A Face Saver or a Brave Face: Options Before India
02 Sep, 2000 · 414
RVR Chandrasekhara Rao looks into the options before India in dealing with Pakistan
Are
India and
Pakistan on collusion course once again? The abrupt collapse of the negotiations with the Hizb-Mujahideen and the renewed pledge of the
Pakistan President of continuing support to the militancy (read-cross-border terrorism) have raised the old fears. While analogies are fallible, the celebration of the Indian Prime Minister's
Lahore trip quickly followed by the Kargil offensive by Pak is certainly not a happy remembrance. The Lahore-Kargil sequence, it will be recalled, was characterized as one in which the
Pakistan armed forces out manoeuvred the civilian government in
Islamabad to derail the peace process. The present sequence also reveals a similar pattern; although apparently this time it was the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen that initiated the proposal for talks only to be pulled back by the Pak official/ military establishment.
Pakistan is contemplating war. Their motive may simply to force tripartite negotiations on
India . While it is difficult to assess the cost-benefits of
Pakistan 's pressure on the militants, an attempt in that regard could still be made.
Pakistan are indeed clear. It weakened
Pakistan 's case among the world community, in particular the
US and the European states, and supported
India 's resolve to be extra-cautious of any overtures for future negotiations with the militants, as also with
Pakistan itself. It may have further confirmed in the eyes of the world of
Pakistan 's malignant role in escalating strategic tensions in the sub-continent. Rafiq Tarar's strident support for PoK is an open admission of instigation of cross-border terrorism. But the point is that Pak might be reckoning that its costs are marginal compared to the benefits.
India can always be an advantage in itself to
Pakistan . Secondly, while it may be rather far-fetched to imagine that
Islamabad fears a possible deal between
India and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen still it is more than a bonus to prove that the latter can be made to dance to the former's tune. As per the costs of angering world opinion for its role in sabotaging the peace, the plain fact is that Pak never care for world opinion on this issue? As per the US-Pak relations, Pak can bank upon the lobbies in the
US to bail it out from any dramatic outcome like the
US declaring it as a terrorism-sponsoring state. Even more important consideration weighting with
Pakistan is that a lame-duck
US administration would not take any such action, barring rhetoric.
India has got itself into. Second, this embarrassment is compounded when the Hizb insisted on
Pakistan 's presence at the talks. If
India could consent to talk to the very perpetrator of terrorism how could it deny entry to
Pakistan 's presence at the negotiation table?
Pakistan and the second between the Hurriyat and
India appears even more dubious. Should the Hurriyat be allowed to become a sort of a mediator between the two-state actor's? On the other hand, comprehensive negotiations between
India and Hurriyat (with all its groups) is a better idea.
India is yet to recover from the trauma of recent events. Should it wait for another face-saver (or bait?) from
Pakistan (or the Hizb) offering a cease fire to resume negotiations or would it get prepared to confront increased terrorism with the possible escalation into another Kargil type war? To be sure, a brave face is what is being projected now by
India . Even the contingent condition of a war is not excluded from this projection. Those are
India 's options as currently seen: a face-saver or showing a brave face.
Pakistan being what it is, the prospect is fraught with infinite possibilities for irrational behaviour. Further, those influential quarters outside, who are supposed to be guardians of peace cannot be relied upon to show continuous support for
India under really critical circumstances. For when once their condemnations of current Pak conduct are made, they are likely to return to their routine theme of counseling
India to restart the negotiating process.
India 's case it seems to be one of keeping the power dry but eventually consenting to negotiation.
It may be unwarranted and even dangerous to draw any conclusion that
The costs to
The discomfiture caused to
Among the benefits that Pak derives should also be the embarrassment that
The condition of not talking to Pak as long as cross-border terrorism continues is almost explicitly comprises. If the Simla formula stipulated bilateral resolution of Indo-Pak disputes (which forms the bed-rock of Indian policy), does it not also exclude the terrorist groups, consisting of a murderous and motley crowd of Afghan Fundamentalist, and PoK militants and mercenaries and even of those from the Kashmir valley? In this context, the Hurriyat Conference leaders' proposal of simultaneous two track talks, one between the Hurriyat and
It cannot be denied that
But is this a wise posture? Here the nuclear calculation should enter into the picture. At one level of analysis, given the madness of any responsible state using nuclear bombs in regional wars, Pak's adverting to this dimension may be pure braggadocio. Yet, at another level of analysis any calculus of escalation in passion-ridden wars is extremely unreliable and with the state of mind of the
Oliver Crumble once advised his army 'to pray to God and to keep its powder dry'. In
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