Recent Developments in Kashmir

14 Aug, 2000    ·   404

Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 11 August 2000
Panelists 

 

 

Mr. A.K. Verma, former Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat,

 

 

Lt. Gen. (retd) A.M.Vohra, former Vice Chief of Army Staff,

 

 

Mr. Suba Chandran, Research Officer, IPCS.

 

 

Initiating the discussion the Chairperson (P.R.Chari) pointed out that the rapid evolution of events in Kashmir made analysis and prognostication difficult. The main events to date could be flagged off: GOI's release of the Hurriyat leaders; Farooq Abdullah's tabling of the Autonomy resolution in the Kashmir Assembly; the Hizbul Mujahidin's declaration of unilateral ceasefire, responded to by the Indian Army; massacre of Amarnath pilgrims by rival militant groups; GOI expressing willingness to negotiate without insisting that talks be within the ambit of the Indian constitution; Hizb's insistence that Pakistan be included in these negotiations; GOI's refusal; Hizb's abrogation of its unilateral ceasefire; and resumption of killings in Kashmir.

 

 

Each of the parties involved in this drama, including the Lashkar-I-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar in Pakistan had an ostensible and a hidden agenda. It was therefore simplistic to argue that American pressure was dominant in this process, or that Pakistan was solely responsible for its breakdown or that India was the injured innocent in this episode. More importantly, what did the future hold for the peace process? Was the Hizb making only tactical moves? 

 

 

Mr. Verma reiterated Pakistan 's objective remaining the incorporation of Kashmir into its polity; its CEO was talking of jihad, which meant Pakistan believed it was fighting for the lawful rights of Kashmiris. Civilian rulers who sought a Kashmir solution independent of the Pak Army paid for it with their lives; this included Bhutto, and Zia. The Lahore Declaration sealed the fate of Nawaz Sharif. Leaders in India did not understand this phenomenon that the Army's role was supreme in Pakistan , as they had no contacts with them. 

 

 

Pakistan had isolated itself in the world. Its image was abysmal; it was believed to be the fountain of terrorism and drug peddling and a 'failing' state; its foreign debt was $ 40 bn., and the Paris Club, on which it was pinning great hopes, was only likely to provide some $ 100 m., at most, in end-December with stringent conditions attached. What about next year? The ISI had shifted its support to foreign militants, as they were believed capable of delivering on Kashmir , like in Afghanistan . But Pakistan needed to appreciate there is an international distaste to redrawing of international borders; Clinton has deprecated such efforts. His sympathy-call to Vajpayee after the Amarnath pilgrims were killed and exhortation to Hizb leaders to continue talks were highly symbolic, reflecting US support to India and marginalising of Pakistan .

 

 

The Hizbul Mujahidin and Hurriyat leaders had reflected on the realities of the Pakistan situation before making their conciliatory moves. There was greater flexibility on their part now in dealing with India , and on the autonomy issue, apart from appreciation of the Kashmiris suffering in the State. It is uncertain if Pakistan was aware of the Hizb's moves; but it could not disassociate itself from the ceasefire move for obvious reasons. So Pakistan used the Hurriyat for its purposes, and tried to widen the divide between Salahuddin and Majid Dar. The August 8 deadline was used to force the issue of Pakistan 's inclusion in the negotiations to emphasize its role in any solution.

 

 

A possible split in the ranks of the Hizb would have a cascading effect on the Hurriyat and the definition of azaadi. India has not lost anything. It needs understanding that peace processes are necessarily long drawn out, and require patience. There are no easy fixes, as evident from the cases of the Mizo, Naga, Tripura insurgencies, and the Gorkhaland agitation. The Irish question and Israel-Palestine negotiations are further examples of this reality. Only a generation change in Pakistan could make it see reason; quite obviously its actions have been irrational in the past, witness the events in 1947, 1965, and 1971. The Kargil conflict refuted the nuclear theology that nuclear states did not war against each other. Pakistan claims to have contemplated the use of nuclear weapons on several occasions in the past, as claimed in an article jointly written by Ms. Sattar, Zulfikar Ali Khan and Agha Shahi. It subscribes to a first use doctrine which only emphasizes its irrationality.

 

 

Speaking next Gen. Vohra thought the Hizb's ceasefire offer was a major step forward. There was no military solution to the Kashmir issue. Human rights violations were rife; this was inevitable in an insurgency situation. The Kashmiris were unhappy with bad governance in the State and there was little economic development. Corruption was widespread. The hearts and minds of the local population had to won back; hence cessation of hostilities was the only answer to the problem. Pakistan , too, had learnt that Kashmir cannot be taken away from India , which had the support of the US to seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. The US had also condemned the Pahalgam massacre and regretted the Hizb's withdrawal of their ceasefire. This, too, would restrain Pakistan 's irresponsibility; it was now under pressure from all sides, and would have to move, unwillingly, towards a cessation of militant activities.  

 

 

The hopeful sign was that there was much less artillery firing across the LoC this year. Pakistan 's efforts to raise the bogey of nuclear war in 1984, 1987 and 1990 were essentially bluffs to get international attention and support. It was aware that India might suffer, but Pakistan would be wiped out in a nuclear conflict. It was emphasizing the imminence of nuclear conflict to ensure American panic and assistance to Pakistan . The Hizb reflected indigenous Kashmiri thinking, and another ceasefire was predictable. India should begin a broad-based dialogue with other sectional interests in Kashmir .

 

 

Mr. Suba Chandran went into the history of the Hizbul's origins and growth since 1990. It had a pro-independence plank and was initially favoured by the ISI; more lately, the ISI had shut down Hizb camps, and begun supporting the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar; this had occasioned the Hizb's current unhappiness and its ceasefire offer. The Hizb's goals were focussed on Kashmir , whereas the other two militant organisations had pan-Islamic ideals, which better suited the ISI's larger agenda. Due to its isolation the Hizb cadres had depleted from 12000 to around a tenth of that strength, largely due to attrition by the Security Forces and, partly, the Ikhwans. Besides, the people in Kashmir had rejected violence; the situation was improving since 1997, but this process received a setback due to the Kargil conflict.

 

 

Why did the Hizb abrogate its ceasefire? The four-fold reasons were Pak pressure, Hurriyat pressure, the influence of the Jamait-I-Islami in Pakistan-- Kashmir was its only agenda--and the unhappiness of the Jihadi Council comprising all the militant groups. It needed better appreciation that the assistance of the Hizb within Kashmir , due to its indigenous origins and links, was vital for all the militant groups to provide intelligence, sanctuary and logistical support. An interesting point made was that the Lashkar, for all practical purposes, was independent of Pakistan , since it was getting money from the Gulf; the ISI had used Jihadi elements to serve its agenda; now they were using the ISI and Pakistan for their own pan-Islamic agenda.

 

 

The Q & A session revealed the different views in Delhi to explain the recent developments in Kashmir . They could be summarized.

 

 

(1) India should make serious efforts to improve the economic condition of the Kashmiris and promote good governance. But, should India also support the failing state of Pakistan ? Regularly increasing the defence budget in India would ruin Pakistan if it tried to keep up. The contrary view was that peace was a pre-condition for providing good governance; this explained Farooq Abdullah's inability to provide good governance.

 

 

(2) The public face of the ceasefire and subsequent negotiations was unnecessarily high profile when the need was for quiet diplomacy. There was far too much media glare and publicity associated with the present exercise. Still the ceasefire itself was a welcome development and, hopefully, would set in train a process.

 

 

(3) The Hurriyat was more important than the Hizb, and was more closely linked to Pakistan ; hence India should give prominence to the Hurriyat. The contrary viewpoint was that the Hurriyat only existed because of Pakistan ; neither was the Hizb united on its Kashmir policy. Groupism was inevitable among the militant groups as they competed for resources.

 

 

(4) GOI had made several mistakes in Kashmir ; one was in supporting groups opposed to the JKLF, which mirror-imaged Pakistan 's policy of neglecting the Hizbul Mujahidin. Indeed, the Hizb was used by India to eliminate the JKLF. The deteriorating situation in Kashmir reflected the decline, generally, in the Indian polity. [The Veerappan case was briefly touched upon]. Economic growth had not led to any increase in employment, which reflected in Kashmir ; there was an economic aspect to militancy there. A serious mistake was installing puppets in Kashmir like Bakshi, Gul Mohammed and Farooq, and not taking early steps to prevent the growth of madrassas and the Deobandi influence in Kashmir .

 

 

(5) The future looked grim with India being driven to accept that its sovereignty over Kashmir was not absolute. Militancy could grow in Kashmir , as the people were alienated. It was unlikely that Pakistan 's policy on Kashmir would change. The Islamic factor was important in Kashmir since the Islamic world saw the Kashmir issue in Hindu-Muslim terms. The need of the hour was developing a concept of composite nationalism. A dialogue with the Hizb and Hurriyat would marginalise Pakistan , but they must not be treated as supplicants. India also needed to talk to Pakistan if the nuclear danger was to be averted. Here, again, a contrary view was expressed that there was no agenda for Indo-Pak talks as India could not compromise on the LoC. 

 

 

(6) The developments in Pakistan had a global aspect; it was a bastion of US imperialism, but was now facing an internal crisis and losing its allies. It was no coincidence that the Kashmir crisis developed as the Afghanistan crisis wound down. The irrationality of Islam was also a global phenomenon. The US had always supported absolutist Muslim states; now it found they had become problems. 

 

 

(7) India must appreciate that the Kashmiris distrusted it, and that Farooq had little credibility as an independent entity in the State. There was need, therefore, to increase the Kashmiri stake in the Indian Union by providing them employment and educational facilities outside Kashmir . The proposal for trifurcating of the State, which is raised from time to time, would knock the bottom out of India 's case that Kashmiri culture was composite and its case regarding the secular nature of Indian nationalism. Kashmir was a microcosm of India ; that had to be stressed.

 

 

 

 

 

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