Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace
18 Jan, 2001 · 451
N. Manoharan analyses the prospects of the unilateral ceasefire declared by the LTTE
To the surprise of all, the LTTE announced a unilateral ceasefire on December 21, 2000 stating its “sincere desire for peace and a negotiated settlement” of the ethnic conflict. The announcement was sudden, but not unexpected.
Jaffna
Peninsula
, the centre of the proposed Eelam. However, they started facing reverses after June 2000 due to an assertive Sri Lankan politico-military leadership and sophisticated arms bought on the international market by the government, combined with choking of supplies and support to the guerillas. The Tigers also lost many cadres and is facing a severe manpower shortage. Hence, a respite was needed to recuperate. The LTTE has also been facing international pressure to settle the long-simmering ethnic dispute through a dialogue at the earliest. The announcement of a ceasefire, therefore, should be viewed from this perspective also.
Colombo
, however, the first two conditions (de-escalation and lifting of economic blockade) were not acceptable as they were projected by the LTTE to “regroup” and equip itself for a bigger offensive. Obviously, the government does not want the history of 1990 and 1995 to repeat itself when the Tigers bought time in the name of talks to “strike harder”. The government was also unwilling to lose the upper hand in its Operation Kinihira-V (Stage-II). There is a strong lobby in the Army which is against suspension of hostilities at this juncture.
Colombo
is not facing any pressure for de-escalation from the international community, especially its donors, to strike a deal with the rebels and end the conflict. There is also pressure due to economic constraints. The war has eroded much of the Lankan GDP from development. It has also burdened the society with staggering inflation, unemployment and shortage of essential commodities. The ruling People’s
Alliance
government is also bound to seek a solution as promised in its two election campaigns.
India
or
Norway
, as advocated by the moderate Tamil parties, will not help the process owing to severe opposition from by Sinhalese hardliners. As far as the economic blockade is concerned, curbs on food items and other essential commodities can be relaxed as they will not help the LTTE’s war efforts. The Tigers can also accept a time frame for talks leading to a final solution in stages. For this, talks on talks should go on.
Analysts were expecting the announcement, as the Tigers were on the defensive, for quite some time, struggling to hold the territories they had captured till mid-2000. The LTTE achieved several rapid successes in 1999; in early 2000 it was on the verge of capturing
The Sri Lankan Government’s reaction to the LTTE’s unilateral offer was on expected lines, especially regarding the conditions laid down by the rebels. Though the LTTE’s conditions were vague, they focused on four demands:
1. Immediate de-escalation of the ongoing military operations;
2. Lifting of economic blockade on the LTTE controlled areas;
3. Creating a “conducive atmosphere” for talks; and
4. Talks to focus on ‘core’ political issues.
To
This does not mean that
The moderate Tamil parties have also been vociferous about using this opportunity to seek a solution. They fear that the “inflexible attitude” of the government might derail the peace process. To them it “will be difficult for a guerilla force to be engaged in serious negotiations on the one hand, and to be fiercely fighting on the other.” Therefore, the ceasefire should precede talks. It is true that some of the Tamil parties are pro-LTTE, but their demands are not unjustified.
Generally speaking, if the LTTE thinks it can regroup and win, it is being impractical. On the other hand, if the government is confident of victory over the “militarily weakened” LTTE, it is being unrealistic; hence, the practical step forward is to proceed with the peace talks and exploit this opportunity. The government’s argument of “poor track-record” cannot be bought, as unlike the earlier two occasions, there is the presence of a third party now, which is the international community. Intransigence, at this juncture, would be risky and suicidal for the Tigers by alienating international sympathy and support.
If the LTTE is genuine in its offer, it should assuage the government’s concerns by accepting UN ceasefire monitoring. Apart from consolidating the ceasefire, the involvement of the UN would be a good confidence building measure. Except the UN, involvement of either
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