The Kargil intrusions in 1999 must be seen in the context of the Lahore bus ride and its impact on Indo-Pak relations. While information was available on possible "infiltration" as opposed to "intrusion", India missed the wood for the trees and those assessing Pakistan intentions were lulled into complacency by Lahore.

The function of intelligence agencies is not merely to inform, but to assess. But the evidence gathered by Kargil Review Committee (hereafter KRC) shows that intelligence was available; what was missing was the assessment.

The military received information from it field formations of militant training in Skardu, apart from felt to be of increased military movement along with militant cadres (in certain sectors). Logistics build up, including stocking of ammunition, was also noticed, but this was indicative of increased artillery shelling across the Line of Control (LOC) and infiltration militant into Jammu and Kashmir.

The IB chief warned the government in June 1998 that Pakistan to infiltrate militant into Kargil. RAW is also said to have furnished information that Pakistan was planning an offensive. Either the information did not reach the right audience or it was too general in nature to be acted upon.

What does all this mean? Would these bits of information have given the government the big picture? If it did why did the government not take steps to counter any such moves? From internal analysis by various agencies it appears that it was expected that Gen. Mushraff would try and do some thing different, but audacity was not anticipated. Additionally, each agency tried to reach top government leadership directly, without allowing the JIC to conduct a comprehensive situational analysis.

The KRC also observes that information about activities within the FCNA region were available, but "very few of these could be considered actionable intelligence." The report then uses the benefit of hindsight to suggest that all this information "fitted into an assessment of likely large scale militant infiltration and yet more intensive shelling in the summer of 1999."

There is no mention about the loss of Kaksar in 1988 and how it took couple of days of intensive fighting and loss of 30-40 soldiers to recapture it. Also in 1998, 300-400 men were stopped from infiltrating in to the Kargil sector. KRC only mentions only major intrusion that took place in 1993, in which Pakistan suffered 27 casualties.

According to the KRC, the critical failure of intelligence related to absences of data on the induction and de-induction of battalions and the lack of accurate data on the identity of the battalions the Kargil area during 1998. The KRC says that its own analysis showed changes in the ORBAT, including a turnover of some units, induction of two additional battalions in addition to the 13 deployed, and forward deployment of two battalions from Gilgit to Gultari and from Skardu to Hamzigund respectively.

The KRC conclusion is that since Pakistan was focusing on Kargil, hence "information regarding the inductions of battalions in the FCNA region and the forward deployment of two battalions could have proved to be an indicator of the likely nature of Pak activity in this sector. This begs the question as to how the induction of two battalions could have made any difference, when all assessments were talking of infiltration and not intrusions.

The military was not alert either. The elaborate system of intelligence gathering from unit level to brigade to division did not generate any details of increased Pakistan activity or militant activity in the Northern Areas Yes, information about troop and artillery accretions was here, but it was only seen through the insurgency prism.

Second, the army's own assessment suggested nothing serious as evident from the May 10, 1999 Unified Command HQ conference in Srinagar in which 15 Corps Commander Lt Gen Kishan Pal noted that nothing major was going on, except infiltration of a localised type that would be taken care of. The KRC notes "Corps Commander had moved adequate force to contain the intrusion…there was no clarity in the assessment to the magnitude of the intrusions and the composition of the intruders."

In other words the army did not know the scale and depth of the intrusions till that time. Is it possible that the army chain of command refused to study the intelligence provided to them? In other words, the chain of command had made a decision to hold intelligence at certain levels itself not wanting to be bothered unless actual conditions on the ground changed radically.