Future of Indo-US Relations

21 Aug, 2000    ·   409

Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 18 August 2000


Speaker: Alok Prasad, 

 

 

Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

 

 

 

 

Initiating this Friday Group discussion the speaker stated that, undoubtedly a qualitative change had come about in Indo-US relations after Clinton 's visit, and they had acquired a certain maturity. Little realized was the fact that Indians now accepted the inevitability of doing business with the United States . On the institutional side one round of dialogues with the US had been completed on the several issues identified during the Clinton visit. The Foreign Minister had formal meetings with Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott. An important area of cooperation had opened with the anti-terrorism dialogue. India was placing a draft treaty before the UN General Assembly, which had the support of the US

 

 

At the bilateral level the sub-groups established for science and technology and energy were doing useful work. The latter was discussing the transfer of technology pertaining to coal gasification and improving the efficiency of motors; both were of great interest to India . However, US basic interests lay in climate change issues, India 's interests were focussed on the energy sector, which needed to reform if it was to grow. The unbundling of generation and transmission would allow meaningful privatization to occur.

 

 

Further, bilateral trade was doing well and had reached $ 12 bn. annually, with the balance of trade in India 's favour being $6 bn. This was apart from some $ 5 bn in software exports from India to the US . The weakness in this trade relationship was that the export basket was not changing and continued to be dominated by textiles and other traditional items. Still, the requirement for US finance, apart from technology, had to be accepted, and so was the need for India to improve its investment climate.

 

 

The nuclear area represented the prime area of disagreement. The US had to accept that India would behave as a responsible nuclear weapon state. India needed to accept that hi-tech imports would remain embargoed; the removal of current sanctions was linked to "concrete" steps being taken like signing the CTBT. On the strategic side, India must appreciate that the United States was only accepting it on the margins of the Asian power balance. Was India prepared for a larger role? This was unclear. Possibly, Indo-US relations would, in time, acquire the same texture as French-US relations.

 

 

During the discussions the issue of Pak-US relations came up repeatedly. Would the US pressure Pakistan on cross-border terrorism and the Taliban? Here it was believed that the US would exercise that leverage, if at all, in its own interests, not India 's interests. The US was deeply troubled by the Taliban phenomenon. That is why it was making counter-terrorism cooperation with India a major area of bilateral cooperation, as existed between it and Israel / United Kingdom .

 

 

Would the United States playing a pro-active role in Kashmir ? This seemed unlikely, as the US was not buying the line that everything happening in Kashmir was due to terrorism; terrorism was defined in terms of its being directed against civilians. For that matter, the US did not buy the Pakistani line on jihad, either. 

 

 

Could the possible induction of a Republican Administration after the elections alter equations; specifically, would it be averse to India testing again? It was clear that the Republican opposition to the US ratifying the CTBT was informed by the personal animus of its leaders to President Clinton, although it was known that they favoured no ban on testing. But, the Democrats and Republicans had no serious differences on the non-proliferation question, as it was in the American national interests to freeze the size of the Nuclear Club. Perhaps the CTBT would never be ratified, but would be naïve for India to believe it would not be pressured to join that Treaty and conform by its provisions against field-testing.

 

 

Was it possible for India , particularly the Embassy in Washington , to organize the NRIs to promote India 's cause? The Kashmiri NRIs were getting into the act, and their organizations were largely inimical to India . It was felt that the NRIs were not particularly interested in Indo-US relations, and their importance should not be exaggerated, despite their success  in the IT sector; neither could the NRIs become India 's main interlocutors. Moreover, second generation NRIs saw themselves as Americans and not Indians. Still, NRI business groups had done useful work in changing attitudes on the Hill. The India caucus was helping to promote India 's point of view. NRIs could also help in bringing US legislators to India to see things for themselves. It was agreed that NRIs should get into, as they were, South Asian studies in the Universities and think tanks, but it was disconcerting that American scholars per se were losing interest in this area. 

 

 

Reverting to US relations with Pakistan , their policy towards Kashmir , and China , and the likelihood of a China-Russia nexus developing in future, the speaker deprecated the tendency in India to find conspiracy theories where there were none. The US did not equate China with India did to obvious differences in their effective power. China-Russia relations could not develop beyond a point as both considered their relations with the United States to be more important. The US was deeply concerned with the need for a solution to the Kashmir problem; this had to be found by India and Pakistan . It was not especially interested in the terms of their agreement. An unfreezing of the Kashmir problem had occurred after the ceasefire, and this process had to be carried forward expeditiously.

 

 

 

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