Jammu and Kashmir: Problems and Prospects
23 Jun, 2000 · 372
Bhashyam Kasturi analyses three issues – territorial, political, and socio-economic – that need consideration in terms of policy inputs and long-term imperatives before India with regard to Kashmir.
The problem in
Jammu and Kashmir
poses an inter-linked internal-external challenge to Indian national security. The issue has three major aspects in terms of its impact on bilateral relations with
Pakistan
. There is the territorial, the political and finally socio-economic aspect that need attention to evolve a national policy. Every aspect of national policy has to be viewed from the perspective of the internal-external dynamic presented by the
Kashmir
issue.
Kashmir
are well known; they present a dual challenge to Indian security. For instance, intelligence has to focus upon cross-border terrorism and internal insurgency. Both are separate but inter-linked.
India
are:
Jammu and Kashmir
, including territories in Pakistani and Chinese possession, needs attention. In a sense,
Kashmir
is a trilateral issue not a bilateral one.
China
holds the Shaksgam valley ceded to it by
Pakistan
in the sixties.
China
also holds Aksai Chin and the Deosai plains which
India
claims. This reality has to be factored into any discussion on territory. Current Indian thought bifurcates the Pakistani from the Chinese problem, and treats the Line of Actual Control with
China
separately. Diplomatically, this makes sense, but not geo-strategically.
India
has been pushing hard to get everybody to accept the “reality” of the Line of Control between
India
and
Pakistan
. The
US
has apparently accepted this formulation, for its own reasons. If this reality is to be transformed into fact,
India
and
Pakistan
will have to ponder over what happens to Siachen, i.e. the territory beyond
Pt. NJ
9842, where there is no LOC but only what
India
calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL).
Pakistan
committed aggression in
Kashmir
in1947 and was emboldened to do so again in 1999 in Kargil.
India
’s pre-conditions for resuming a dialogue with
Pakistan
on the latter ending cross-border terrorism. This is vital for any trust to be established, but is inexorably linked to internal violence ending. This is where a political dialogue between all political parties is required. Several forums have begun this process, but more needs to be done to end the cult of the gun.
Pakistan
has to accept. Without it the dialogue would be incomplete. In fact not enough has been done to focus world attention on conditions in the Northern Areas and POK; this is a challenge for Indian diplomacy.
India
’s North-East is detrimental to national interests.
Kashmir
in the early phases of the insurgency and have settled elsewhere. It is those who are living in refugee camps that the government must focus on.
India
is clear about the internal-external dynamic and seeks a solution on these lines, evolving a national consensus on
Jammu and Kashmir
may become easier.
The macro level issues relating to handling of
The three issues that need consideration in terms of policy inputs and long-term imperatives before
Territorial
The status of the entire state of
The other question is that
This, of course, detracts attention from the fact that
Political
The bilateral aspect of Indo-Pak relations are currently focused on
A political dialogue is also a dialogue with the people, people of all shades of opinion and religions. It is a dialogue that has to be constantly undertaken. It also involves people from the Northern Areas and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, this much
This is where also governance and coordination in counter-insurgency operations also become imperative. The key is realising that, in the long run, allowing the insurgency in the state to become a money spinning business like in
Socio-economic
The revival of the state, both socially and economically can happen only when violence ends. People will return, this applies to Kahmiris who have left the State and tourists, only when the atmosphere is calm. Too much should not be expected from those who left
Provide incentives to return. Rebuild houses and villages ravaged by decades of insurgency. Take up road building on a large scale. Improve communications. And get people to participate. All this is premised on violence receding from the Kashmiri psyche. Once