Debate: Is a Nuclear Iran good for India?
11 Jul, 2011 · 3423
Abhijit Iyer-Mitra argues how Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb coincidentally favours India's strategic goals
An Iranian nuclear bomb is now fait accompli. No military action can stop it, while sanctions and stuxnet can only slow it down. The negatives are obvious, but India’s official position “opposed to any new nuclear powers” begs the question as to why is it keeping quiet? What are the regional dynamics of an Iranian bomb? And lastly, what impact will it have on India domestically and on India’s alliances abroad?
India was never happy about giving up its relationship with Iran. The reasons for that friendship were energy (which India needs desperately and from diverse sources), a bargaining lever against America, a conduit to playing the great game in Central Asia and finally to encircle Pakistan. Iran obliged (possibly unwittingly) on all counts. Now much has changed and India having burnt its Iranian bridge is consigned to defeat on three of those four interests come 2014. Iran going nuclear may just provide an opportunity to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
The threat to India whether jihadi or nuclear has always been Sunni, Pakistan being the launching pad and Saudi Arabia the intellectual home. In such a scenario, creating another enemy for Pakistan and strengthening any ideological enemy of Saudi Arabia is critical for India. The problem is that India cannot take any direct action against these two simply out of fear of derailing US interests. A nuclear Iran changes all that.
First, a nuclear Iran is a much more revisionist Iran which presents an existential threat to the gulf monarchies that have viciously oppressed their Shia minorities, while providing a safe-zone from where to carry out destabilization free from the fear of conventional retaliation. A nuclear Iran may very well arm and train peninsular Arab Shias – something it has been too cautious to do thus far. Iran’s capability to build a potent guerrilla force given Hezbollah’s good showing against Israel in 2006 should not be underestimated. Given that peninsular Shia concentrations sit atop most of the oil reserves, significant disruption in these regions along with competitive radicalization within the Gulf states will strain finances (important for Wahhabi proselytization abroad). Much of the Gulf’s stability being purchased by government handouts, strained finances almost always result in social disruption. This turmoil mated with Al-Qaeda’s peninsular focus will only serve to attract Arab Jihadis back, bringing the chickens home to roost.
Second, post 2014 a renewal of hostility between Iran and Pakistan over Afghanistan is likely as was seen prior to 9/11. Any gains by Iran in Afghanistan may lead to increased attacks against Pakistani Shia and set a destructive action-reaction cycle in motion. So if Pakistan claims that the US presence is the main destabilizing factor, then the US withdrawal will be an equally destabilizing factor albeit of a different nature. Iran’s bomb will therefore achieve objectives that India’s Machiavellis have persistently failed at vis-à-vis Pakistan - continued internal destabilization and geostrategic encirclement.
Third, Iran’s Sunni minorities are concentrated in its two extremities – the Iraqi and Pakistani borders. Pakistan’s terror resources will have to be split on 2 fronts – Kashmir and Iranian Balochestan-Sistan. Since the terrorism imperatives of the Pakistani state only increase with an Iranian bomb, its international isolation (which will almost certainly ensue post 2014) is only likely to worsen. Most importantly Pakistan’s main patrons - the Gulf Sheikdoms will be forced to publicly and substantively cut ties should they seek a continued US shield against a significantly upgraded Iranian threat. America having burnt its fingers relying on Pakistan, will hardly make the same mistake again by enlisting Pakistani cooperation in containing Iran.
The best part is that many of India's goals are achieved without India having to lift a finger or in any way alienate America. The internal political dynamic that a Shia-Sunni polarization produces may very well be to America’s advantage. The Shia-Sunni split in India by most accounts settles at a 30:70 ratio. While the Sunni’s in India tend to vote as a bloc, the Shia’s tend to have an eclectic voting pattern. Polarization however will ensure that any party courting the Muslim vote, will effectively have to declare a preference for Shia or Sunni thereby alienating one or the other – with the current balancing act virtually impossible to sustain. In practical terms this will mean a significant weakening of the “Muslim vote bank” and a decisive shift to the right, which may ultimately force left leaning and centrist parties to move right of centre. As a corollary, that move will only mean an Ideological strengthening of the American alliance and a weakening of anti-American demagoguery in the Indian political discourse.
Whether this was the calculus behind India’s silence, or the sheer ineptitude of the Indian Foreign Service is impossible to tell. Whatever the case, India should learn to love the Iranian bomb – the best things in life after all are free.
India was never happy about giving up its relationship with Iran. The reasons for that friendship were energy (which India needs desperately and from diverse sources), a bargaining lever against America, a conduit to playing the great game in Central Asia and finally to encircle Pakistan. Iran obliged (possibly unwittingly) on all counts. Now much has changed and India having burnt its Iranian bridge is consigned to defeat on three of those four interests come 2014. Iran going nuclear may just provide an opportunity to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
The threat to India whether jihadi or nuclear has always been Sunni, Pakistan being the launching pad and Saudi Arabia the intellectual home. In such a scenario, creating another enemy for Pakistan and strengthening any ideological enemy of Saudi Arabia is critical for India. The problem is that India cannot take any direct action against these two simply out of fear of derailing US interests. A nuclear Iran changes all that.
First, a nuclear Iran is a much more revisionist Iran which presents an existential threat to the gulf monarchies that have viciously oppressed their Shia minorities, while providing a safe-zone from where to carry out destabilization free from the fear of conventional retaliation. A nuclear Iran may very well arm and train peninsular Arab Shias – something it has been too cautious to do thus far. Iran’s capability to build a potent guerrilla force given Hezbollah’s good showing against Israel in 2006 should not be underestimated. Given that peninsular Shia concentrations sit atop most of the oil reserves, significant disruption in these regions along with competitive radicalization within the Gulf states will strain finances (important for Wahhabi proselytization abroad). Much of the Gulf’s stability being purchased by government handouts, strained finances almost always result in social disruption. This turmoil mated with Al-Qaeda’s peninsular focus will only serve to attract Arab Jihadis back, bringing the chickens home to roost.
Second, post 2014 a renewal of hostility between Iran and Pakistan over Afghanistan is likely as was seen prior to 9/11. Any gains by Iran in Afghanistan may lead to increased attacks against Pakistani Shia and set a destructive action-reaction cycle in motion. So if Pakistan claims that the US presence is the main destabilizing factor, then the US withdrawal will be an equally destabilizing factor albeit of a different nature. Iran’s bomb will therefore achieve objectives that India’s Machiavellis have persistently failed at vis-à-vis Pakistan - continued internal destabilization and geostrategic encirclement.
Third, Iran’s Sunni minorities are concentrated in its two extremities – the Iraqi and Pakistani borders. Pakistan’s terror resources will have to be split on 2 fronts – Kashmir and Iranian Balochestan-Sistan. Since the terrorism imperatives of the Pakistani state only increase with an Iranian bomb, its international isolation (which will almost certainly ensue post 2014) is only likely to worsen. Most importantly Pakistan’s main patrons - the Gulf Sheikdoms will be forced to publicly and substantively cut ties should they seek a continued US shield against a significantly upgraded Iranian threat. America having burnt its fingers relying on Pakistan, will hardly make the same mistake again by enlisting Pakistani cooperation in containing Iran.
The best part is that many of India's goals are achieved without India having to lift a finger or in any way alienate America. The internal political dynamic that a Shia-Sunni polarization produces may very well be to America’s advantage. The Shia-Sunni split in India by most accounts settles at a 30:70 ratio. While the Sunni’s in India tend to vote as a bloc, the Shia’s tend to have an eclectic voting pattern. Polarization however will ensure that any party courting the Muslim vote, will effectively have to declare a preference for Shia or Sunni thereby alienating one or the other – with the current balancing act virtually impossible to sustain. In practical terms this will mean a significant weakening of the “Muslim vote bank” and a decisive shift to the right, which may ultimately force left leaning and centrist parties to move right of centre. As a corollary, that move will only mean an Ideological strengthening of the American alliance and a weakening of anti-American demagoguery in the Indian political discourse.
Whether this was the calculus behind India’s silence, or the sheer ineptitude of the Indian Foreign Service is impossible to tell. Whatever the case, India should learn to love the Iranian bomb – the best things in life after all are free.
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