“Some Myths and Misconceptions”– An Addendum

26 Jun, 2000 · 381

Manoharan adds on to the list of myths and misconceptions pointed out by Brig. Sinha

Brig. Sinha’s ‘myths and misconceptions on ethnic conflict in

Sri Lanka

’ is commendable for looking at the crisis from a new angle. In addition to his list of delusions a few more need mention.

The belief that Sri Lankan Tamils are a single homogenous group is not true. There are Jaffna Tamils and Batticaloa Tamils, who differ in social organisation, economic activity and cultural practices. There are also large differences among the Tamils based on caste. Relations between the upper caste Vellalas and lower caste Karaiyars and Mukkuvars has never been cordial.
It is also a misconception that Eelam could be formed by merging the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka . The Muslim majority district of Amparai and Sinhalese dominated Vavunia interpose, and break up the territorial contiguity of the proposed Tamil ‘homeland’. The Muslims, though linguistically Tamils, have ruled out joining a Tamil Eelam due to their persecution by the LTTE in the early 1990s.
A separate independent state may not fulfill the “aspirations” of Sri Lankan Tamils. What is the guarantee that all militant and moderate outfits will come together to safeguard the rights of the Tamils? Can the possibility of a civil war in an independent Tamil state ruled out?

Moving on to Brig. Sinha’s observations:-

It is true that the Sri Lankan Army did not lose Jaffna as a logical conclusion of its retreat from the Elephant Pass (EP) although the strategic value of EP cannot be underrated. By holding on to EP, the Tigers can strike at Jaffna any time, though there is currently a stalemate.
In addition to effective patrolling of the Palk Straits, New Delhi ’s offer of a $100 million credit to Colombo during Jaswant Singh’s mission is important. Apart from the moral support provided to maintaining the territorial integrity of the island State, this could facilitate a diversion of funds to the war effort from the Sri Lankan coffers.
The rate of refugee influx is slow, not only because of strict vigilance by the Indian Navy, but also due to the lack of ‘pull factor’. Miserable living conditions in the refugee camps in India and intense interrogation on landing by security officials to separate civilians refugees from militant refugees are further discouraging factors. Incidentally, the Indian Navy and Coast Guards have been rescuing stranded refugees abandoned on islets inside our territorial waters by Sri Lankan boatmen on humanitarian considerations.