Arms Control: A Dead End?
23 Jun, 2000 · 368
Arpit Rajain ponders whether arms control measures after the Cold War have reached a dead end
The process of arms control, has sadly not happened. At the beginning of the 21st century it is facing a dead end. No real progress has been made on vital arms control issues.
US
. This could unleash another arms race. The
US
has told the Russians that it wants to amend the ABM treaty or they would withdraw. The CTBT has become a dead treaty until states make a concerted effort to revive it.
China
continues to refine its arsenal and modernise its missiles.
France
conducted more tests.
North Korea
has tested yet another missile and made further progress on its nuclear weapons program. So have
China
,
India
and
Pakistan
.
France
and
UK
have taken some declaratory steps towards disarmament. The Russian Duma ratified the CTBT (14 Apr) just before the Review Conference and signed START II (21 Apr). The 2000 NPT Review Conference was convened at
New York
against this backdrop which highlighted the challenges to nuclear disarmament worldwide and the future of the NPT.
World Court ’s interpretation of the NPT. The
Russian Federation
and
USA
must implement START II and conclude START III at an early date. The CTBT can only be revived if the 44 states whose consent is required for this purpose ratify it. To advance the international disarmament dialogue beyond the NPT, all states must agree to establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention verification regime. If the supporting pillars of the non-proliferation regime are not supported and strengthened, arms control after the Cold War would reach a dead end.
With the end of the Cold War the risk of a nuclear conflict has receded, but the dangers from the existence of nuclear weapons and doctrines that support their use still exist. We are now witnessing the institutionalisation of nuclear deterrence. The Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons, partially made public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of its strategic defense, indeed the role of these weapons has increased to include deterring ‘rogue’ states, deterring chemical and biological weapons, and other undefined vital US interests abroad. Thus the role of nuclear deterrence has expanded well beyond the narrow purpose of deterring the use of nuclear weapons.
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995 serious concern was voiced by both camps-the contextualists, who argued for extension, believed they were strengthening one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime, but the abolitionists expressed concern with the discriminatory nature of the treaty and that it had not prevented horizontal proliferation. Over the next five years there were many milestones-the most prominent being the South Asian nuclear tests. Establishing a National Missile Defense has received flak even within the
However,
Some believe that the NPT Review Conference has been a great success as the P-5 have given “an unequivocal undertaking” that they would eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This is just different phraseology for covering up the failure of the NPT to prevent proliferation. This failure has been in overall progress towards nuclear disarmament.
The contexualists point out that nuclear disarmament has been facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states following the end of the cold war. This trust they argue is premised on the NPT. The abolitionists argue that, since the P-5 still retain their nuclear weapons, where is the trust they reposed in Art VI of the NPT. The nuclear weapon states had undertaken therein to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating…to nuclear disarmament”. Over the next two decades the only progress was in enhancing their stockpiles. Agreed that a comprehensive disarmament agenda towards a nuclear zero is a complex task given the complex interplay of variables. Yet several steps can be suggested for states to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons in their security architecture:
· Address doctrines of use and amend them from ‘offensive-defense’ to ‘defensive-defense’.
· Increase transparency to instill confidence, not only with adversaries, but also with the local population.
· Promote CBMs in ‘hot spots’.
· The P-5 have to commit themselves to a time-bound framework for getting rid of nuclear weapons.
· Agree immediately to reduce the number of nuclear warheads.
Nuclear non-proliferation depends on progress being made on nuclear disarmament. The P-5 must reaffirm their legal obligation to nuclear disarmament by accepting the
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