Agni-II: A watered down response from China

02 Feb, 2001    ·   458

Satyajit Mohanty and Bhartendu Singh analyse China’s response to India’s Agni –II missile
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
On 16 January, 2000 India successfully test-fired its 2000 km range Intermediate Range Ballistic  Missile (IRBM) Agni II. It has the capability to strike  targets upto 3000 km using specific  payloads. The  test was highly acclaimed in India by the Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Defence Minister Shri George Fernandes as an important milestone in our efforts to acquire  credible minimum deterrence for assuring India ’s security.  Given the range, Agni II should logically be aimed at Chinese cities.

 

 

However, if Agni II is aimed at China   it is surprising why the Chinese establishment has only come up with a muted response, given its  proclivity  to react vociferously to other nation’s moves  when its vital strategic interests are at stake.  A careful reading of the Chinese strategic priorities would point to the fact that Agni II does not  figure in the Chinese calculus of  deterrence and India ’s credible minimum deterrent  is at a very primitive stage to deter Chinese  strategic moves and  actions.

 

 

The concept  of deterrence operates at two levels to be effective. Firstly,  deterrence should  operate at an operational level and secondly, it should have a psychological  impact on the opponent it seeks to deter. At the operational  level, China ’s  missile capabilities are decades ahead of India ’s  Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).  India has long way to go to match China ’s current stage of defence development. India has to develop its logistics and C3I systems to have effective strike capabilities. China is marginally affected by India ’s  current stage of defence development because  its  calculations of deterrence operate  at a completely different level. China ’s main concern is the Asia-Pacific Region where it seems to be locked in territorial disputes in the South-China Sea and elsewhere. The Taiwan issue is also looming large  in China ’s strategic perceptions. What really worries China are the moves and countermoves of USA and Japan . Hence, Japanese moves to pursue an independent foreign policy and its remilitarization plans have set  off  alarm signals in Beijing . Following  a change in U.S. diplomacy from passive  neutrality to active participation since the  renewal of the US-Japan Security  Treaty in 1996 and the publication of the  East  Asia Strategic  Assessment (EASA ) in 1998 , China is apprehensive of the U.S. roles in the region. Further, China is  particularly worried about Japan-U.S. collusion  in the building of the Theatre  Missile  Defence (TMD) system. China ’s  main concern is  to prevent the development of the TMD which would  blunt its missile  capabilities and  undermine its deterrence. Chinese  preoccupations, post 

 

 

Gulf –War, is aimed at a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to  match the capabilities of U.S. and develop credible  C3I systems. China   will predictably step up its missile technology  and  logistics systems  to improve  its deterrence  capabilities to breakthrough the T.M.D. barrier. 

 

 

Deterrence is also a psychological  move aimed at warning the opponent of unacceptable damage in the light of any attack. By not overreacting, China has blunted the deterrence  sought by India . It further seized the initiative when Foreign Ministry spokesperson,  Mr. Zhu Bangzao, said that China hoped  to see peace and stability in South Asia and  was  unwilling to see any arms race in the  region.

 

 

Moreover,  inspite of Gen. Mushrraf’s   interview in the state-run Pakistan Television that the test should be a matter of concern for China, it wouldn’t be  a matter of surprise  if Pakistan comes  up with a matching response by  testing a solid fuelled  missile (Shaheen-II,) like  it test fired  Ghauri II following India’s test fire of Agni I. This could happen with the help of Chinese technology. Thus, China ’s muted response  followed by its backdoor  support to Pakistan will help confiine India within the subcontinent.

 

 

Therefore,  to make an impact  or Chinese policy making circles, India has to move quickly to  Agni III  and then to the Surya stage in quick succession and  within a limited timeframe. It is only then that India ’s credible minimum deterrent  will be  a realistic aspiration.

 

 

 

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