Selig Harrison’s Idea of a Nuclear Bargain between India and the US An excerpt from The International Herald Tribune (reproduced in the Asian Ag
19 Dec, 1997 · 45
Selig Harrison suggests that a nuclear bargain is possible between the US and India. This would reduce the tensions over non-proliferation that has poisoned Indo-American relations
In an article written in the International Herald Tribune (reproduced in the Asian Age, 9 December 1997, p. 9) Selig Harrison suggests that a nuclear bargain is possible between the US and India. This would reduce the tensions over non-proliferation that has poisoned Indo-American relations.
India
to "cap [its] nuclear weapons potential at present levels". By transferring nuclear power plants and technology to
India
the
US
can tap a market of $50 billion in investments in civilian nuclear technology in the decades ahead, whilst retaining full foreign ownership of nuclear plants. Moreover, the agreement on civilian nuclear technology transfer from the
US
to
China
has made it "urgent" for the
Clinton
administration to strike a deal with
India
.
US
could provide
India
access to its civilian nuclear technology and co-operate in nuclear safety, thus far barred by the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of the
US
, which prohibits transfer of civilian nuclear technology to
India
. The
US
could at least "offer to seek congressional approval" to get around this Act.
India
should provide the following three concessions in non-proliferation and arms control:
India
would have to accept international safeguards over its seven civilian nuclear reactors and any new power or medical research reactors supplied by either the
US
or others. While such a move would enable the
US
to monitor fissile material production in these reactors and prevent their diversion for military purposes, Indian research reactors and reprocessing facilities that could be utilised for military applications would remain exempt from inspections. This would also be in keeping with the recognition of
India
as a nuclear capable power by the former Secretary of Defense, William Perry.
India
would have to convert its de facto commitment not to export nuclear technology into a binding de jure one. This would bring
India
in line with a key provision of the NPT.
India
would have to compromise on the issue of a nuclear test ban. Although
India
has refused to sign the CTBT and called for a time bound elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers, it could agree to stop testing either immediately or after conducting one or more final test/s like the Chinese. The Indian Parliament could "endorse" such a declaration, "citing key provisions of the treaty and explicitly pledging that
India
would comply with these provisions". This could be either a unilateral declaration or an undertaking given to the UN or the
US
.
India
and, similarly,
Pakistan
. Of course, the
US
and
Russia
would have to move "more rapidly" to not only reduce their nuclear arsenal but also those of
China
,
Britain
and
France
in a multilateral forum. Without this "movement",
India
and
Pakistan
are unlikely to sign the FMCT also.
The bargain involves giving "concrete incentives" to
The Nuclear Bargain
The
In return,
1.
2.
3. Finally,
All this is necessary to "cap the further accumulation of weapons-grade fissile material" and ensuring non-deployment of nuclear weapons by
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