The P-5 Visits and India’s Nuclear Energy Programme
04 Jan, 2011 · 3311
Tanvi Kulkarni discusses the nuclear component of the five high profile visits to India in 2010
The race to enter India’s nuclear power market is on. India has been gaining recognition as a responsible nuclear weapons power and, more significantly, expanding its nuclear commerce. Not all the deals that India wanted have fructified; but, a scramble for entering India’s nuclear power industry was a notable feature of the visits made by the leaders of the major nuclear powers of the world to India in 2010.
Beginning in July 2010, India hosted high profile visits from the P-5 countries (Britain, the US, France, China and Russia, in that order). Their leaders came with huge trade and business delegations and offers of multimillion dollar deals to ‘create jobs back home’ and ‘make money’. India’s nuclear energy requirements have opened up a $150 billion market for nuclear power reactors and fuel, which provides immense scope for foreign firms to gain nuclear business in India. Apart from commercial logic, political factors and diplomatic leveraging have also dictated what each country has obtained from the giant Indian nuclear pie.
Ban on nuclear exports to India (a non-NPT state) and the unwillingness of previous Labour Party Governments has been responsible for the low level of UK-India nuclear commerce. In July 2010, UK’s Conservative Party Prime Minister, David Cameron, assured that he would approve export licenses for civilian nuclear technologies being transferred to India and enable British firms like Rolls Royce and Serco to do nuclear business with India. No announcement however was made on advancing the India-UK joint declaration on nuclear cooperation. However, BARC signed a joint nuclear research programme with UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research.
Having signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) ahead of US President Obama’s four-day visit in November, India hoped to reassure US nuclear power firms on the supplier liability aspects. Pending further negotiations, India’s Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) has not yet allotted specific nuclear projects to Westinghouse and General Electric. Obama was left to celebrate the deal and reiterate both countries’ commitments to a nuclear weapons-safe and weapons-free world. While supporting Indian membership of the four export control regimes (NSG, MTCR, Australia Group and Wassenaar), he demanded a firmer Indian stand against Iran’s nuclear activities. Singh and Obama also floated the idea of a dialogue between nuclear weapons powers to reduce nuclear weapons.
French President Nicholas Sarkozy visited India in the first week of December. Four nuclear agreements were signed during his visit: Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and French Nuclear Safety Authority renewed their agreement on exchanging technical information and regulating nuclear safety; there were agreements on technical cooperation between AERB and French Institute of Radiation Protection and on Protection of Confidentiality, and, most significantly, a Framework Agreement between Areva SA and NPCIL for constructing two of six nuclear reactors at Jaitapur in Maharashtra along with supply of uranium fuel and a reprocessing facility. The French have shown keenness to deepen commercial nuclear relations with India despite the liability concerns.
The nuclear component was missing in the talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, when he visited India the week following Sarkozy’s visit. Nuclear antagonism and China-Pakistan nuclear relations continue to mar any prospects for Sino-Indian civil nuclear cooperation. The Joint Communiqué did not go beyond reiterating commitments to global nuclear disarmament. Anxious not to heighten existing tensions with China, no clarifications were sought on the Sino-Pakistan nuclear deal. Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao confirmed that India would be tackling the issue “through existing international mechanisms”.
The Russian President’s visit in December was an opportunity to accelerate Indo-Russian civil nuclear relations. India’s nuclear liability clause was expected to affect the state-backed Russian companies the least. However, just prior to his visit, Medvedev made it clear that although India’s signing the CSC would not assuage Russian concerns it would not affect their commitment to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to India. According to the agreement signed between Prime Ministers Putin and Singh in March 2010, Russia is slated to construct sixteen nuclear reactors in India. Agreements for Kudankulam 3 and 4 were not signed; an indication that the Russians do not want to be left behind in influencing India’s nuclear policies to accommodate their own interests. The joint statement called on both countries to consider civil nuclear energy ventures in third countries.
India is energy starved and has an attractive nuclear power market. Nuclear research is an area where cooperation with major powers is advancing. India is inviting support for establishing the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. Negotiations with the US, French and the Russians highlight how each perceives its bilateral commercial nuclear relations with India, especially with regard to India’s civilian nuclear liability law. France moved ahead of the others with the Areva-NPCIL agreement. Indian nuclear diplomacy would have to do more on the American and Russian fronts. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG waiver have allowed India to approach countries like Japan and South Korea for civilian nuclear deals. India should use the existing nuclear business relations and effective diplomacy to further expand its nuclear commerce.