An article in the series ‘Ten Years After’ written by Medha Chaturvedi (http://bit.ly/qL9xa0) focuses on ‘terror outsourcing’ as a new phenomenon of the last ten years. The author makes an interesting argument that regional groups are now being used to spread terrorism in localized areas. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, ETIM in Xinjiang and the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in India are projected as a part of this terror outsourcing.

Although an interesting concept, three specific questions need to be posed: Why should regional groups be willing to be an outpost of terror central, so to speak, and fight someone’s jihad? How strong are the linkages between the centre and the outpost, and what brings the two together, beyond the funds? How do individuals in non-Muslim countries, primarily the West (UK, France, Germany and the US) get influenced by the al Qaeda ideology even before directly connecting with terror central?

‘Terror franchisees’ would be an appropriate concept for the above questions, and would fill the gap in understanding the linkages between terror central and the outposts. A terror franchisee could be defined as an indigenous terrorist group/organization in a region/country, with certain local grievances based on communal issues/ideologies and identities against the State, that is attempting to use a larger global cause/ideology of another terrorist organization and be a part of a global terror network.

Terror franchisees as an understanding would address some of the primary questions that arise based on the ‘outsourcing’ argument. The primary thrust of the outsourcing argument-that outposts are willing to be proxies of terror central primarily for monetary motivations needs to be explored further. Is money the primary motive of the JI, ETIM and IM? None of these three groups, along with other terror groups from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Chechenya and Pakistan were purely a creation of the post 9/11 war on terror. They were in existence before 9/11, hence the argument that these groups are a part of al Qaeda outsourcing should be revisited.

Second, not many of these outposts share the primary enthusiasm of terror central, which is anti-west in nature (anti-American to be precise) and involves the creation of an Islamic ummah through the sword. While these outposts would consider the above issues as a part of explaining the rationale for their existence, the primary reasons for their existence are local and sub-regional.

Case studies of Swat Taliban and Punjabi Taliban would support the concept of how terrorist groups in various regions are trying to organize themselves as part of larger international terror network led by the al Qaeda, aptly named as the base.
Swat Taliban and Punjabi Taliban are in fact pre-Taliban phenomena. Since the early 1990s, the Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Sufi Mohammad has been fighting for the imposition of shariah in the Malakand division. Though the TNSM came to light for sending volunteers into Afghanistan in 2001 against the US-led forces, the group was in existence even before the idea of Taliban was born. Maulana Sufi Mohammad was imprisoned as part of Pakistan’s efforts to cut down the activities of the TNSM.

Not many had heard about the Swat Taliban, until the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) came into existence during the last decade. Since the TTP itself has never been a monolithic organization and includes numerous groups within the FATA, the TNSM has slowly taken a Taliban identity and mutated into Swat Taliban. Despite assuming the ‘Taliban’ identity, the primary causes and objectives of the Swat Taliban have been restricted to Malakand. While the Swat Taliban would still rhetorically support the anti-American and anti-West agenda of the Taliban and al Qaeda, its primary emphasis is limited to the imposition of shariah. Thus the TNSM has become the Taliban franchisee in Swat.

Similarly, the Punjabi Taliban-though this was a new tag, the fighters under this banner originally belonged to Sunni sectarian organizations including the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Just as the TNSM mutated into Swat Taliban, these sectarian organizations are now mutating into Punjabi Taliban, or using the ‘Taliban’ banner to carry out sectarian attacks within Punjab. While the Punjabi Taliban is still a loose amalgam, it is likely to be strengthened and structured as a Punjabi franchisee. While this would agree with the overall objectives and ideologies of the Taliban, the primary target would remain sectarian.

Why would these local terrorist groups use a larger banner? While the monetary aspect cannot be undermined, the search for an over arching ideology, local grievances (secular and religious) against the State and the struggle for power vis-à-vis political and religious groups in a particular environment play a greater role in their decision to become a franchisee organization of terror central.

The cases of ETIM and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) respectively though can neither be perceived totally as a franchisee organization nor as al Qaeda/Taliban outposts in Xinjiang and Indonesia. More than the al Qaeda/Taliban wanting these two organizations to spread their ideology elsewhere, the ETIM and JI need the former, for ideological support, international networking, training and providing safe haven.
It would be interesting to see how individuals from various European towns, influenced by the al Qaeda/Taliban ideology, respond after 2014. Will they become individual franchisees or form groups in their respective countries?