Hostage Negotiations: Flaws at Kandhahar
17 May, 2000 · 355
Kanchan L. says that the "imperative was delay tactics and to drag the siege on to weaken the resolve of the terrorists; ...as terrorists do not normally plan to kill to harm hostages... since they are conscious of the fact that the hostages are their main bargaining asset"
Hostage negotiations are not normal negotiating processes. The response towards hostage-taking terrorism involves issues credibility, prestige, and reputation that differentiate hostage negotiations and normal bargaining. The
Kandahar incident revealed certain objectives that were significant to the strategy of the Indian government.
Saudi Arabia . Even when a flexible response strategy was adopted no concrete support was sought from the
U.S.
India 's negotiating stance, especially when it yielded to their demands which discredited the hard-line posturing in the initial phase.
The initial position adopted by the government was of having "no truck" with the terrorists. It is during this phase that the government was found wanting; it could not influence, control or assume the initiative. The "no truck" stance gave way to a more flexible response, stressing the importance of time.
The "no truck" move was premised on the belief that it would be a mistake to open negotiations with the Taliban, as this would accord it diplomatic recognition; this was a central precept of the strategy. The strategy was weakened from the outset by dependence on the Taliban for resolving the problem. The government had no effective means to influence the terrorists' behavior, and lacked adequate resources to bargain with the Taliban since no other country was willing to provide diplomatic assistance, either direct or indirect. The government sought to rationalise this decision by emphasizing the lack of military options. The pariah status of the Taliban regime also led to isolation of the Indian government. The government ought to have pursued the option of seeking assistance from countries like
The demand for return of the hostages was set by the terrorists at a high level, which undermined the credibility of
To procrastinate is a significant feature of hostage negotiations, particularly when terrorists demand an early resolution. The government seems to have acted in haste due to the time limits imposed upon it by the terrorists and the Taliban. At the outset, the hostage takers set their deadlines with the knowledge that the resuited in the time ractor" becoming crucial as the incident professed. The government also came under pressure to resolve the crisis swiftly due to intense media coverage, especially the televised images of the relatives' trauma. Media generated pressures led to the government laying an emphasis on public support.
Within the overall negotiating framework, an interactive relationship between terrorism, media coverage and the government's strategy made the time factor work in favour of the terrorists rather than the negotiators. Visible reactions to public pressures ought to have been minimized. The negotiators should have restored to prevarication and delay, appreciating the Taliban's warning to the hijackers not to harm the hostages. The imperative was delay tactics and to drag the siege on a weaken the resolve of the terrorists; experience has shown that terrorists do not normally plan to kill to harm hostages as deliberate policy, since they are conscious of the fact that the hostages are their main bargaining asset.
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