A Recipe for the Kargil War, May 1999
04 Nov, 2000 · 429
Brig Chandra B Khanduri analyses the issues “skillfully avoided” by the Kargil Review Committee Report
Since the publication of the Kargil Review Committee Report on December 15, 1999 , the ‘fog of war’ is lifting. There are reports of Brig. Surinder Singh being given a ‘show cause notice’ to be dismissed/discharged from service for apparent dereliction of duty. And although the Army confirmed having driven the Pakistanis out of the Indian held
territory
of
Kargil
-a tactically dominating feature Point 5353 remains occupied by the Pakistanis.
Pakistan
carried out an extensive ‘reconnaissance (recce) in force’ all over the 168 km of the border. This was based on their aerial recces by RPVs, aircraft and helicopters. Combined with their heavy artillery bombardments all over the area they first dropped their troops on the nearer heights and then inched forward. There were existing voids or gaps between posts, which facilitated the enemy intrusion. These were: Maskoh Valley-36 Km; between Marpo La and Bhimbat-9.5 Km, and Batalik-Chorbat La-25 KM. Thus there existed gaps for 80 Km. The enemy was quick to exploit this weakness in defences with our luxury of ‘winter vacation’.
Pakistan
attempt to ‘capture some posts in Kargil’. Ipso-facto, the fact that intrusions had taken place was known; what was, however, not known was the quantum of force and its exact ground deployment.
India
’. Who was to initiate it when the territorial integrity of the country was being threatened? Even if the political leaders failed it was obviously the Army who should have done it. For, it was the Army’s responsibility to safeguard and recapture the lost territory. The Committee failed to highlight this.
The Kargil Review Committee’s Report has been criticized both for its limited ‘terms of reference’ and its ‘open-ended findings’ by the Committee, and for not pinpointing the accountability for the fiasco that lead to an almost 400 sq km intrusion into the Indian territory.
Since 1947-48 Pakistanis have attempted to siege J&K. They found that Indian troops occupy some of the posts along the LoC only during the summer; so they began to clandestinely occupy them from the winter of 1998. This, according to Gen. Musharraf, was to ‘avenge for the invasion of Siachen in 1984’. The Pakistani strategic aim was also their avowed objective of ‘internationalization of the Kashmir issue’ and their other ‘historical grievances’, beside inching forward to gain tactically important features that could dominate the Indian defences, including National Highway (NH) 1 A.
The committee's biggest problem, it seems, was to ascertain definitely when the Pakistanis began their operation of ‘creating an alternate Siachen’ in Kargil. It quotes from the captured diary of a Pakistani Officer and other POWs, and links them with Gen. Musharraf's visit to Baltistan. It has questioned commanders of the Kargil from 1996 till 1999. And yet it provides no concrete answer to this vital question. The intrusion did not start in early 1999 as the Government claims. Instead it took place one year earlier from the spring of 1998 when
Further the Indian aerial recces by helicopter flights were only undertaken in September-October 1998, by which time the Pakistanis had moved forward, but it seems no one from our side was prepared to accept this fact. Not even Brig. Surinder Singh who raised the ante in January 1999 by his so called ‘Enhanced Threat Perception’. He claimed to have ‘visualized’ a build up of an additional brigade against him across the LoC. Was he concealing the fact of intrusions is not clear from the Committee’s findings, although it holds him responsible to have ensured ground patrolling to maintain contact with the enemy-a duty, which was undoubtedly mandatory for him? Then there is HQ 15 Corps where, in January 1999, its Corps Commander clearly visualized the
The actions and reactions that led to the Kargil situation have been seen by the Committee. It sees the R&AW failing to provide actionable strategic intelligence. The R&AW has tried to defend itself but not convincingly. But why did the Brigade, Division and even the Corps fail to acquire tactical intelligence? Why did the IAF dismiss the credibility of the Pak RPV activities? Why did the ARC fail to obtain worthwhile air photos? Why did the helicopter patrols not fly low over the areas suspected to be occupied by the Pakistanis? Why were gunships and air in interdiction role not used as soon as suspicion built up? Regrettably, these vital questions remain unanswered.
Then the R&AW predicted ‘a limited swift offensive’ by the enemy in the area in early 1998 but, because it could not convince the AHQ, it just deleted it from its next report! Is this not a case of being brow-beaten or sheer complacency?
All these and several other issues are skillfully avoided by the Committee giving one reason: ‘lack of politico-strategic interaction in
And finally, there is the question of pinpointing individual responsibility. There was none. We as a nation have much to learn from the Kargil episode. The Committee has failed to do this, which has not been fair to more than 1, 500 casualties of this six-week war, besides its enormous cost in money and material.
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
