Prospects of Peace in Nagaland

26 Jun, 2000    ·   376

Brig. SP Sinha points out why despite a formal ceasefire with both the factions of NSCN in Nagaland being a positive step, past experience of ceasefire and talks with the underground Nagas has not been encouraging
The announcement of a formal ceasefire by the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, NSCN(K), and its readiness to hold talks with the Central Government is a welcome development. Earlier a ceasefire agreement between the Muivah faction, NSCN (M), and the centre had come into effect from Aug 97, which was extended a number of times; the last extension expires in July this year. Four rounds of formal talks have been held between the two sides. The last round was scheduled to be held in February, but was aborted after the arrest of Muivah by the Thailand police for jumping bail.

 

 

Although a formal ceasefire with both the factions of NSCN is a positive step, past experience of ceasefire and talks with the underground Nagas has not been encouraging. In 1964 a ceasefire was arranged between the underground and the Centre by the efforts of Peace Mission led by JP. The ceasefire was extended a number of times despite violation of its provisions. It would be recalled that the first batch of underground Nagas was sent to China in 1966 for training when the ceasefire was still operative. The ceasefire agreement was finally abrogated by the Centre in 1973 after an attempt was made on the life of the then Chief Minister, Mr. Hokishe Sema. A similar attempt was made  in December 1999 on the life of the present Chief Minister, Mr. S.C. Jamir, allegedly by militants of the NSCN (M), when he was travelling from Dimapur to Kohima. This time the ceasefire was given a lease of life. 

 

 

In the late 1960s there were six rounds of talks between the underground Nagas and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Nagas missed a historic opportunity to find a lasting solution of the Naga problem when they refused the offer of a settlement “not within the framework of the Indian Constitution but within the framework of the Indian Government”, meaning that the constitution could be amended to accommodate a settlement. The Shillong Accord of 1975 was another turning point in the chequered history of Nagaland. The opportunity to usher peace was again due to the refusal of the hard core to accept the Agreement. The Accord also brought into focus the failure of the negotiators to develop wider contacts before finalising the agreement.

 

 

Once again there is a ceasefire, and the Centre is trying to bring in all factions within the ambit of these talks. But the situation has changed dramatically, since the days when Indira Gandhi was prepared to grant maximum autonomy to the Nagas. The two major underground factions, NSCN (M) and NSCN (K), are engaged in bitter internecine feuds which have claimed hundreds of lives in the last decade. The Naga-Kuki clashes have added another dimension to their rivalries. The question of “Greater Nagaland”, a demand shared by the underground and elected representatives of Nagaland to incorporate Naga inhabited areas of Manipur into Nagaland, is an emotive issue which no Manipuri would accept.

 

 

The declared negotiating stances of both the NSCN (M) and the Centre are inflexible. The Centre is on record that it will consider any Naga proposal if it is within the framework of Indian sovereignty. Muivah, on the other hand, insists that the sovereignty of the Nagas is non-negotiable. “What then is the point of continuing the charade of negotiations?” some may ask. There is great danger in terminating the negotiations at a time when the Naga factions are amenable to talks. There are inimical forces at work in the neighbourhood of North East India, that would like a continuance of the insurgency. If the Centre slams the door on talks, the militants would “free to fall” in the open arms of our adversaries.

 

 

The Centre should move forward with the talks, but with caution. To begin with there is a need to establish trust between the two sides. The ceasefire must not be used by militant groups to strengthen their respective positions, by procuring fresh arms and recruiting new cadres. The security forces have alleged, and not without substance, that the militant groups are running a parallel government, which has eroded the credibility of the elected representatives. The state must not be allowed to wither. On the other hand, a section of Nagas suspect India ’s hand in Muivah’s arrest and incarceration in Bangkok . Whatever be the truth, it is important to re-establish the broken trust. Should the Indian Government have reasons to suspect Muivah’s links with Pakistan ’s ISI, the better course would be to confront him with the evidence. Our Intelligence agencies should not be allowed to follow their own “private agenda”.  

 

 

 

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