Armed Forces and the Media
16 Aug, 2000 · 406
Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna says the media must be harnessed to win the battle of the hearts and the minds of the people
The Kargil Review Committee had highlighted in its recommendations the need for improved defence related public relations. The media is an important force multiplier, and it must be harnessed to win the battle of the hearts and minds of the people and keep them fully abreast of developments at home and abroad. This will ensure that they are not misled by rumours, propaganda and dis-information; this could happen if they do not have access to a truthful and speedy account of the facts and the progress of events.
India
and reach out to regional and international audiences. Kargil also brought out the need to review information-handling procedures within the Armed Forces and their public dissemination. The Army needs a much improved public relations capability, not only during war, but equally, when it is deployed for counter- insurgency, terrorism, proxy war and other internal security duties.
Peace-time media activity pertaining to the armed forces is handled by the regular Information Services cadres of the Ministry of Defence. These cadres are not equipped to handle media relations during war. During the 1999 Kargil war, the function of media briefing was taken over by a triad of senior military and civil spokesmen. Army Headquarters set up an Information and Psychological Warfare Cell under an officer of the rank of Major General with direct access to the Chief of the Army Staff.
The Kargil war highlighted the importance of the media in projecting the operations to the remotest parts of the country and arousing nationalism and patriotic fervour in the nation. The media could not, however, transcend the boundaries of
The entire subject of Public Relations has to be looked at afresh in a composite way by the Ministries of Defence, Home and Foreign Affairs and the three Service Headquarters. Pending such an examination and updating of the existing Government of India publication “Operational Publicity Guidelines”, this article recommends certain measures that could be taken to publicise the Army’s activities in counter insurgency, terrorism and proxy war.
The “Operational Publicity Guidelines”, in their existing form, deal essentially with a war situation. They do not cover counter insurgency and internal security situations. The peace- time set up of the Director Public Relations (DPR) is also not equipped to handle such contingencies. Therefore, the work of the security forces in fighting militants as also their efforts to “win the hearts and minds of the people” are being projected in an ad hoc manner.
The immediate requirement is to have a Central Communications Unit at Corps Headquarters for Corps level editing, comprising select service officers and men, and an element from the DPR. This unit should collect and disseminate information, as also coordinate with media organisations, especially visiting journalists and TV teams. It could specifically invite good film editors from ND TV. In the event of more than one such unit being established in a Command, coordination between corps units could be undertaken by Command Headquarters.
Next, there is a need to have a media team at each level of command down to the battalion level. At the battalion level, it could be an officer who can write well and another person who can operate a hand held camera. The size and composition of media teams would be dictated by the size of the headquarters and its requirements. These media teams would be of great help to project the activities of the armed forces through films and other means. The procedure evolved should provide for regular operational briefings by the operational/intelligence staff at headquarters or by the concerned corps/divisional commanders.
There is also a need to train selected service officers and men in media work by running suitable courses for them on a regular basis. Likewise, media personnel need to understand the organisation, role, ethos and fighting capabilities of the armed forces and the characteristics of its various units. There is need to train them too. A media-military interface would be most beneficial. Perhaps, an Institute needs to be established with this purpose.
When these measures are in place, we could hope for prompt and timely information in an age when news is increasingly being transmitted and used instantly, with TV news being broadcast on the hour, every hour. Delay invariably means having to react to the opponent who is able to describe and interpret happenings in a most favourable light from his point of view.