 

·                     A technical dialogue on nuclear risk reduction

 

 

·                     Serious talks to resolve the Kashmir conflict both sides displaying flexibility going beyond their stated positions.

 

 

·                     A military to military dialogue with a limited agenda to de escalate tensions and move from a position of confrontation to accommodation.

 

 

·                     Brainstorming by political and community leaders to frame steps to reduce ethnic and religious bigotry in both countries.

 

 

 

 

Focus on these priorities does not downplay  people to people initiatives. In fact Track II  initiatives like the Nimrana and Balusa group, and think tanks can play an important role in bridging the gap in mutual perceptions.

 

 

Gen Durrani suggested that India stepped down from its moral high ground, accepted the reality of Pakistan and engaged with the military government. A settlement reached with the military in the loop in Pakistan will be lasting.

 

 

Finally Gen Durrani recommended that India should not lay down any pre-conditions for talks, especially asking Pakistan to check the Jihadi groups in Kashmir . According to him the government in Pakistan may be able to influence the Jihadi groups that support the movement in Kashmir if there is hope for a solution of the Kashmir problem. And this hope only the Indian government can provide.

 

 

Maj Gen Durrani ended his talk by circulating the following proposal for cooperative border monitoring of three sites on the Indo-Pak border including one on the LoC and two on the international border.

 

 

POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH BORDER SECURITY FORCES

 

 

·                     Frequency and outline of periodic meetings with the Pakistani counter parts and the BSF at various levels.

 

 

·                     Impromptu meetings with the Pakistani counterparts by BSF. Why and how often?

 

 

·                     What general issues are discussed in the planned periodic meetings?

 

 

·                     Are issues like cattle straying across the border, control of smuggling, etc discussed between the two forces?

 

 

·                     With the improvement of relations with Pakistan , can you visualize joint border monitoring between the two border security forces?

 

 

·                     Do the two border security forces ( India and Pakistan ) share/exchange any information at the present time?

 

 

·                     What is the type of coordination that is carried out at the Wahga Crossing between the two border security forces and other departments of the government (customs, immigration, railways, etc.)?

 

 

·                     Do you see any joint monitoring along the LOC by  deployed troops? Moving from a status of confrontation to a status of cooperation?

 

 

·                     How much fencing has been carried out along the border? What are the type of fences  employed and what is their purpose?

 

 

·                     Can modern technology play a part in improving the management of the border?

 

 

·                     Any related issues, especially problems and issues.

 

 

 

 

Discussion

 

 

Q: How can the Indian government be assured that the psyche of the Pakistani leadership is changing and that they are ready for peace? What is the role of the ISI in Indo-Pak relations?

 

 

A:  The ISI is flogging a dead horse in the subcontinent. In Pakistan RAW has the same aura but the same psychological impact. The ISI is only a defence intelligence agency, acquiring information about foreign militaries like any other regular defence intelligence agency. Since the threat perception from India is very high, there is naturally greater a focus on India . The objective of the ISI is definitely not to break  India . As far as the psyche of the leadership in concerned, everyone in Pakistan knows that the current economic state of affairs cannot continue  too long and hence the desire for peace is definitely there.

 

 

Comment: The inability of Pakistan to control, reduce or condemn the violence in Kashmir is worrying. In fact, on the eve of every Independence Day,  commitment to jihad in Kashmir is renewed. Joint border monitoring has to be preceded by political commitment to this exercise. It has been attempted before but due to  reluctance on the part of Pakistan it did not work out.

 

 

Comment:  Despite saying that both sides must move beyond their stated positions you have only reiterated your government’s position here. If you say you cannot control the jihadi groups you are violating Article 1 of the Simla Agreement. The ISI is funded by drug money and is a rogue intelligence agency.

 

 

Response:   Your views regarding the ISI are biased because it does not have any drug money.  Secondly, my views are not the same as those of General Musharraf.  Harkat and Lashkar are not funded by the government in Pakistan . They collect money from the mosques in Pakistan and as such are more anti-Pak than anti-India. Pakistan should have condemned the attack on the Red Fort. It was wrong of it not to do so. But this attack cannot be equated with the violence in Kashmir . The problem in Kashmir was not created by Pakistan . It was created by domestic discontent. Pakistan only helped to bring the issue into prominence.

 

 

Q: Is there any new thinking in Pakistan except for the stand that Kashmir has to be a part of Pakistan ?

 

 

A: As said earlier in the presentation, there is a need for both sides to go beyond their stated positions to resolve the issue.

 

 

Q: Who is really in the driving seat in Pakistan ? What is the power of the jihadi groups in Pakistan ? What is the relationship between the Pakistani army and the  jihadi groups? 

 

 

A: The army in Pakistan is not a monolith in terms of  ideas. As far as political issues are concerned, there are diverse opinions. It is however not a democratic organisation and policy decisions are taken only by the top few. There are, of course, channels of communication between the different hierarchies that may convey to the leadership the feeling in the lower ranks. In the conference of Corps Commanders, the majority wants peace. In a power clash between the jihadis and the army, the army will definitely come out better.

 

 

Q:   In view of Musharraf’s capitulation to the Islamists on every issue from weaponisation to blasphemy laws, what faith can one have in his ability to rein in the jihadi groups?

 

 

A:  No guarantee can be given about this . But it must be kept in mind that the majority of the army sees the jihadis as a threat to Pakistan .

 

 

Comment:  To say that there can be no pre-conditions for talks when Pakistan is using Jihad as an instrument of foreign policy and Pakistan ’s ability to control jihadi groups is suspect is illogical. Can there be talks of a reciprocal nature with face saving opportunities for both sides?

 

 

A: The idea of reciprocal talks is always welcome.

 

 

General Durrrani  wound up the discussion with the following comments

 

 

·                     Nuclear risk reduction between the two countries should have priority over solving other issues because of the high level of mistrust between the two nations.

 

 

·                     There is a need for back channel communication to negotiate a solution outside the glare of publicity.

 

 

 

 

 

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