In a major ruling, the Supreme Court of Nepal declared that the Constituent Assembly’s term could only be extended beyond its two years’ mandate on two grounds: One, in the event of a national emergency, and the other as a ‘doctrine of necessity’, implying additional time to complete constitution-making. It also declared that the earlier constitutional extension was invalid as it violated article 18A of the interim constitution.

The Supreme Court ruling has effectively shaken the political and forced them to take the tasks of constitution-making and the integration of Maoist combatants more seriously. However, going by the political discourse over the last two days, it is apparent that they are nowhere near any political reconciliation. The Nepalese Congress (NC) is sticking to its ten-point agenda, with a focus on a national-consensus government and completion of the integration process. In this, they are supported by the Oli and Madhav Nepal groups of CPN (UML), United Democratic Madhesi Front and other smaller parties, including the splinter group of the Madheshi Jannadhikar Forum-Republic (MJF-R), which split from MJF-Nepal on Monday, an act for which India is being held responsible by the UCPN (Maoists).

In addition, the Maoists are playing a game of brinkmanship, and for two reasons. One is their belief that the NC is at best grandstanding and will eventually come around as the end of the CA would signify the end of the 2006 political framework; a risk which the politically weak NC may avoid. Second are the perceived fractures within the UCPN (Maoists). With Bhattarai supporting a more flexible line as opposed to Mohan Baidya’s harder stance, which supports the readying of cadres for a people’s struggle, the maneuvering space for Prachanda is becoming increasingly limited. There is also a concern regarding a premature reconciliation of the combatants’ issue which will run to ground the struggle for democracy of previous years and force the Maoists out of their present position of leading the political formation. To say therefore that the Maoists have a vested view of democracy will not be out of place.

Given the prevailing climate, three scenarios can be suggested to avert further chaos:
Scenario A: Complete the task of drafting the constitution in the next three days; a tall order by any standards. Alternatively, at least get a basic agreement on the integration of Maoist combatants, in particular the deposition of arms under the Special Committee. In the absence of this basic step no forward movement is possible.
Scenario B: Use the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to extend the CA, but conditionally lay out timelines for the completion of integration, deposition of arms with the Special Committee and completion of constitution-drafting within the given time schedule. This step is important as in its absence and given the political line up at the moment, for the ruling combine to muster a two-third majority is near impossible. This calls for a high degree of political pragmatism and spirit of mutual accommodation.
Scenario C: is what this paper calls a brinkmanship scenario. With the above two options looking increasingly difficult, the only option will be the dissolution of the CA and imposition of Presidents’ rule. Whether the President has the power to do so is being hotly debated; however, it must be noted that in the case of a persistent deadlock of four years, there will probably be no option left but to dissolve the CA and put in place a national all party government, with the backing of the Nepalese Army to maintain law and order. This is not an easy option. It will certainly see a reaction from the Maoists who could walk out and threaten to launch a people’s struggle. This is a bleak and almost improbable, but not impossible scenario, given the internal dynamics of UCPN and fighting within the pro-democracy and people’s struggle groups.

Interestingly, two players who have largely maintained a low profile for the last year or so will now be called upon to play a major role as the scenario heads for a standoff. These are the Nepalese Army and the President of Nepal. The Nepalese Army has so far behaved exemplarily and stayed out of the controversy, even offering to absorb up to 5000 combatants in the combined Army-Maoist force, subject to meeting minimum (diluted) conditions. This is a scenario that will most certainly plunge Nepal into chaos and must therefore be averted at all costs.

The common perception is that despite differences, a spirit of political survival will prevail and in all probability, a solution along the lines of Option B will be reached through a last minute consensus. In this hour all friends of Nepal should encourage political parties to head towards the path of reconciliation.