Kargil Committee Report

01 May, 2000    ·   350

Report of the IPCS Panel discussion held on 13 April 2000
Panelists: Lt. Gen. Hazari, PR Chari and Lt. Gen. VK Sood

 

 

Lt.Gen Hazari

 

 

The Kargil Review Committee had very specific terms of reference. It was to investigate events leading up to the Kargil crisis and seek means for prevention of similar crises in future. It was not an exercise in fixing blame for the Kargil crisis on any one person or organisation. The scope of the review was to analyse the creation of the present situation in Jammu & Kashmir in an historical perspective. This included the Simla Agreement, the proxy war in J&K, and the nuclear factor in Indo-Pak relations. India 's response, or the lack of it, to the situation has been analysed in this context.

 

 

Apart from published matter, discussions with approximately 95 individuals including an ex- President of India, all ex-Prime Ministers, except Mr. Deve Gowda and Mr. Chandrashekhar, ex Army Chiefs, former heads of RAW and IB, and all the relevant ministers were conducted. In each case the discussions were recorded and verified by the person interviewed. The committee did not interrogate but sought information. There were also presentations made at each organisational level of the Army from the Corps HQ downwards. Similar presentations were made by RAW and IB. In addition, media persons, who had reported on the Kargil crisis were interviewed. The report consists of 14 chapters of which Chapter 13 deals with findings and Chapter 14 makes a total of 21 recommendations regarding intelligence, terrorist operations, border management, defence management, defence budget, nuclear policy, media relations and information, civil military relation etc. The annexures and appendices to the report have not been published.

 

 

Role of RAW

 

 

RAW as an organisation claimed that it was spread very thin in the Kargil region with the same units handling the Laddakh region as well. Downsizing the RAW in Prime Minister Morarji Desai's time was cited as the reason for this. To the question as to why this issue of inadequate manpower was not tackled till now, there was no convincing answer. It was, hence, a systemic fault rather than a failure of the institution. The intelligence gathered by the RAW was not found to be up to date, reliable or adequate to be able to forecast the intrusions in the Kargil sector.

 

 

Role of the Army

 

 

Since 1971, the Army had a mindset that there was no threat of attack from Pakistan in the Kargil area. It was generally believed that this area does not lend itself to sustained patrolling or sustained military operations. Extreme climatic conditions in the Kargil areas are responsible for this mindset, since ground patrolling in winter is not possible. Only mountaineering patrols can be conducted, and these patrols suffer casualties. Hence there was a reluctance on the part of Army commanders to send troops to patrol an area that was not considered vulnerable but could lead to casualties due to extreme weather. Army commanders accepted this as a matter of policy. In keeping with this mindset the brigade deployment in this area had not changed since 1971. Therefore the Army did not assess the threat in Kargil correctly.

 

 

Systemic failures

 

 

The following questions were raised by the committee and addressed to the various departments in the government

 

 

Why was the strategic and tactical policy for India 's northern borders not continuously reassessed and changed accordingly

 

If there was a downsizing of RAW, why was it not upgraded in view of the changed security environment

 

Why did the government not adopt a proactive stance in J&K to contain the militancy

 

Why was available space technology like satellite imagery not pressed into service to keep an eye on the unpatrollable areas

 

 

 

P.R. Chari

 

 

The annexures and the appendices of the Kargil Committee report are vital to the document and should be made public. The following systemic inadequacies need to be addressed.

 

 

The primary problem is of restructuring the national security management and apex decision-making relating to defence. Plus there is a need for greater integration between MoD and Services headquarters. Though these inadequacies were discussed by the committee, they were not made public. Secondly, disproportionate attention was paid to the nuclear factor in the report. The report makes out that India 's nuclear program is a reaction to Pakistan 's nuclear program which is not factually correct. As far as intelligence failure is concerned, Pakistani intrusions in Kargil defied military logic. However, it must be borne in mind that all major intelligence failures are a result of the reluctance to think the unthinkable. History provides many such examples like the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour , Chinese entry into the Korean War, the Yom Kippur War etc. The mindset of the Indian army that Pakistan would not attack hampered their attempts to analyse the situation in Kargil.

 

 

The report leaves two questions unanswered :

 

 

What has India learnt from repeated intelligence failures

 

Why is the DRDO not held responsible for not equipping the Indian Army with basic gear like high altitude winter clothing, light weight rifles, rucksacks, and night vision devices

 

Lt. Gen.VK Sood

 

 

The terms of reference of the committee were clear and the report is precise. A few general observations can be made are as follows:

 

 

In the Army, heavy involvement in CI operations creates an atmosphere of fatigue and affects training . Further, tensions between the Army and Paramilitary forces, and between military and civil authorities affects general operations in Kashmir . Hence, a permanent unified command is imperative to effectively deal with the situation.

 

The present adhocism should be discarded. A consistent policy based on strategic and tactical concerns needs to be evolved. Therefore, Siachenisation of Kargil is important.

 

While a certain forward deployment is required, only technological surveillance can effectively ensure proper vigil over this area.

 

Today, India 's conventional arms superiority over Pakistan stands at a ratio of 1.37:1. This does not provide India the required edge on the battlefield. Hence, conventional superiority needs to be improved.

 

Comments

 

 

There is an area of "unknowability" in all intelligence set-ups, which has to be factored in while assessing the performance of any intelligence agency. It is a fact that intelligence gathering suffered because of the downsizing of RAW.

 

 

The Army and other intelligence agencies refused to share information with each other leading to a complete lack of coordination.

 

Modern air warfare depends on accuracy of intelligence. The intelligence agencies have already said that there is a limit to the accuracy of intelligence but this limit should be specified to tactical planners.

 

The public dimension of the Kargil crisis was badly handled. There are structures and systems in place for dissemination of information to the public, which were not activated leading to scanty news, as well as speculation in the media.

 

The Kargil committee report should not be an academic exercise only. It is necessary to implement its recommendations to improve the situation

 

Though Siachenization of Kargil has taken place, it is not a long-term solution. A proactive policy must be followed in Kashmir to root out the problem.

 

Kargil intrusion was due to failure at all levels--political, diplomatic, intelligence and armed forces. There is no trust between the Army and the intelligence bodies. This needs to be tackled at the earliest. Further, domestic intelligence must be strengthened.

 

Response

 

 

While talking about the nuclear factor, it must be kept in mind that the Pakistan 's nuclear programme started prior to India 's peaceful nuclear explosion and preempted the Indian programme at all stages.

 

Siachenization of Kargil is not advisable. Along with Kargil, the rest of the northern Indian border has to be kept in mind. In fact, India must have a declaratory policy that emphasises proactive action in Kashmir . But crossing the LoC has to be preceded by a diplomatic exercise to explain India 's security concerns to the world.

 

Accurate information about terrorist training camps, ammunition depots and their administration complexes could enable precision bombing of these sites. This has to be backed by the capability to defend our own air space.

 

Areas of "unknowability" are different in different setups. But this level has to be reduced to the minimum.

 

India requires a setup that can provide it with politico-strategic assessment. During the Kargil crisis, tactical moves on the ground were not complemented with strategic assessment, leading to the neglect of security on the border. As of now, the intelligence agencies are only capable of tactical assessment. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) needs to be refurbished to provide politico-strategic assessments. In addition, independent assessment of the performance of the various intelligence agencies needs to be made by independent experts. Finally, tactical and strategic assessment need to be integrated for more effective policymaking and implementation.

 

 

 

 

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