War in Sri Lanka : Some Myths and Misconceptions

26 Jun, 2000    ·   379

Is a clear analysis of the Sri Lankan crisis possible when the basic perceptions upon which the analysis is built are false? Brig. Sinha explores the misconceptions clouding the analysis.
The dramatic success of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in recent months, culminating in the capture of the Elephant pass in the last week of April, has given rise to some misconceptions. After the capture of the Elephant pass there was widespread speculation that the fall of Jaffna was imminent, and the choice before some 40,000 Sri Lankan troops in Jaffna was either to surrender to LTTE or face the prospect of getting killed or captured. More than a month after the fall of the Elephant Pass , Jaffna is still held by SLA . There are signs of recovery, and some cohesion in SLA for the bitter fight ahead. The air lifting of 122 mm multi-barrel rocket launchers from Pakistan and acquisition of Kfir jet fighters from Israel has considerably enhanced the fire power of the SLA and boosted their low morale. The SLA is still in control of the strategic Palaly airport and Kankesanthurai port.       

 

 

Although there are reports of LTTE shelling both these places they have not been damaged to the extent of becoming more operational. It is possible to maintain the present level of troops in Jaffna through sea and air routes. It was believed that the fall of the Elephant Pass had severed the land route from the South to Jaffna , but the fact is the SLA was never dependent on this route for the movement of men and material. The SLA had inducted the bulk of its forces into Jaffna Peninsula when it had captured Jaffna nearly four years ago through Kankesanthurai port.

 

 

Many military and political analysts have commented that by declaring its intention not to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka , which includes military or logistical support, India has closed its option to influence the outcome of the war in Sri Lanka . This is also a misconception. India can still influence this war without direct military intervention or logistical support to either party. The day the LTTE is denied access to Tamil Nadu’s coast, its capacity to wage war will be reduced to a level where it cannot continue its offensive to re-capture Jaffna . The slow progress of LTTE’s advance to capture Jaffna in recent weeks and the trickle of refugees from Jaffna to Tamil Nadu’s coast against the expectation of general exodus is a pointer to effective patrolling by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard to deny LTTE access to Tamil Nadu’s coast. It is also a pointer to the direction of India ’s Sri Lanka policy. In my view, this is the best course of action for the government to assist Sri Lanka effectively without raising a domestic controversy.

 

 

The view held by some commentators that, if the LTTE is denied victory in Jaffna , public opinion in Tamil Nadu would turn against the NDA government is largely imaginary. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was a strategic blunder by the LTTE, which has cost them the support of the Tamils on India , crucial for the victory of their cause. The nexus of LTTE with the militant organisations of North East India and Peoples’ War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh has reinforced the image of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in the perception of average Indians. 

 

 

Even if one considers a worst case scenario in which the SLA capitulates and is forced to withdraw from Jaffna , it will create new problems which the LTTE is ill equipped to handle. The unilateral declaration of independence, as speculated by some Tamil Nadu politicians, would be the in crowning strategic blunder. The prospects of a “Tamil Homeland”, consisting of Northern & Eastern provinces, would be lost. There is no possibility of any country, least of all India , recognising the renegade state. Will Prabhakaran have any compunction in abandoning 30 per cent of the total Tamil population of Sri Lanka who live in Sinhalese majority areas, mostly in Colombo , at the mercy of Sinhalese marauders? If he abandons them, will he be able to sustain his image as the champion of the Tamil cause.

 

 

A ‘Halo’ has been created around Prabhakaran as a great guerilla leader. Unfortunately, this myth was unwittingly reinforced by withdrawal of the IPKF. The ferocity of LTTE’s fight against SLA is not motivated by the charisma of Prabhakaran’s leadership, but the bitterness and hatred Sri Lankan Tamils feel towards the SLA for its atrocities committed against them. The realisation of this plain truth by the Sinhalese would go a long way to finding a just solution to the island’s ethnic strife.

 

 

There is another myth that it is possible to negotiate with Prabhakaran. In the past, Prabhakaran betrayed, not only the IPKF, but also Presidents Premadasa and Chandrika Kumaratunga. He has systematically eliminated all the moderate Tamil leaders of Sri Lanka and is reported to have killed his own second-in-command, Mahatya. One must, however, credit Prabhakaran with never diluting his dream of an independent Eelam. That dream unfortunately is a mirage, and is not shared by all Sri Lankan Tamils. Unless the personal dream of Prabhakaran and the just demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils are separated, there is no hope for peace in Sri Lanka . 

 

 

 

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