Speaker: Ashley Tellis

Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Ashley Tellis began with separate analyses of US -South Asia and US-China relations and wove the two relationships together at the end of his presentation.

US-South Asia Relations

Mr. Tellis sketched the spectrum of US -South Asia relations in broad strokes with the emphasis on India and Pakistan. According to Tellis, President Clinton's visit to South Asia signals the maturation of the American policy towards South Asia from a Pak centric policy to a more balanced interaction with India and Pakistan. He traced the evolution of US policy in South Asia in the following way. During the Cold War the US had a reluctant alliance with Pakistan for safeguarding its strategic interests in South Asia. 

The end of the Cold War saw a shift in US policy towards a more even-handed relationship with Pakistan. The recent Clinton visit has laid the foundation of an enhanced engagement of India by the US. This enhanced engagement, however, does not mean that the US recognises India as a regional power but is a realisation that Indo-US relations should not be held ransom to Indo-Pak relations. Further, it is recognition of the fact that India is a major independent actor in its own right.

While recognising that India has an asymmetric position in South Asia, the changes in American policy towards South Asia  presents new challenges to US policy makers. 

·                     Firstly, the US has to develop a comprehensive relationship with India without harming its ties with Pakistan. The US cannot and should not make the rescue of Pakistan the centre piece of its policy towards South Asia. It is essential to encourage the right constituencies in Pakistan to have a continued meaningful relationship with them. President Clinton by far has been the most interested US President in South Asia. Efforts should be made by the  successor administration to keep this interest alive, to do this it is necessary to get rid of the Cold War baggage and define why India is strategically important to the US.

·                     Secondly, India is not seen as sympathetic to US interests. In fact, it is neither an ally nor an adversary. India's nuclear tests have added another dimension to this  undefined relationship. Hence, the struggle to redefine India in the context of  US policy in South Asian is going to be a critical task. Some of the responsibility for this redefinition also rests with India. The choices India makes in the economic, strategic and political arena will be significant.  The scale and pace of economic reforms in India, its nuclear posture and military capabilities, and its commitment to democracy shall impact directly upon future US policy in South Asia.

·                     Third major challenge in redefining current Indo-US relations will be to reconcile the divergent expectation of the two states from an enhanced bilateral relationship The US views India as a potential great power and wants to engage and co-opt it into a US dominated global order. The Indian view is somewhat different. India views itself as a great power here and now and wants corresponding relations with the rest of the world. An the political level, India  wants the US to endorse it as a regional power and back its claim for a Security Council seat. The US, does not see this as the right time to do that. 

·                     Fourthly, one of the major challenges the US faces in its enhanced engagement with India is to convey to it that a larger relationship with India does not mean abandoning its core interests like the NPT. The NPT is critical to maintaining its global supremacy, and US concerns about the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes are a -product of these concerns.

US-China Relations

The safest thing to say about US- China relations is that they are at a complex transitional stage. There has been a shift in US policy from a strategic partnership with China to the present complex relationship with it.  Despite the passage of the Permanent Normal Trading Rights (PNTR) Bill, there is a growing recognition of impending conflict between the US and China in  future.

According to Tellis, the US has the following objectives vis-à-vis China. At the fundamental level, the US wants to engage China in the  hope of incorporating it into the present US dominated global order. Its policy objectives are to access the Chinese markets for free trade, to prevent China from using force in solving disputes like Taiwan, to keep China from threatening US allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia; and finally to maintain US forward presence in the world. To achieve these objectives the US must not make an adversary of China. The current US strategy to achieve these objectives is somewhat untidy, comprising elements of engagement, hedging and investment simultaneously. 

US engagement with China is important in the context of North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. China will be a key factor in any changes in North Korea as well as upholding the NPT regime. The US policy towards Taiwan has elements of hedging with persuasion and threat being parts of it. The US is not convinced that persuasion will work on the issue of Taiwan with China and is prepared to play a larger role.

From the US point of view,  an investment in its own national and global security is important. In this context, The US military must advance proceed from a manouevre-based military to an information-based one. National Missiles Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) are a part of this modernization. Further the US needs to resuscitate its alliances, maintain an active forward deployment and look for new strategic partners. It is, hence, important to keep China as friendly as possible and maintain US supremacy to the extent that it is continuously an uphill task for China to catch up with it.

US-South Asia-China Relations

For Washington, South Asia and China constitute two different worlds. US-China relations impact upon core US concerns, while US-South Asia relations are only extrinsically important to the US. Often policy makers do not squares these two areas. However, in recent times the linkages between the two regions are being appreciated in US policy circles. There is an increasing recognition of the fact that China is part of the strategic problem in South Asia and cannot be provided the role of a security manager in South Asia. It cannot be treated purely as an outside actor in Indo-Pak relations. Further, there is growing recognition that TMD will affect China and by implication South Asia. However, If some time in the future, the US seeks to contain the growth of Chinese power, then East Asia rather than South Asia would form the fulcrum of such an alliance.

Discussion

Question:  You have spoken about the challenges of US taking India seriously. What are the challenges for India taking the US seriously? Further, if NPT is a tool for maintaining global US supremacy and global peace, this is not possible with the presence of a hegemonic power like the US.

Response:  It is the American belief that the US follows a model of global politics in which power is subordinated to norms and values. For lack of any better alternative, the current US dominated world order presents the best option as it mitigates the worst features of power politics. This is not necessarily bad from the Indian point of view. It is an exercise of primacy that envisages a role for institutions and norms and accommodates  the concerns of smaller states like India.

Question:  If non-proliferation is the core issue, it will affect India-US Relations in the coming days. Why was the US silent about Pakistan acquiring assistance from other powers for promoting its nuclear weapons programme? Thirdly, why should the US be worried about nuclear deterrence in South Asia, when it is no threat to the US?

Response:  The US has no problem with nuclear deterrence in South Asia and the US could minimise its impact. The problem lies in converting this practical understanding to support its non-proliferation principles. The threat that India poses is not to US physical security, but to its core principles. A proliferated nuclear world is not in the interest of the US nor India.

Question:  One of the important objectives of Clinton's Moscow visit was to get its concurrence to amending the ABM Treaty. Given the negative response from will the US walk out of the Treaty?

Response: Inside the US, the Democrats are convinced that the any decision related to the Treaty should be taken collectively. However the Republicans may go ahead unilaterally if they come tp power after the elections.

Question:  Given the strategic calculations of India, its policy will be in direct confrontation with the US. For example, how will the US react to India developing longer range delivery systems? What could be the benchmarks that are acceptable both to the US and India? Are they negotiable, given the stand of both countries?

Response: There has never been a well-defined benchmark in this regard. The US would be able to appreciate the strategic posture of India, if it is well defined instead of it being open ended. If India aims to push ahead too fast, it would be very difficult for the US to accept it but these issues could be negotiated.

Question:  Pakistan has always been important to the US because of its strategic significance. Given this factor, what is the possibility a breakthrough in Indo-US relations? Secondly, India should be able to play a more significant role in coordinating with US interests in the Central Asian region.

Response: At present Pakistan has no role such as a Trojan horse in Central Asia.  Pakistan exists because it is there and the US has to live with it. It does not play that important a role regarding US interests in Central Asia. If one were to prioritize US interests, then East Asia would assume the first place followed by the  Persian Gulf and South East Asia.